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This dissertation reexamines the critical orthodoxies of postmodern American 
literature by attending to the everyday objects that populate the worlds of narrative texts 
written from the 1960s to the first decade of the new millennium. Whereas the majority 
of literary and cultural critics, from Fredric Jameson to Linda Hutcheon to K. Anthony 
Appiah, argue that postmodernism can be best understood in terms of a commitment to 
the demystification of social arrangements that seem natural, this project proposes that 
what makes literature postmodern is a dedication to the ongoing material construction of 
the social. Beginning with the most mundane items in works of fiction by Leslie Marmon 
Silko, Don DeLillo, John Barth, Toni Morrison, and others, “Postmodern Materialism” 
charts the complex interactions of vast arrays of subjects and objects in the assembly of 
social groups. The resulting inquiry offers two important benefits: 1) a new approach to 
postmodernism in general through a rereading of postmodern fiction; 2) a unique 
methodology for assessing the relationship between things and people that reveals the 
fluidity of, and thus the possibility for remaking, our social structures. By showcasing the 
simplest components of the social, the project of postmodernism can be seen, I maintain, 
as calling our attention not so much away from ourselves and our preoccupations as 
toward the material world that we all share. Such a shift in consideration does necessitate, 
however, a theoretical movement away from human essence as the gravitational center of 
our social relations, thus precluding an overly reductive comparison between people that 
more often than not results in the exclusion, alienation, or marginalization of individuals 
and groups based on actual or perceived differences. Along these lines, I conclude that 
postmodern fiction is especially well-suited for a critical remaking of the social because it 
is attuned to the ways in which the social is constantly being fashioned by the world of 
material objects. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION: POSTMODERNISM IS NOT POSTMATERIALISM 
 
 
In their academy-award winning film Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind 
(2004), director Michel Gondry and screenwriter Charlie Kaufman assemble a cinematic 
narrative that tests the boundaries of memory and consciousness. Protagonist Joel Barish 
(Jim Carrey) falls in love with the zany and mercurial Clementine Kruczynski (Kate 
Winslet), but the relationship eventually turns sour and Clementine undergoes a memory-
erasing procedure to wipe Joel from her mind entirely. When Joel discovers that he has 
been erased, he decides to reciprocate and have Clementine erased from his memory. The 
doctor instructs Joel to go home and retrieve every object, memento, and keepsake of any 
kind that might remind him of his relationship with Clementine so that these items can be 
used to construct a map of Joel’s brain, which will enable the doctor and his technicians 
to locate the relevant memories of Clementine and delete them. Joel returns with art 
supplies, coffee mugs, potatoes he and Clementine had dressed as people, two garbage 
bags full of things. The technician situates Joel in a chair topped with a brain scanner that 
resembles a hair dryer at a salon, sets the first object down in front of him—a snow 
globe—and asks him to “react” to the object. Joel begins by explaining that there is a 
funny story that accompanies the snow globe, but the technician interrupts and says that 
he will actually get a better read out if Joel refrains from any verbal explanations of the 
thing and simply focuses on the memories. Speech, in this scenario, is unnecessary 
2 
because the objects alone are enough to generate the necessary brain activity to create the 
map. The objects are essential to Joel’s memories because they were central to the actions 
and events from which those memories were formed. Without the objects the initial 
events would not have happened and the memories themselves would not exist in the first 
place. 
Much like the snow globes, coffee mugs, and potatoes that shape and then 
ultimately become material manifestations of Joel’s relationship with Clementine, our 
lives are populated with everyday material things that are not merely symbolic of our 
social interactions but also constitutive of them. Without these seemingly mundane 
objects the organization of our experiences would be entirely different. This potential 
difference—the possibility of an alternative social arrangement in light of the 
significance of things—is a prevalent theme in the literature of the postwar period in the 
United States. And yet, in considerations of an era typically identified with the Beat 
movement, the counter-cultural revolution, protests on college campuses, the Cold War, 
and the alleged “end of history,” the material circumstances of daily life often take a back 
seat to the more sensational conflicts over information and ideas. But are these more lofty 
and abstract movements, uprisings, and rebellions not the products of everyday 
interactions between people and things? The chapters that follow offer a rationale and a 
methodology for reconsidering writers and texts from this so-called “postmodern” age at 
a time when postmodernism, as such, seems at best to be fading from our critical 
vocabulary, or, at worst, to have become for many a prime example of our failures to 
effect true social and political change. This reappraisal is grounded in the materiality of 
3 
everyday life, and intended to uncover an important connection between the circulation 
of things and people in relation to one another. The results offer two important benefits: 
1) a new approach to postmodernism in general through a rereading of postmodern 
fiction; 2) a unique methodology for assessing the relationship between things and people 
that reveals the fluidity of our social structures. 
This project takes its title from two familiar theoretical terms: “postmodernism” 
and “materialism,” both of which have had an indelible impact on literary and cultural 
criticism over the last half century. Postmodernism is an infamously amorphous and 
contentious word, used endearingly as often as it is disparagingly. In studies of literature 
and culture this term tends to designate a body of texts characterized by the zeitgeist of 
deconstruction, demystification, and experimentation.
1
 However, one fundamental 
element has been all but overlooked in such conversations: the importance of the material 
world in postmodern literature. Unlike postmodernism, materialism is, on the surface at 
least, a more conventional concept. In the Western tradition, materialism has typically 
denoted two schools of thought: classical antiquity’s “ontological question about the 
basic stuff of the universe and how it is organized” and the European Enlightenment’s 
“experimental method of the new physics and its refusal of non-material explanations of 
physical processes” (Frow 26-27). In the twentieth century, Marx’s influence on literary 
theory has led to the evolution of an historical and cultural materialism that—while 
insightful and indispensable—has shifted materialist inquiry from the material domain of 
“basic stuff” to the forces of economic and social production as the building blocks for 
the structures of society.
2
 While certain writers and texts in the postwar era have been 
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tagged with the postmodern label, discussion of materialism in this literature has focused 
on demystifying the social forces such as race, class, and nation that supposedly produce 
culture rather than on the material constitution of the social itself.
3
 Thus, in reexamining 
the critical orthodoxies of postmodernism in light of the “basic stuff” that provides 
“material explanations” for the social, “Postmodern Materialism: Things, People, and the 
Remaking of the Social in Contemporary American Narrative” shows that an attunement 
to the material objects of everyday life and their roles in shaping relations among people 
is what makes fiction postmodern. 
For all their mundanity, everyday things have a long and complicated 
philosophical résumé. And so it seems fair to ask, what do I mean by things? John Frow’s 
references to classical antiquity and the European Enlightenment above suggest what 
James Knapp and Jeffrey Pence state explicitly in their special issue of Poetics Today 
entitled “Between Thing and Theory” (2003): “the ‘thing itself’ is among the most 
seductive and elusive notions in the history of Western metaphysics” (654). Even if we 
were to confine ourselves to studies of the “thing itself” in the twentieth century alone we 
would be forced to grapple with everything from Bertrand Russell’s chapters on the 
existence and nature of matter in The Problems of Philosophy (1912) to Martin 
Heidegger’s 1950 lecture on “Das Ding” eventually translated and published as “The 
Thing” in Poetry, Language, Thought (1971) to Donald Winnicott’s psychoanalytic 
theory of “transitional objects” in Playing and Reality (1971).
4
 More recently and closer 
to home in the world of literary and cultural studies, theorists such as Susan Stewart, Bill 
Brown, and Barbara Johnson have considered the effects of things in the interactions 
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among human subjects. Where Stewart is concerned primarily with collections and 
souvenirs, Brown with a theory of things, and Johnson with a philosophy and poetics of 
subjectivity and objectivity, I want to look at the literal, material things of everyday life 
themselves.
5
 When I reference things, objects, stuff, or the materiality of everyday life, 
what I mean are the Coke bottles, balls of twine, socks, baseballs, toy drums, cigarette 
butts, target arrows, and rings that populate the worlds of the fictional narratives under 
investigation.
6
 I avoid overtly symbolic things such as photographs, artistic things such as 
paintings or sculptures, propertied things such as houses or land, and things typically 
scrutinized by psychoanalysts such as Winnicott or Jacques Lacan as objects of desire, 
transference, or loss.
7
 I focus instead on the kinds of things that do not appear to carry 
such obvious cultural or aesthetic significance. Thus, postmodern materialism is not 
merely an exercise in interpreting the social as it is represented in things, but an 
explication of what a character in Walter Abish’s novel How German Is It? (1979) calls 
the “thingliness intrinsic to all things” (19 original emphasis). While many studies of 
things in themselves are philosophical attempts to better understand human subjects in 
juxtaposition to nonhuman objects, I am interested in what the “thingliness” of things 
tells us about the larger social networks in which all subjects and objects live and operate. 
Rather than following the philosophical and sociological approaches of so many 
theorists who have set out to understand postwar literature, I do not begin with the social 
phenomena I think may provide an explanation for the order of things. For instance, 
many literary critics turn to important writers such as Guy Debord and Jean Baudrillard 
and their work on media, Jean-Franҫois Lyotard and his theory of the master narrative, or 
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Fredric Jameson and his cultural logic of late capitalism, but I turn to everyday things, 
most recently popularized as a method of inquiry by thinkers such as Brown and Johnson 
in literary studies, and perhaps most notably Bruno Latour in the realm of social and 
science studies.
8
 The reason for this methodological about-face is that, as Latour has 
modeled in his assessment of sociological theory, I want to avoid confusing what I 
“should explain with the explanation” (8). In other words, when we direct our attention to 
the material domain of the texts that we have been told often takes the deconstruction of 
familiar social categories as its primary aim, what we discover is that postmodern fiction 
is not invested in the preexistence of these categories in the first place. Instead, fiction 
often characterized as postmodern is most interested in the literal construction of the 
social out of the various material objects that populate its narrative worlds. The social, 
then, is always a product that is being made and remade by the arrangement and 
rearrangement of material objects and human subjects into unique and fluid networks. 
The great insight of postmodernism is not so much that our social collectives are 
constructed out of some abstract forces and ties and thereby fake or somehow inauthentic, 
but that the social is constructed out of literal materials and therefore open to 
reconstruction.
9
 
To chart the construction of the social from its most ordinary material components 
is to describe the very events and entities that we often rely upon to explain other 
phenomena. That is, to begin with the most quotidian of objects and interactions is to 
explain the power of the social rather than taking that power for granted as an unseen 
force that orders associations between things and people. This methodological 
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commitment grows out of a principal tenet in the work of Michel Foucault, one that he 
articulates with lucid concision in Les Mots et les choses, literally translated Words and 
things, but published under the English title The Order of Things. In his chapter on 
“Representing,” Foucault distinguishes between two basic forms of comparison: that of 
measurement and that of order. “Measurement,” Foucault explains, 
presupposes that […] one considers the whole first and then divides it up into 
parts. […] Order, on the other hand, is established without reference to an exterior 
unit […] one cannot know the order of things ‘in their isolated nature,’ but by 
discovering that which is the simplest, then that which is next simplest, one can 
progress inevitably to the most complex things of all. (53) 
 
 
Mapping the construction of social aggregates, I follow Foucault’s theory of order, 
keeping in mind the difficulties of this task as enumerated by Latour. After all, as Latour 
has noted, 
no one was more precise in his analytical decomposition of the tiny ingredients 
from which power is made and no one was more critical of social explanations. 
And yet, as soon as Foucault was translated, he was immediately turned into the 
one who had ‘revealed’ power relations behind every innocuous activity. 
(Reassembling 86n original emphasis) 
 
 
The translation of Les Mots et les choses itself might be read as first-rate evidence of 
Latour’s observation, but in reexamining the critical orthodoxies of postmodern literature 
“Postmodern Materialism” resurrects Foucault’s methodology of order by working from 
the most simple of objects to the dizzying complexity of social collectives. 
I reassess the most important theoretical components of postmodernism through a 
materialist reading of postmodern fiction, which I conceive of as an inductive analysis of 
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texts that begins with mundane, everyday material objects as actors in the formation of 
larger and more multifaceted social networks. In his seminal study A Sense of Things: 
The Object Matter of American Literature, Brown offers a strong rationale for troubling 
the boundaries of Marxist materialism in particular when he describes the “gambit” of his 
work as the tradeoff of “sacrific[ing] the clarity of thinking about things as objects of 
consumption, on the one hand, in order to see how, on the other, our relation to things 
cannot be explained by the cultural logic of capitalism” (5-6). But he also points out that 
a key factor prompting his study is the question of “why literary critics, historians, and 
anthropologists might have turned their attention to things in the midst of the ‘abstraction 
[that] increasingly determines our lives’—an updated, intensified version of the 
abstraction said, by Simmel and others, to characterize modernity” (19). Having just 
spoken of Henry James’s representation of material objects in The American Scene 
(1907) as a prefiguring of the “postmodern fate of the object,” and “the artistic 
reproduction of ‘objects as they’re felt, not as they are,’” it seems safe to infer that Brown 
imagines the fiction and theory of postmodernism as the apotheosis of modernity’s 
abstractions.
10
 Brown’s implicit, and at times explicit, characterization of a 
fundamentally abstract postmodernism—cultural instead of material—should be no 
surprise given the legacy of Debord, Baudrillard, Lyotard, and Jameson, who assert that 
postmodernism renders all experience cultural.
11
 Whereas critics like Linda Hutcheon 
have offered the counterargument that the very work of postmodern theory and fiction is 
to reveal that everything has always been cultural,
12
 I reread postmodern fiction to argue 
that postmodernism construes culture itself as a product of material arrangements, and 
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more specifically to propose that postmodernism is not, quite literally speaking, 
postmaterialism. 
But if a materialist reading as I define it asks us to reimagine the entire critical 
discourse of postmodernism, then why retain postmodernism as a framework at all? Why 
not simply dispense with this clunky term and its attendant problems and blaze an 
entirely new materialist trail? There are two primary reasons for continuing to utilize this 
fraught aesthetic and historical marker. First, one common thread that weaves its way 
through nearly every critical discussion of postmodernism is the idea of social 
construction. That is, the concept of social construction has dominated the fictional and 
theoretical discourse of postmodernism to the extent that the two terms have nearly 
become synonymous. Michael Bérubé, for instance, wrestles with the ambiguity 
surrounding postmodernism by exclaiming with some resignation that “it’s hard to 
determine the relevant facts and features of pomo when so much of pomo has questioned 
how ‘facticity’ is constructed” (122). I maintain postmodernism as a useful framework 
because the recognizable body of texts that seems committed to enacting this idea of 
constructedness specially enables us to ask an important question that has heretofore gone 
unasked: constructed out of what? If our facts, our social categories, our knowledge of 
past and present are all constructed, then what are the materials out of which they have 
been and are being constructed? It is my contention that there is an identifiable tendency 
to emphasize the significance of everyday material objects as constituent actors in the 
construction of the social in much of the fiction published from the late 1960s to the end 
of the century. 
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Second, my readings suggest that postmodern fiction offers a distinctive 
representation of the relationship between material objects and human subjects in the 
literary history of the United States. Whereas, by and large, most of American literature 
up through the first half of the twentieth century seems to imagine objects and subjects as 
inherently and ontologically different, fiction of the postwar era envisions the relationship 
between the two more in terms of Latour’s useful questions about the role of subjects and 
objects in the formation of social ties. “The questions to ask about any agent,” Latour 
insists, “are simply the following: Does it make a difference in the course of some other 
agent’s action or not? Is there some trial that allows someone to detect this difference?” 
(Reassembling 71). Postmodern fiction asks and answers these questions regardless of the 
nature of the agent, rendering it especially well suited for a remaking of the social 
because it is dependent not on ethereal social forces or preexisting social categories, but, 
to borrow a term from Latour, on the human and nonhuman “actors” that constitute the 
Social. 
 
The Agency of Objects 
 
From the earliest exploratory voyages to the most recent novels, the literature of 
the United States abounds with all kinds of objects that carry special significance: 
merchantable commodities in Thomas Harriot’s exploration narrative; portrait miniatures 
in the early novels of Charles Brockden Brown and Lydia Maria Child; the preaching 
license so long withheld from William Apess; Frederick Douglass’s root; Nathaniel 
Hawthorne’s scarlet letter; the spoils of Henry James’s Poynton; Susan Glaspell’s trifles; 
William Carlos Williams’s red wheelbarrow; Ralph Ellison’s calfskin briefcase; August 
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Wilson’s piano; the things carried by Tim O’Brien’s Vietnam platoon; the myriad 
personal items unearthed in the rubble of the World Trade Center towers in novels of the 
last decade by Ken Kalfus, Claire Messud, Jay McInerny, and others. From the mundane 
to the symbolic, these everyday objects play significant roles in the experiences of the 
characters who make, buy, give, use, and lose them. And yet, throughout most of this 
literary history, there is a common tendency to view objects and human subjects as 
ontologically different. That is, objects have primarily been conceptualized as inert and 
essentially subject to the agency of human beings. Sometimes that distinction is 
naturalized and not an explicit element of textual discourse. At other times it is used as an 
explicit means of denying the rights and privileges of personhood to certain groups of 
people.
13
 In other cases still it is an overt feature of the literary aesthetic, for instance, in 
the modernist poetics of H.D., Pound, and Williams. In one of the most insightful 
moments of his introduction to A Sense of Things, Brown rereads William Carlos 
Williams’s famous dictum “no ideas but in things” by insinuating that this battle cry 
should be regarded as 
a slip of the pen: a claim—on behalf of replacing abstractions with physical 
facts—that unwittingly invests objects with interiority, whereas Williams meant 
to evacuate objects of their insides and to arrest their doubleness, their vertiginous 
capacity to be both things and signs (symbols, metonyms, or metaphors) of 
something else. (11) 
 
 
Here lies the essence of literary modernism, and yet I would argue that the disjunction 
Brown reads in Williams’s maxim is perhaps even more representative of the modernist 
mode than the pronouncement itself. That is, at the heart of much American literature up 
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through the first half of the twentieth century we find an elemental split between ideas 
and things, between subjects and objects. However, when we come to the fiction of 
postmodernism, this divide becomes much less of a chasm and more of a question, 
begging us to rethink our relationship with the material world. 
This reexamination of postmodernism in light of the material accomplishes at 
least two important goals. First, it demonstrates that postmodernism is not an abstract, 
immaterial aesthetic, but resolutely material in its commitment to the importance of 
everyday objects. Everyday materiality is crucial because it shows that the social 
networks formed by the interaction of human and nonhuman actors can be reformed into 
different configurations to enfranchise the marginalized, or perhaps at least to dilute the 
chorus of existing narratives of the social. Rather than merely revealing that the cultural 
logic of late capitalism drives the society of the spectacle and holds us hostage to the 
precession of simulacra, postmodern fiction demonstrates the material possibility of 
remaking society. Thus, the second major goal of this project is to add a material 
dimension to Hutcheon’s, Paul Maltby’s and others’ assertions that postmodern fiction is 
relentlessly political and not apolitical, isolationist, or merely playful. Hutcheon claims 
that postmodernism denaturalizes political structures that seem hegemonic (Politics 34), 
and Maltby posits that despite its “institutional base” in the academy, postmodernism has 
the power to subvert dominant political discourse (18-19). I would add that an attention 
to postmodernism’s preoccupation with the materiality of everyday life extends and 
revolutionizes these arguments by breaking them free from the chains of existing political 
and social structures to which they are currently beholden, and further, offering the 
13 
rearrangeable mundane objects of postmodern fiction as the basis for this aesthetic’s 
political efficacy. 
If objects are going to serve as the simplest and most basic constituents of the 
social in this treatment of postwar literature, then we must also be willing to attribute to 
them some form of agency, resistance, or singularity. Philosophical discussions of the 
agency of objects tend to differentiate between those mired in human determination and 
those that retain some independence from human meaning. The former are typically 
classified as “objects” and the latter as “things.” Most famously, perhaps, Heidegger 
discusses the thing in juxtaposition to the object in his essay “The Thing,” where he calls 
on a clay jug as his primary example. In its ability to stand on its own, the vessel is 
characterized, for Heidegger, by “the self-supporting independence of something 
independent” and thus it “differs from an object.” He goes on to explain that “when we 
take the jug as a made vessel, then surely we are apprehending it—so it seems—as a 
thing and never as a mere object” (166-67). Brown’s pioneering essay “Thing Theory” 
carries this philosophical discussion into the realm of literary theory, not through a jug, 
but through a window in A.S. Byatt’s novel The Biographer’s Tale. Brown concentrates 
on a dirty window that causes one of Byatt’s characters to look at, instead of through, the 
glass. “We begin to confront the thingness of objects,” Brown postulates, “when they 
stop working for us: when the drill breaks, when the car stalls, when the windows get 
filthy, when their flow within the circuits of production and distribution, consumption 
and exhibition, has been arrested, however momentarily” (4). I often use the terms 
“object” and “thing” interchangeably to denote literal items because of the tediousness of 
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the language and because most of these items can be understood in both philosophical 
senses in their respective texts. However, I have chosen the word “Things” as the 
designator for the material in my title because it is the independence of things, their 
capacity to resist human determination, to stand alone, to contain stories that is most 
illuminating when attempting to account for their agency as we move from the simplest 
to the most complex arrangements of subjects and objects in the remaking of the social. 
By framing my analysis with material things and not a theoretical concept such as 
poststructuralism or deconstruction, or a typical social marker such as class or nation, I 
am able to trace the circulation of everyday things throughout and across narratives to see 
what kinds of social collectives get constructed rather than looking to the texts to ask 
what they can tell us about seemingly prefabricated communities. Thus, each analytical 
venture into the world of a given text focuses on a specific object or set of objects and 
works inductively from these things to discern how the social is being made and remade. 
What becomes apparent as this methodology is employed across the corpus of 
postmodern fiction is that the very idea of making and remaking the social is the bedrock 
of postmodernism’s theory of social relations. Paradoxically, then, fluidity is the 
constant. Because this phenomenon is pervasive throughout so much of the fiction 
published in the second half of the last century, I have chosen to focus on a handful of 
texts that I submit are representative both historically and aesthetically. From the 
denaturalizations of race, gender, class, and nation that saturate postwar literature to the 
experimental and metafictional writings of the 1960s and 1970s, to the historiographic 
metafiction popularized in the 1970s and 1980s, to the representations of the so-called 
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end of history in the 1990s and beyond, this project calls on a cross section of novels and 
stories to demonstrate the importance of material things across the historical and aesthetic 
landscape of postmodern fiction. This selection of primary texts includes narratives that 
demonstrate successful remakings of the social as well as narratives in which the promise 
of remaking proves elusive as people and things sometimes settle back into the 
parameters of familiar social categories. While the former brand is perhaps the more 
pleasurable of the two, the latter is typically more stark and forward in its representation 
of the potential of the material as the benefits of material remaking are withheld in favor 
of maintaining the status quo. Both forms heighten the role of things in the organization 
of the social lives of people. 
Although this material methodology does not originate with my inquiry into the 
everyday things of postmodern fiction, this study extends the recently-dubbed “new 
materialism” conversation in literary studies in at least two substantial ways. First, an 
attention to the “object matter of American literature,” as Brown calls it, has not been 
carried into the postwar era. Despite its self-proclaimed emphasis on “providing a 
prehistory of consumer subjectivity and agency” and “the discursive processes through 
which commodities first became identified as privileged vehicles of subjective expression 
and civic identification,” Lori Merish’s path-breaking Sentimental Materialism: Gender, 
Commodity Culture, and Nineteenth-Century American Literature (2000) offers 
illuminating treatments of a variety of “domestic artifacts” from the late eighteenth 
through the mid-nineteenth centuries (2, 90). Brown’s A Sense of Things (2003) provides 
the fullest enactment of his new materialist “thing theory,” articulated in the article of the 
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same name, and in other venues such as the interdisciplinary collection Material Powers: 
Cultural Studies, History, and the Material Turn (2010). Brown’s analyses, although 
partially pitched in response to the perceived abstraction of late twentieth-century fiction 
and theory, focus on late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century American writers such 
as Mark Twain, Sarah Orne Jewett, and Henry James. And in the philosophically-
flavored Persons and Things (2008), Barbara Johnson extends the consideration of things 
into the world of literary modernism with her treatment of the “self-consciously 
unpoetic” objects in Marianne Moore’s poetry (28 original emphasis). In my treatment of 
writers that span the historical and aesthetic plane of postmodern fiction, from John Barth 
to Leslie Marmon Silko to Don DeLillo, I push this discussion into a literary period as yet 
unexamined by this new materialist methodology. 
 
The Social Is Not a Substance 
 
This study also extends the “new materialism” of literary studies by building on 
Brown’s claim that a new materialism has arisen “that is irreducible to Marxism” (“The 
Matter” 60) and John Frow’s assertion that “the writings of Marx thus have little to do 
with the traditional preoccupations of philosophical materialism” (“Matter” 29). This 
project fills a gap in theorizing social relations created by the movement away from 
Marxist social theory. Far from being a mere historical extension of “new materialism” in 
general or of Brown’s “thing theory” in particular, “Postmodern Materialism” analyzes 
everyday things in contemporary fiction in order to get out from under the weight of 
existing social categories. For when we undertake an analysis of any text, whether it be 
literary, legal, theological, if we begin that process with the framework of a familiar 
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social category such race, nation, class, or gender, then we may come up with a new way 
of understanding the category, but we will ultimately still end up within the parameters of 
the category. Thus, I focus the analytical chapters of this study on the mundane, 
everyday, quotidian interaction of objects and subjects to see what kinds of material 
configurations lead to the formation of social structures, rather than starting with the 
social structures themselves. One distinctive benefit of this attention to the material is that 
it redirects what cultural capital the concept of postmodernism may have left toward the 
reconstructive agency of postmodern fiction. 
This literary methodology owes a great debt to the sociological work of Latour, 
especially his influential Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-
Theory. The weight of Latour’s work in Reassembling the Social rests on a subtle yet 
significant distinction between two basic approaches to understanding the relations we 
call social. The first approach he calls the “sociology of the social” and the second he 
calls the “sociology of associations.” Under the sociology of the social, society or the 
social order is a “domain of reality” distinct from “other domains such as economics, 
geography, biology, psychology, law, science, and politics” (3). This approach imagines 
the social as a phenomenon, a force, a substance that can be used to explain other 
phenomena, and it has dominated sociology for the last century becoming “common 
sense not only for social scientists, but also for ordinary actors via newspapers, college 
education, party politics, bar conversations, love stories, fashion magazines, etc.” (4). 
Under the sociology of associations, on the other hand, there exists no “social force,” no 
substance that we might identify as social. Instead, the social is what is gathered by other 
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kinds of material connectors, hence actor-network-theory. Latour articulates the 
distinction succinctly early on: 
whereas sociologists (or socio-economists, socio-linguists, social psychologists, 
etc.) take social aggregates as the given that could shed some light on residual 
aspects of economics, linguistics, psychology, management, and so on, these 
other scholars, on the contrary, consider social aggregates as what should be 
explained by the specific associations provided by economics, linguistics, 
psychology, law, management, etc. (5 original emphasis) 
 
 
This distinction leads Latour to value material objects, or what he calls “nonhuman 
actors,” equally with human actors in an effort to account “for how society is held 
together, instead of using society to explain something else” (13), and also privileges the 
idea of “worknets” as an optimal model for conceptualizing the social where “it’s the 
work and the movement, and the flow, and the changes that should be stressed” (143). 
What happens when we stop treating the social as a preexisting substance whose presence 
can help us account for the way things are, and start investigating the material 
interactions and relations of human and nonhuman actors? 
“Postmodern Materialism” considers the ramifications of this approach for 
literary analysis if not by continuing to develop the familiar social categories that are 
often used as frames for reading literature (i.e. what can this text tell us about race, class, 
etc.), then by tracing an explanation for the social and its fluid networks predominantly in 
the material domain of postmodern fiction. The essential problem with treating the social 
as a definable substance is that it necessitates a certain level of stasis. In other words, to 
assume that the social is comprised of different categories such as race, class, nation, and 
gender is to imagine it as a rubric whose dimensions are established and well-known. 
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There is no getting outside the rubric. The only variation possible can be found in the 
extent to which the rubric is fulfilled. Mapping this framework onto the things and people 
that make up the social unavoidably paints them into static corners where we claim to be 
able to know, understand, and define race in its entirety, gender in its entirety, and so on. 
This method is the “measurement” mode of comparison mentioned earlier by Foucault, 
and it cannot account for either the daily or epic change that the literature of the postwar 
period is said by many to represent. Thus, instead of treating the social as a substance, I 
redirect our critical gaze from the larger categories that we generally think of as making 
up the social to the more quotidian and simple things whose movements and interactions 
can account for the constant formation of the social itself. 
The resulting analysis leads to a redefinition of postmodernism in general and 
postmodern fiction in particular as a new materialist aesthetic committed to the making 
and remaking of the social. However, I am not prepared to jettison the crucial lineage of 
postmodern philosophy and theory handed down from the pivotal thinkers mentioned 
earlier, including Baudrillard, Lyotard, and Ihab Hassan, Jameson, Andreas Huyssen, and 
Hutcheon. Each of these influential critics has suggested in his or her own way that what 
makes a literary text postmodern is its capacity to revisit existing political and social 
structures. For Baudrillard, postmodernism reveals a nostalgic longing for a past that does 
not exist, while Lyotard sees postmodernism as a critique of such nostalgic master 
narratives. Some, like Jameson, believe this repetition to be politically impotent, while 
others, like Hutcheon, regard this return as a complicit yet critical subversion of dominant 
political ideologies. In each of these cases, what makes literature postmodern is its 
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capacity to critique, deconstruct, demystify existing social narratives and structures, and 
this capacity is valuable. However, when we reexamine the social as “worknet” 
composed of various actors, what becomes apparent is that the critical, deconstructive 
power of postmodern fiction is actually the product of its constructive capacity. In other 
words, it is only the making and remaking of ever-unique and fluid social networks that 
renders the static categories obsolete. Thus, I am not denying the demystifying powers of 
postmodernism as outlined by influential and insightful theorists; I am merely asking us 
to reconsider such definitions in light of the material construction of the social 
fundamental to the postmodern project and evidenced especially in fiction. 
This redefinition resonates closely on some levels with Brian McHale’s interest in 
postmodern fiction as representative of a shift in what he calls the dominant.
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than concerning itself primarily with epistemological questions, postmodern fiction, 
McHale argues, is predominantly invested in questions of ontology. His seminal 1987 
study Postmodernist Fiction illustrates this argument in a flurry of illuminating readings 
that trace the literary trajectories of Beckett, Robbe-Grillet, Fuentes, Nabokov, Coover, 
and Pynchon across multiple texts within each writer’s corpus. McHale convincingly 
demonstrates a discernible shift from a prevailing attention to questions about knowledge 
to questions about being. Somewhat similarly, my own inquiry is focused more so on 
“what is there,” or the ontological, rather than on “how we know it,” or the 
epistemological. The significant difference between our respective studies is that McHale 
remains interested in the ontological as an abstract mode of philosophical inquiry, while I 
am interested in the ontic realm, the literal being of material actors, both nonhuman and 
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human. Ultimately, where most critics and philosophers define postmodernism as a 
critique of naturalized social and political structures or a revelation of dominant cultural 
modes, I define postmodernism as a material construction of the social, and contend that 
these subsequent critiques and revelations are the products of this construction, much like 
existing generations of iPhones are only rendered obsolete by the development of new 
generations of iPhones. 
The implications of this reexamination of the critical discourse of postmodernism 
also reach beyond the realm of literary studies and beyond the twentieth century, where 
we find critics looking back on this seemingly outdated concept. At the turn of the 
millennium, for instance, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri extend Jameson’s “cultural 
logic of late capital” and Daniel Bell’s characterization of postmodernism as coextensive 
with post-industrialism to build the case that 
the postmodern situation is eminently paradoxical when considered from a 
biopolitical point of view […] On the one hand, in this situation all the forces of 
society tend to be activated as productive forces; but on the other hand, these 
same forces are submitted to a global domination that is continually more abstract 
and thus blind to the sense of the apparatuses of the reproduction of life. (64)
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Hardt and Negri consider the political implications of what they call postmodernization 
as one stage in the dialectical “succession of economic paradigms since the Middle Ages” 
where the global economy has shifted away from its modern foundation built on industry 
to a more abstract and immaterial foundation of services and information (280). Under 
this rubric, postmodernism is just as immaterial as it seems in the literary theory of 
Jameson or Hutcheon. It is this postmodernism that Terry Eagleton imagines as the 
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denouncement of “dreams of ambitious change […] as illicit ‘grand narratives’” (45). 
However, if we turn our critical gaze away from the ethereal “forces” of power and 
toward the literally-material constitution and construction of such forces then the 
attendant problems of this postmodernization process can be better understood or even 
remedied. When we follow Foucault and Latour and no longer substitute “an invisible, 
unmovable, and homogeneous world of power for itself” (Reassembling 86), when we 
look instead at the hosts of human and nonhuman actors that compose the networks that 
make up our social world, we will be able to see the possibilities for remaking those 
networks.
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The material promise of remaking the social also has the capacity to contribute to 
any number of critical conversations regarding race, class, nation, and gender without 
merely reifying these categories as static and making them organizing principles of a 
literary and theoretical study. While some have leveled criticism at postmodern 
conceptions of class, as we have seen in the works of the Marxist critics above from 
Jameson to Eagleton to Hardt and Negri, others have criticized postmodern theories of 
race, gender, and nation for casting such markers as mere linguistic constructs. In her 
1994 review of Kwame Anthony Appiah’s In My Father’s House: Africa in the 
Philosophy of Culture, Jayne Chong-Soon Lee summarizes Appiah’s ontology of race as 
something that cannot be analyzed “from within frameworks that already assume 
biological difference” (753). Lee complains that, for Appiah, “any conception of race that 
is significant is really just culture in disguise” (770). She goes on to charge that the “most 
important weakness of Appiah’s dismissal of race is that in declaring biological and 
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essential conceptions of race useless and dangerous, he fails to recognize that race is 
defined not by its inherent content, but by the social relations that construct it” (772). But 
Lee does not take into account Appiah’s theory of the “manufacture of otherness” that I 
take up in Chapter 2 and which actually provides a more grounded theory of race than the 
“social relations” upon which Lee relies. Addressing the same problem in broader terms, 
Rey Chow has offered the more nuanced argument that the language of theory and of 
poststructuralism in particular has had a profound effect on “multiculturalism, 
postcoloniality, and ethnicity” and that “in the face of the practical struggles that go on 
daily against different forms of social injustice, it is, for many, unacceptable to declare, in 
accordance with poststructuralist theoretical logic, that these versions of X do not exist” 
(178, 180). She goes on to diagnose our political and intellectual climate: 
The conundrum we face today in the wake of theory may thus be described as 
follows: In their attempts to argue the specificity of their objects of study, critics 
of marginalized historical areas often must rhetorically assert their resistance to or 
distrust of Western theory. (180) 
 
 
But in each of these cases a materialist reading can revolutionize the legacy of Western 
theory in the second half of the twentieth century by demonstrating the value and 
reconstructive agency of even the most mundane objects. 
If the social can be reconsidered as a fluid network of material interactions as 
opposed to a collection of forces that disenfranchise and marginalize, then what becomes 
clear is that the social configurations that result in disenfranchisement and 
marginalization can be remade through the reorganization of their material components. 
If everything human and nonhuman is, to use Latour’s terminology, a mediator instead of 
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an intermediary,
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 then altering the relationship between even the most ordinary objects 
can have a serious impact on the larger networks in which those objects operate. Locating 
the material at the supposedly absent center of postmodern fiction transforms our 
understanding of this body of literature by uncovering its generative and constructive 
potential. Rather than serving as representative of the need for deconstruction, critique, 
and demystification, a materialist reading of postmodern fiction reveals these approaches 
to be facets of a larger constructive process in which the social is being constantly made 
and remade as a fluid network of human and nonhuman actors. Thus, change is possible 
because all actors are significant, not because the configurations of actors are fake, 
inauthentic, or purely linguistic. 
 
The Social In Process 
 
“Postmodern Materialism” also adds a material dimension to the theory of social 
construction by demonstrating how the fiction of the last half century relies especially on 
the significance of everyday objects in its remaking of the social. Novels such as Silko’s 
Ceremony and Marilynne Robinson’s Housekeeping enact the remaking of the social 
despite the best laid plans of characters who seek to maintain the status quo. DeLillo’s 
Underworld, Julia Alvarez’s How the García Girls Lost Their Accents, and Toni 
Morrison’s Jazz chart the circulation of things and people in the assembly of social 
networks that renders familiar social categories obsolete, or at least less potent. Fiction by 
Barth, David Foster Wallace, and Jonathan Lethem bogs down in its attempts to remake 
the social, highlighting the supreme tragedy of allowing the possibilities of the material 
domain to remain unrealized. From the earliest text, Barth’s Lost in the Funhouse (1968) 
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to the most recent text, Lethem’s The Fortress of Solitude (2003), the fiction I identify as 
postmodern exhibits a unique relationship between material objects and the everyday 
lives of the characters who come in contact with them. These texts imagine this 
relationship as especially fluid because of their vision of material objects as coextensive 
with human subjects in the construction of the social and because of the significance they 
allot to material objects as the constituent elements of the otherwise ethereal forces we 
imagine as constitutive of the social. Each of the chapters is thus organized around 
movements of ideas and things rather than around a central text or author. The first 
moves from critique to construction; the second from otherness to what I call inclination; 
the third from poststructuralism to postmodernism; and the fourth from knowledge to 
experience. This arrangement suggests that there are no abstract power structures that 
exist “out there” somewhere. Instead, there are only material structures that are made, and 
thus can be remade to enfranchise the marginalized or at least to dilute the influence of 
existing narratives of the social. 
Along these lines chapter 1, “Recollecting the Social: From Critique to Critical 
Construction” argues that postmodern fiction shifts the locus of social relations from 
human essence to the material interactions of human and nonhuman actors through its 
reconstruction of familiar social categories such as race, nation, and gender. Here I focus 
on collections of everyday objects compiled by characters in Silko’s Ceremony (1977) 
and Robinson’s Housekeeping (1980) to show that what becomes apparent in any close 
reading of postmodern fiction is that it is not merely critical or deconstructive. In other 
words, postmodern critique is not essentially a matter of revealing that the social 
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collectives we perceive as natural are, in fact, constructed. The central problem I take up 
in this first chapter is that “constructed” is more often than not taken to mean fake, 
inauthentic, unnatural, or artificial. But when we turn to the material objects that populate 
the worlds of Silko’s and Robinson’s novels we find concrete actors participating in the 
formation of these naturalized categories. The consequences of familiar social markers 
such as race and nation are certainly real, so why should we conceptualize the markers 
themselves as artificial? My contention is that postmodern fiction does no such thing. 
Instead, and with much more proficiency than has been recognized to date, 
postmodernism provides a material, process-oriented way of thinking about the social 
phenomena that such familiar categories attempt to express. This materialist, in-process 
approach accounts for the significance of all human and nonhuman actors in the constant 
construction of social collectives, from the Coke bottles collected by one of Silko’s 
characters to Ruth, the protagonist of Robinson’s novel, to the socks collected by Ruth’s 
grandmother. 
Working in conversation with well-known postmodern theorists and scholars of 
Native literature alike, Chapter 1 also reads Silko and Robinson to demonstrate the 
importance of minimizing the distinction between human and nonhuman actors in the 
assembly of the social. In the Euro-American literary tradition, this idea is relatively 
unique to the postmodern mode. However, critics such as Paula Gunn Allen and Craig 
Womack and novelists such as Silko and Linda Hogan reveal that facile distinctions 
between “manmade” and “natural” things have oftentimes been of little importance in the 
traditions of Native writers. In Ceremony and Housekeeping the elevated recognition of 
27 
material objects collected by various characters reveals a constant networking, or 
gathering of things that indicates the social is always under construction, even when some 
characters may be actively working to preserve the status quo. These collections are not 
only representative or symbolic of the materialist brand of social construction I have in 
mind here, but are also active agents in making and remaking the social along with the 
characters in the novels. 
Chapter 2, “Narrating the Social: From Otherness to Inclination,” charts the 
circulation of two specific material objects in novels by DeLillo and Alvarez to reread 
“otherness” as a classic feature of postmodern discourse. Whereas Chapter 1 concentrates 
on collections of objects to demonstrate the obsolescence of familiar social categories in 
the face of in-process networks, this chapter zeroes in on two singular things to show that 
otherness, or difference more generally, is the product of material inclinations between 
actors. Following the trajectories of these objects through their respective texts reveals 
that a central feature of postmodern fiction is its valuation of the material even at the 
level of the narrative. While opponents and proponents of postmodernism seem to agree 
that one of its most important characteristics is a celebration of difference, a materialist 
reading of this fiction shows that “otherness” is not foundational but a constantly-remade 
effect of ever-shifting arrangements, or inclinations, of actors in relation to one another. 
DeLillo and Alvarez both structure their novels, in part, around material objects, and in 
the process create connections between a variety of entities that defy the stratification of 
the social into essentially different and preexisting categories, spheres, or strata. Rather 
than investing in difference as an organizing principle for understanding the social and 
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thus perpetuating essentializing naturalizations of various groups, postmodern fiction 
privileges the material domain, uncovering a fluid network of human and nonhuman 
actors that can challenge and reconstruct dominant narratives of the social. 
Both DeLillo’s Underworld (1997) and Alvarez’s How the García Girls Lost 
Their Accents (1991) also feature significant shifts in narrative voice as components of 
their material remakings of the social. The end of each novel makes a sharp transition to a 
second-person perspective, implying that a network model of postmodern materialism 
even has the capacity to diminish the distance between the worlds of writer, narrator, and 
reader. In Underworld, the reader is allowed to fill in gaps in the circulation of a souvenir 
baseball that the characters cannot close, and DeLillo capitalizes on our complicity by 
turning to “you” at the novel’s end. Alvarez explicitly turns her narrator toward the 
reader by having her speak to “you” as she draws her narrative to a close in the literal 
hollow space of a toy drum. Each of these turns relies on the reader’s knowledge and 
understanding of the material object and identifies not a fundamental difference between 
the world of the novel and the world in which the novel is read, but an attempt, as Roland 
Barthes says, to “abolish (or at least to diminish) the distance between writing and 
reading” (“From Work to Text” 162). 
Pointing out the closing gap between writer, text, and reader is certainly not 
original to postmodern materialism. However, adding a material component to this 
metafictional convention invests all human and nonhuman actors with the necessary 
agency to become true mediators. Chapter 3, “Writing the Social: From Poststructuralism 
to Postmodernism,” concentrates on material objects in Barth’s metafictional classic Lost 
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in the Funhouse (1968) and Wallace’s rewriting of Barth’s title story in his novella 
“Westward the Course of Empire Takes Its Way,” originally published in the short story 
collection Girl With Curious Hair (1989). Barth and Wallace both experiment with 
typically postmodern styles of writing by calling attention to the process of writing itself, 
resulting in extremely self-aware narratives. But rather than approaching this self-
reflexivity as the epitome of postmodernism’s supposedly poststructuralist critique of 
structuralist systematicity, I turn to the material domain of these stories to see what 
interpretations present themselves when we consider the less overtly-linguistic 
characteristics of these texts. Once again, we find that postmodernism is not synonymous 
with a purely theoretical, poststructuralist critique of oppositional hierarchies and closed 
systems because it is busy stressing the work, movement, flow, and changes amongst 
human and nonhuman actors. 
Barth’s and Wallace’s commitments to the centrality of everyday material objects 
such as bee bobs, glass bottles, target arrows, name-coins, and stoves ultimately shift the 
substance of postmodern fiction from abstract language play to material networks. Thus, 
the readings in Chapter 3 are designed to frustrate the conflation of postmodernism and 
poststructuralism, if not to dilute the power of language, then at least to make it into one 
factor in a larger material network rather than the ultimate stuff of knowledge and 
experience. It is postmodern fiction’s investment in the significance of all human and 
nonhuman actors that renders them reconstructive agents. When all actors are significant 
agents, the disenfranchisement and marginalization of certain individuals or groups 
cannot be blamed on ambiguous “social forces” or nebulous “social structures” because 
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such vague ties do not exist. The social is not a substance. Instead, in the networked 
relations of postmodern materialism, the problem can be traced back to identifiable 
interrelations between actors responsible for making and remaking the social. 
Postmodernism’s valuation of material objects as co-participants with humans in 
the construction of social networks calls for a unique inquiry into the ontology of the 
social. Rather than feeding the flames of disputes over epistemic relativism, lack of truth, 
or the absence of meaning, I propose postmodern fiction exhibits a stubborn 
unwillingness to bracket the existence of the material world in favor of a meditation on 
knowledge and experience. Extending the critical convention that postmodernism favors 
ontology over epistemology, Chapter 4, “Remaking the Social: From How We Know to 
What Is There,” argues that postmodern fiction enacts more than a mere shift in 
philosophical questions. Tracing the influence of a single type of object, a ring, across 
novels by Morrison and Lethem, this chapter asks: What if postmodern fiction does not 
set out simply to bring “social forces” to light as constituted by material objects? What if 
these narratives are also invested in actively remaking the social as a network out of the 
various human and nonhuman actors that populate the worlds of these texts? What would 
such a remaking look like? Morrison’s Jazz (1992) and Lethem’s The Fortress of 
Solitude (2003) both feature rings that participate in the formation of networks in which 
human actors ultimately own up to their agency in forming the social, and thus offer ideal 
opportunities to answer these questions. 
The supreme difference between the formation process in each novel is that while 
Morrison’s ring joins human actors in the successful remaking of the social, Lethem’s 
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ring is relegated to a less significant role in the network at various times throughout the 
narrative. The resultant contrast between the social networks that get constructed in each 
text is both sharp and revealing. Morrison’s novel uncovers the generative power of the 
material domain by rendering its nonhuman actors participants. That is, when all actors 
are recognized and valorized in consideration of their roles in the cultivation of relational 
networks, then a remaking of the social becomes possible. But when the material domain 
is bracketed in deference to the abstract musings of human actors alone, as in Lethem’s 
novel, the top-down, familiar social categories that so often determine the lived 
experience of people are reinforced. The perpetuation of the social as a substance 
ultimately nullifies any remaking of the social. Lethem’s novel closes this study, then, to 
leave us with a powerful image of the consequences of neglecting the significance of the 
material domain in postmodern fiction as his characters bog down and settle into the 
familiar roles predetermined for them by the strictures of race and class. 
This study finally demonstrates that what underlies the project of postmodernism 
as it has typically been defined over the last few decades is not merely an absent center, a 
nostalgia for a past that does not exist, or a critique of all that seems natural. Instead, 
“Postmodern Materialism” uncovers a complex and fluid web of things and people whose 
relations are forever alterable, changing, in-process. Literature of our new millennium 
seems so far to extend this materialist aesthetic by continuing to remake the social in 
ways unimaginable even during the last half century. Early twenty-first century narratives 
such as Lethem’s suggest that at least some writers see the possibilities as well as the 
dangers of allowing those possibilities to go unrealized. Other writers such as Jonathan 
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Safran Foer (Everything is Illuminated, Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close), Nicole 
Mones, (A Cup of Light), Colson Whitehead (John Henry Days) and Sherman Alexie 
(Ten Little Indians, especially “Do Not Go Gentle”), have also carried the significance of 
everyday things into the new century, and although a full treatment of these texts is not 
possible here, at least one common feature can be traced across these narratives and many 
others written around this time. In each instance material things play an important role in 
the formation of a community that does not conform to the well-established parameters of 
any familiar social category. And yet, none of these texts dismisses the effects of 
nationality, race, age, or gender. Postmodern materialism does not render the 
consequences of preexisting categories null and void. As a matter of fact, one of the 
central benefits of reading postmodern fiction in this way is that it provides a material 
means of redressing these effects by offering marginalized characters the opportunity not 
only to work within existing systems of power, but also, since systems of power do not 
exist apart from their material making, it offers the realization that their actions change 
the social structure itself. This reality has always been the case but many have not been in 
a position to see, and so this project sets out to illuminate things, people, and the potential 
for remaking the social in literature of the postwar era.
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Notes 
 
 
1
 From its earliest invocations in the discourse of literary criticism, postmodernism has been represented as 
an exercise in critique. In a 1959 essay published in Partisan Review and treated at length in the next 
chapter, Irving Howe argues that, “at least in our time, the novel seems to lend itself irrevocably to the 
spirit of criticism” (429). Looking back on the emergence of postmodern fiction in his influential 1991 
study Dissident Postmodernists: Barthelme, Coover, Pynchon, Paul Maltby observes that “in the 1960s a 
number of critics, notably Leslie Fiedler, Ihab Hassan, and Susan Sontag, welcomed postmodernism as a 
species of subversive writing” (17). Linda Hutcheon theorizes postmodernism as a “complicitously critical” 
mode, one that can’t help but perpetuate the problems it sets out to parody, critique, and ironize (The 
Politics 34, 94-101). 
 
2
 Working in direct conversation with Marx and Engels’s The German Ideology and A Contribution to the 
Critique of Political Economy, Terry Eagleton articulates the thrust of Marxist materialism in his seminal 
1976 study Marxism and Literary Criticism: “The social relations between men, in other words, are bound 
up with the way they produce their material life. Certain ‘productive forces’ –say, the organization of 
labour in the middle ages—involve the social relations of villain to lord we know as feudalism. At a later 
stage, the development of new modes of productive organization is based on a changed set of social 
relations—this time between the capitalist class who owns those means of production, and the proletarian 
class whose labour-power the capitalist buys for profit. Taken together, these ‘forces’ and ‘relations’ of 
production form what Marx calls ‘the economic structure of society,’ or what is more commonly known by 
Marxism as the ‘base’ or ‘superstructure’” (2-3). Thus, Marxist materialism is interested in the “social” 
relations whose literally-material constitution remains unexamined. I turn our attention to the material 
composition of these “relations.” 
 
3
 See, for instance, the only title to combine postmodernism and materialism, Postmodern Materialism and 
the Future of Marxist Theory: Essays in the Althusserian Tradition, in which editors Antonio Callari and 
David F. Ruccio offer a collection of essays that “find echoes in postmodernism” and offer a new Marxism 
that “retain[s] a focus on class, but [does so] on different grounds and in a different way. Its specific 
contributions would continue to be found in its analyses of the class aspects of social practices in capitalist 
(and other) social formations. It, however, would negotiate the relations between class and nonclass aspects 
of social processes in a quite different way, assigning a strategic, not tactical, function to the proposition 
that social beings and processes are multidimensional and multiplicitous” (3). Thus Callari’s and Ruccio’s 
“postmodern materialism” continues to rely on the immaterial social “processes,” rather than offering a 
material explanation for the processes themselves. 
 
4
 Russell opens his second chapter by asking, “is there a table which has a certain intrinsic nature, and 
continues to exist when I am not looking, or is the table merely a product of my imagination, a dream-table 
in a very prolonged dream? […] For if we cannot be sure of the independent existence of objects, we 
cannot be sure of the independent existence of other people’s bodies” (9). Russell identifies a certain 
material equanimity between things and people with regard to their physical existence, and goes on to 
consider the ethical importance of sense-data in establishing the presence of physical objects as it relates to 
our ultimate responsibilities to one another. Martin Heidegger considers a similar question: “what is the 
thing in itself?” in his discrimination between a “thing” and an “object”: “Plato, who conceives of the 
presence of what is present in terms of the outward appearance, had no more understanding of the nature of 
the thing than did Aristotle and all subsequent thinkers. Rather, Plato experienced (decisively, indeed, for 
the sequel) everything present as an object of making. Instead of ‘object’—as that which stands before, 
over against, opposite us—we use the more precise expression ‘what stands forth.’ In the full nature of 
34 
 
what stands forth, a twofold standing prevails. First, standing forth has the sense of stemming from 
somewhere, whether this be a process of self-making or of being made by another. Secondly, standing forth 
has the sense of the made thing’s standing forth into the unconcealedness of what is already present. 
Nevertheless, no representation of what is present, in the sense of what stands forth and of what stands over 
against as an object, ever reaches to the thing qua thing. The jug’s thingness resides in its being qua vessel” 
(168-69). Thus, for Heidegger, a thing is not its manmadeness nor its self-madenes, but the void that it 
holds as the jug’s thingness is defined by the space into which liquid is poured. The maker shapes the sides 
and bottom but cannot shape the actual void. Donald Winnicott most famously exposits his concept of 
things in relation to people in the well-known Playing and Reality (1971). In this touchstone 
psychoanalytic work, Winnicott develops his theory of the transitional object, which most of us know as 
the security blanket. For Winnicott, this object aids in an infant’s transition away from oral fixation on 
fingers and fists. “I have introduced the term ‘transitional objects’ and ‘transitional phenomena,’” 
Winnicott writes, “for designation of the intermediate area of experience, between the thumb and the teddy 
bear, between the oral erotism and the true object-relationship, between primary creative activity and 
projection of what has already been introjected, between primary unawareness of indebtedness and the 
acknowledgment of indebtedness” (2). 
 
5
 Stewart breaks important new ground in her 1993 study On Longing: Narratives of the Miniature, the 
Gigantic, the Souvenir, the Collection, in which she argues at one point that “the souvenir magically 
transports us to the scene of origin, but the collection is magically and serially transported to the scene of 
acquisition, its proper destination. And this scene of acquisition is repeated over and over through the serial 
arrangement of objects in display space. Thus, collected objects are not the result of the serial operation of 
labor upon the material environment. Rather, they present the seriality of an animate world; their 
production appears to be self-motivated and self-realized. If they are ‘mad,’ it is by a process that seems to 
invent itself for the pleasure of the acquirer. Once again, an illusion of a relation between things takes the 
place of a social relation” (165). Bearing echoes of Heidegger’s “The Thing,” Stewart’s analysis make a 
connection between things and people in her reference to the social, but she subordinates the role of things 
to that of people, a substantial point of divergence between her analysis and mine. Bill Brown’s seminal 
“Thing Theory” essay, first published in a special issue Critical Inquiry in 2001 devoted to “Things” has 
laid the foundation for much of the so-called “new materialist” work in literary studies over the last decade. 
However, as Knapp and Pence have argued that Brown’s work, along with the other essays that appear in 
the special issue, “do not ground their inquiry in things but, rather, consider the concept of things—and 
specific examples that can be seen to represent the concept—in theoretical terms” (653). Barbara Johnson’s 
Persons and Things (2008) is a brilliant meditation on the personhood of things and the “thingliness” of 
persons, ultimately concerned with understanding things as means of grappling with the “difficulty in being 
sure that we treat persons as persons. In other words, the relations between persons and things might be the 
norm in human relations already and not the object of an impossible quest. A study of persons and things 
might reveal all the ways we already treat persons as things, and how humanness is mired in an inability to 
do otherwise” (2). Although my own methodology takes a different approach, there are important 
resonances between Johnson’s fundamental concern with human relations and my own investment in the 
fluidity of those relations. 
 
6
 I address the distinction between “thing” and “object” fundamental to any discussion of things throughout 
the history of philosophy at length in chapter 1, and at other moments throughout the study. Bill Brown 
offers an especially illuminating review of the literature on this subject in his seminal “Thing Theory” 
essay published in the special issue of Critical Inquiry devoted to “Things” in the Autumn of 2001. 
 
7
 I discuss Winnicott’s “transitional object” briefly in note 4. As for Lacan, in The Four Fundamental 
Concepts of Psycho-Analysis, which constitutes Book XI of his Seminar, he imagines the object, or objet 
petit a, as the thing to which the subject opposes itself and thereby finds its place in the larger order of 
things (62-63, 73). Or, in Slavoj Žižek’s description of our material existence in reality in relation to 
parallax: “Materialism means that the reality I see is never ‘whole’—not because a large part of it eludes 
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me, but because it contains a stain, a blind spot, which indicates my inclusion in it.” He continues, 
“Nowhere is this structure clearer than in the case of Lacan’s object petit a, the object-cause of desire. The 
same object can all of a sudden be ‘transubstantiated’ into the object of my desire: what is just an ordinary 
object to you is to me the focus of my libidinal investment, and this shift is caused by some unfathomable 
X, a je ne sais quoi in the object which can never be pinned down to any of its particular properties. L’objet 
petit a is therefore close to the Kantian transcendental object, since it stands for the unknown X, the 
noumenal core of the object beyond appearances, for what is ‘in you more than yourself’” (18-19). 
 
8
 Guy Debord analyzes and attacks the omnipotence of media representation in his 1967 classic Society of 
the Spectacle, while Baudrillard most famously takes up meaning and the media in Simulacra and 
Simulation. Lyotard’s theory of the master narrative was first translated into English in the 1984 edition of 
The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, and Fredric Jameson’s influential theory of 
postmodernism as the cultural logic of late capitalism was first published as an essay in the New Left 
Review in 1984, and then in book form in 1991 by Duke. Barbara Johnson’s Persons and Things was 
published in 2008, but Bill Brown’s “thing theory” has been, by far, the most influential critical wave of the 
so-called “new materialism.” Brown defines his unique brand of materialism in the 2001 special issue of 
Critical Inquiry, reprinted as the introduction to his collection Things, the latter of which features an essay 
by French sociologist and science studies theorist Bruno Latour. Latour’s Reassembling the Social: An 
Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory, challenges existing theories of the material, and has proven 
foundational to this study. 
 
9
 I offer extensive treatment of the concept of social construction in chapter 1. The most important point at 
stake here is that “constructed” should not be conflated with unnatural, inorganic, unreal, or inauthentic. 
 
10
 Brown’s language here bears the marks of Fredric Jameson’s seminal claim that in the postmodern era 
“the producers of culture have nowhere to turn but to the past: the imitation of dead styles, speech through 
all the masks and voices stored up in the imaginary museum of a now global culture” (Postmodernism 17-
18). Jameson’s argument builds on Debord’s, Baudrillard’s, and Lyotard’s claims regarding postmodernism 
as fundamentally cultural, meaning that “reality” or “the real” is not a matter of, well, matter, but of socio-
economic and cultural convention. My argument is that socio-economic and cultural conventions are 
products of the constant fluctuation of material networks comprised of both human and nonhuman “actors,” 
to borrow a term from Latour. 
 
11
 As James A. Knapp and Jeffrey Pence, editors of “Between Thing and Theory,” a special issue of Poetics 
Today, have argued, “In scholarly fields as diverse as our own specializations—early modern culture and 
film studies—a widespread trend has emerged consisting in the privileging of the historical record as 
corrective to the vagaries of interpretation and the allegedly unproductive reflexivity that is often associated 
with the influence of French intellectual thought—especially that of Jacques Derrida, Jacques Lacan, and 
Michel Foucault but also of Jean-Franҫois Lyotard, jean Baudrillard, Giles Deleuze and Félix Guattari—on 
the literary and cultural theory of the 1970s and 1980s” (642). Thus, across the board the work of theorists 
and philosophers most often identified with literary postmodernism has been understood as vague, ethereal, 
abstract, immaterial, in need of a more concrete corrective. 
 
12
 Hutcheon’s argument is articulated most lucidly in The Politics of Postmodernism (34), although she also 
takes up this problem in her earlier and more definitional A Poetics of Postmodernism: “Postmodernism 
teaches that all cultural practices have an ideological subtext which determines the conditions of the very 
possibility of their production of meaning” (xii-xiii). 
 
13
 In her 1824 novel Hobomok, A Tale of Early Times, Lydia Maria Child employs a portrait miniature of 
Mary Conant’s beloved as a significant motif intended to stand in for the man himself in his absence: 
“Brown’s miniature was not forgotten; and as it lay before her, she could think of nothing, only that the 
form, which once could boast so much dignified beauty, was now unshrouded and uncoffined in the deep, 
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deep ocean” (123). In this instance, material objects are important symbols acting as tools and conduits for 
the thoughts and feelings of human subjects. In contrast, the “discourse of humanism,” as Saidiya Hartman 
points out, necessarily led to the objectification of black bodies throughout the legal history of the U.S. and 
in narrative texts such as Harriet Jacobs’s Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl (1861), and also transformed 
“declarations of slave humanity” into “brutal exercise[s] of power upon the captive body rather than 
ameliorating the chattel condition” (Scenes of Subjection 5). And, moving into the twentieth century, 
Charles Johnson says of Richard Wright’s great achievement in Native Son that, “Every prop on the stage 
of this sustained, brutal thriller refers back to Bigger’s mind, to his special, twisted way of seeing. Nothing 
is neutral. Everything is charged by the broken heart and broken mind of a black boy reduced to a state of 
thinghood” (Being and Race 14). 
 
14
 McHale credits Jurij Tynjanov with the developing the concept of the dominant, but relies primarily on 
its articulation in the work of Roman Jakobson, in which the dominant is defined “‘as the focusing 
component of a work of art’” (6). McHale goes on to provide a rationale for the possibility of a plurality of 
dominants in any given discourse. He then catalogs the definitions of postmodernism in contrast to 
modernism offered by David Lodge, Ihab Hassan, Peter Wollen, and Douwe Fokkema to argue that “in all 
these cases, the oppositions tend to be piecemeal and unintegrated; that is, we can see how a particular 
postmodernist feature stands in opposition to its modernist counterpart, but we cannot see how 
postmodernist poetics as a whole stands in opposition to modernist poetics as a whole, since neither of the 
opposed sets of features has been interrogated for its underlying systematicity” (7). He then offers the 
concept of the dominant as a means of both eliciting “the systems underlying these heterogeneous 
catalogues” and of beginning “to account for historical change” (7). 
 
15
 In their monumental work Empire Hardt and Negri argue that the familiar imperialism perpetrated by the 
nation-state as the lowest common denominator in the world political system has been replaced by a new 
form of empire that is not reducible to the sovereignty of the nation-state: “In contrast to imperialism, 
Empire establishes no territorial center of power and does not rely on fixed boundaries or barriers. It is a 
decentered and deterritorializing apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates the entire global realm 
within its open, expanding frontiers. Empire manages hybrid identities, flexible hierarchies, and plural 
exchanges through modulating networks of command. The distinct national colors of the imperialist map of 
the world have merged and blended in the imperial rainbow” (xii-xiii). While Hardt and Negri may be 
somewhat overstating the decline of the nation-state as a locus of sovereignty on the global stage, the 
charges they level against postmodernism as a conceptual framework are legitimate and further highlight 
the benefits of a materialist reading as I have defined it. 
 
16
 The reference for Latour found in Reassembling the Social is included in the text. The footnote 
referencing Foucault in Latour’s work provides no specific referent to Foucault, however. I suggest the 
interview entitled “Truth and Power” that appears as the sixth chapter of the 1980 collection 
Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Writings 1972-1977. See especially his explanation of power 
and genealogy on pages 115-117. 
 
17
 I discuss Latour’s distinction at length in chapters 1 and 3, and at other times throughout the study, but 
for my present purposes Latour’s most basic definition will do: “An intermediary, in my vocabulary, is 
what transports meaning or force without transformation […] Mediators, on the other hand, cannot be 
counted as just one” (39). In other words a mediator is anything that has an effect on the other agents that 
come into contact with it, as opposed to an intermediary which is a mere conductor or conduit. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
RECOLLECTING THE SOCIAL: FROM CRITIQUE 
TO CONSTRUCTION 
 
 
Published in the summer 1959 issue of Partisan Review, Irving Howe’s “Mass 
Society and Post-Modern Fiction” marks a seismic shift in American literature and 
culture. In fact, the table of contents for that issue can be read as a microcosm of the 
changes taking place at the time as Howe’s essay is situated in between an essay by 
modernist stalwart Robert Penn Warren and poems by John Ashbery and Charles Olson, 
writers often recognized as forerunners of American postmodernism. In this early attempt 
to make sense of a new phenomenon in American fiction, Howe suggests that, like the 
modernist authors who set out to challenge the traditional values of the literature of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, these “post-modern” writers work against social 
assumptions in modernist novels. Howe says these emerging writers “recognize that the 
once familiar social categories and place-marks have now become as uncertain and 
elusive as the moral imperatives of the nineteenth century seemed to the novelists of fifty 
years ago” (426). In part, his point in calling attention to a modernist framework of 
“familiar social categories” is to introduce a new and unfamiliar “mass society” emerging 
in the late 1950s and early 1960s, a society that cannot be understood purely in terms of 
preexisting social markers such as class, nation, and religion. For Howe, what drives the 
emergence of literary postmodernism is the need to challenge these existing social 
narratives, and so he concludes that this new “post-modern” novel “seems to lend itself 
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irrevocably to the spirit of criticism” (429). This characterization of postmodernism as an 
inherently critical paradigm unable to complete its own project by offering alternatives to 
the “familiar social categories” it undermines has become a defining trait in both 
aesthetic and historical definitions of postmodernism.
1
 
From Howe’s 1959 essay to Hutcheon’s influential 1989 book The Politics of 
Postmodernism, the motive behind theorizing postmodernism as a rejection of familiar 
social categories has been noble. Critics have picked up on postmodern fiction’s impulse 
to push us away from essentializing narratives that seek to determine the status and 
potential of individuals based on the larger social collectives in which they live and 
operate. Along these lines, Hutcheon asserts that postmodernism is a paradoxical mode of 
“complicity and critique, of reflexivity and historicity, that at once inscribes and subverts 
the conventions and ideologies of the dominant cultural and social forces of the 
twentieth-century western world” (Politics 11). For Hutcheon, what makes fiction 
postmodern is its paradoxical participation in whatever dominant or naturalized cultural 
narratives it actually sets out to critique. As with Howe’s “spirit of criticism,” this 
paradox has evolved into a defining characteristic of almost any text we might be 
compelled to identify as postmodern. Hutcheon’s theorization of postmodern fiction as 
complicitously critical, so to speak, is integral to our understanding of the important 
political work these texts do because it provides a methodology for how they challenge 
conventional narratives dependent on familiar social categories. It is my contention, 
however, that this theorization is incomplete. Postmodernism’s critique of the naturalized 
is, in fact, part and parcel of an ongoing construction of the social. As Howe himself 
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implies, it was only the emergence of a new social structure that revealed the inadequacy 
of familiar social categories in the first place. 
Let me clarify by pointing out that it is not postmodernism itself that is an 
incomplete project, but our reading of postmodernism. Hutcheon maintains that 
postmodernism’s initial concern is to de-naturalize some of the dominant features 
of our way of life; to point out that those entities we unthinkingly experience as 
‘natural’ (they might even include capitalism, patriarchy, liberal humanism) are in 
fact ‘cultural’; made by us, not given to us. Even nature, postmodernism might 
point out, doesn’t grow on trees. (Politics 2) 
 
 
The value I see in this critical move is not its revelation that any “natural” cultural 
narrative is somehow artificial, but the way in which it levels the playing field by 
demonstrating that all such entities are equally “made by us, not given to us.” Thus, the 
work of postmodern fiction has the potential not merely to disprove dominant narratives 
but also to give voice to those who have traditionally been marginalized. Taking 
Hutcheon’s insightful reading of postmodernism in another direction, then, I would 
disagree with her conclusion that postmodernism lacks reconstructive agency. At the end 
of The Politics of Postmodernism, Hutcheon attributes postmodernism’s conflict with 
feminist criticism to the way it “manipulates but does not transform signification; it 
disperses but does not (re)construct the structures of subjectivity” and, more generally, 
the social world (168).
2
 On the contrary, I would argue that what makes texts postmodern 
is the reconstruction of narratives that does not depend solely on prefabricated ideas of 
the social but arises instead out of the very material world these narratives represent. 
Postmodern fiction may be complicitous as others have pointed out because it draws on 
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naturalized narratives in order to build alternatives among those already in existence. 
However, what is important to understand about postmodern literature is that it moves 
away from the static constructs we imagine as social categories and demonstrates that the 
social is actually a more complex and fluid matrix of networks by dwelling on the 
materiality of everyday life. 
So far we have seen that postmodernism has been charged by both early 
detractors like Howe and supporters such as Hutcheon with ineffectiveness on two fronts. 
First, in its irrevocably critical spirit, postmodern critique is forced to work within the 
confines of that which it intends to subvert, rendering this subversion complicit with, 
even accomplice to, its target. Therefore, it has been alleged that postmodernism cannot 
offer an alternative to what it attempts to expose. Second, mired in the endless recycling 
of the very narratives it seeks to dismantle, postmodernism has also been said to lack any 
substantial impact on the social. Concerned only with the critique of existing social 
categories, postmodernism lacks its own grasp of everyday life, and, therefore, any tie to 
the objectual materiality of the everyday. As such, it is an abstract and immaterial mode 
that cannot deliver because of its complicity with the status quo as well as its ceaseless 
reprocessing of old ideas. In response to such stances, this chapter makes a case for the 
effectiveness of postmodernism insofar as I contend that its critique does not operate 
directly on the “familiar social categories” with which it has typically been associated. 
Instead, and much more successfully than most critics will allow, postmodern critique 
both constructs and challenges social narratives as it works with and through the material 
domain of everyday objects. Thus, postmodern fiction is especially well-suited for a 
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critical remaking of the social as it is attuned to the ways in which the social is fashioned 
by the world of material objects. 
The idea of construction is nothing new to discussions of postmodernism, but the 
term most often used, “social construction,” has ironically reinforced conceptions of 
postmodernism as an immaterial philosophical endeavor committed only to demolition. 
On the surface, it seems obviously inconsistent to claim that a paradigm interested only in 
tearing down can also be defined by its commitment to building up. This disconnect 
arises from a fundamental misunderstanding of postmodern construction. Standing on the 
shoulders of Howe and early postmodern intellectuals such as Susan Sontag and Leslie 
Fiedler, most literary theorists have contended that what postmodernism teaches us is that 
our social categories have been socially manufactured. Hutcheon’s denaturalization of 
dominant narratives is a case in point, as is Satya P. Mohanty’s argument that the heart of 
postmodern literary and cultural theory is a constructivism that “may be defined most 
basically as the idea that all those epistemological norms which were so dear to the 
Enlightenment […] are no more than social conventions, historically variable and hence 
without claim to universality” (11). Whether intended or not, the result of such theories 
has been the equation of construction with artificiality. Latour has explained this 
misunderstanding by recalling the deflation of his excitement upon learning how 
colleagues in the social and natural sciences reacted to his theory of the assembly of 
social networks: “To say that something was ‘constructed’ in their minds meant that 
something was not true. They seemed to operate with the strange idea that you had to 
submit to this rather unlikely choice: either something was real and not constructed, or it 
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was constructed and artificial, contrived and invented, made up and false” (Reassembling 
90 original emphasis). Similarly, in an effort to avoid essentialism, literary theories of 
postmodernism have appropriated the word construction as a means of signifying that our 
social categories are artificial. If postmodern fiction simply reveals that our social 
categories and narratives are all equally artificial, then the stories these novels tell might 
be said to show that everything we know about the social is equally false, or, what 
amounts to the same thing, equally true. However, “constructed” should not be 
understood as a synonym for artificial, nor as an antonym for natural. 
Perhaps the most straightforward way to demonstrate that postmodernism’s brand 
of construction is not purely negative and immaterial is to answer the question: What is 
the stuff out of which the social gets constructed in the worlds of these texts? Postwar 
fiction turns to everyday objects as well as human subjects, or what David Herman calls 
“actants,” and the stories located in these actants, as building supplies out of which to 
assemble the social.
3
 Postmodern fiction makes and remakes the social through the 
networking of a vast array of these actants. That is to say, postmodernism moves from a 
merely intellectual social construction to a material construction of the social. Latour has 
pointed out that the traditional understanding of society as made up of enduring social 
ties—i.e. the social categories rejected by postmodernism—“begs the question of how 
and through which means this increase in durability has been practically achieved,” and 
he adds that “to jump from the recognition of interactions to the existence of a social 
force is, once again, an inference that does not follow from the premise” (Reassembling 
65). In fortuitous proximity to Herman’s use of the term “actants,” Latour asks that we 
43 
think of both human subjects and material objects as “actors, or more precisely, 
participants in the course of action waiting to be given a figuration” (Reassembling 71 
original emphasis). I contend that postmodern fiction overtly invites us to consider both 
objects and subjects as significant actors in the formation of the various networks of 
relation we identify as social. Specifically, postmodern fiction sets about building social 
networks, at least in part, out of things, stuff ranging from pencils, to pebbles, to 
placebos. The recent interest in such everyday objects as evidenced by the popularity of 
material culture studies and “thing theory” has encouraged us to consider the role that 
these inanimate objects play in the organization of the lives of animate subjects, but 
following Latour, the distinction between subject and object breaks down even further. 
Thus, I want to push the envelope (in hopes that it might push back) and look at a few 
texts that demonstrate the brand of construction intrinsic to postmodernism’s critique of 
naturalized narratives and familiar social categories. 
Both texts examined in this chapter, Silko’s Ceremony (1977) and Robinson’s 
Housekeeping (1980), have been excerpted, anthologized, and critically interrogated as 
representative of postmodern fiction insofar as they seem heavily invested in 
demonstrating that dominant understandings of identity markers such as nationality and 
gender are in fact constructed.
4
 But such treatments, either explicitly or implicitly, almost 
invariably conflate “constructed” with artificial, and thus miss out on the possibilities of a 
literal and material construction of the social. Thus, this chapter asks what these novels 
might reveal if we examine sets of material objects collected by their respective 
characters as representative and constitutive of the construction of the social. Silko’s and 
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Robinson’s novels are certainly not the only works of postmodern fiction concerned with 
the significance of everyday objects as the literal materials out of which the social is 
made. Thomas Pynchon’s protagonist Oedipa Maas is sent on a wild goose chase in part 
because of a stamp collection in The Crying of Lot 49 (1966). A.M. Homes’s The Safety 
of Objects (1990) includes stories such as “Looking for Johnny” that experiment with 
material objects as catalysts in relationships between characters that challenge and 
reconstruct gender. Nathaniel Mackey’s avant-garde saxophonist Lambert gathers an 
entire audience in a night club amongst the dispersed pieces of his disassembled 
instrument as the saxophone is recollected before their eyes in Bedouin Hornbook (1986). 
What becomes apparent when we open up our approach to the concept of construction to 
include the remaking of the social is that these texts are best read as displacing the locus 
of social connections from some human essence to material contexts of interaction 
between a wide array of actors. 
The problem is, paradoxically, both that construction gets represented as artificial 
and that, in turn, the resulting social categories produced are branded as natural. Silko 
demonstrates this problem in an essay first published in The Nation in 1994 in which she 
recalls various run-ins she has had with local, state, and federal officials when driving 
through states or crossing state lines in the U.S. Once while being detained she 
remembers realizing that the officers were profiling her and other travelers based in part 
on the various material objects that constituted their appearances: “White people who 
appear to be clergy, those who wear ethnic clothing or jewelry and women with very long 
or very short hair (they could be nuns) are also frequently detained; white men with 
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beards or men with long hair are likely to be detained, too” (“Border Patrol” 414). 
However, while it is things, the material stuff such as clothing and jewelry, that mark 
these various drivers and passengers as either “religious” or “ethnic” their social status is 
ultimately reduced only to the larger categories of race, religion, and gender. What is 
missing from this profiling tactic is the realization that the categories the officers believe 
will aid them in their job are actually constant products of the various material actors they 
almost unconsciously seek out. The officers’ techniques seem to indicate that the 
particular relationship a person has with her material surroundings determines her social 
identity, but their actions scream out that the larger and more familiar social category is 
the lowest common denominator. Silko’s novel accentuates this disjunction by resisting 
the reductive categorization of its mixed-blood protagonist Tayo as perpetually stuck 
between worlds of race and nation. As a whole, Ceremony reimagines whiteness, 
Nativeness, and Americanness as in-process markers of individual and collective identity 
as Tayo assembles his identity out of the various materials he encounters throughout the 
novel. Robinson’s novel lays bare the generational reconstruction of the nuclear family 
through two sisters who desire entirely different social experiences. But what is most 
compelling about Housekeeping’s reinvention of the family unit is that it is carried out 
through the character who is most passionately invested in attaining a stereotypically 
conventional home. 
 
No Ceremony Without Objects 
 
Ceremony has garnered a staggering amount of critical attention, ranging from 
Charles Larson’s early treatment in American Indian Fiction (1978), which Gerald 
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Vizenor calls “the first serious critical interpretation of published fiction by […] authors 
identified as Native American Indians” (Manifest 80),
5
 to Paula Gunn Allen’s “recover[y] 
of the feminine” in the novel in The Sacred Hoop (1992), to Rick Mott’s 2011 discussion 
of digitizing the novel for twenty-first century students (“Ceremony Earth”). At its best, 
this body of criticism attends to the novel’s and its characters’ “ability to interpret the 
patterns within changing cultural and historical contexts,” as Chadwick Allen has pointed 
out (172). At its worst, this conversation has turned to typically postmodern conventions, 
such as rewriting, to discuss the novel in terms of “the postmodern reality of hybridized 
traditions, mixed races, and crossed borders. Ceremony is neither entirely Indian-based 
nor completely western but a hybrid of both” (Spurgeon 76).
6
 The latter approach is 
especially problematic because although it asks us to reframe our understanding of the 
social categories on which those narratives and traditions depend, it is ultimately unable 
to do anything more than recycle these conventions because, like so many other 
treatments of postmodern fiction, it focuses on the clash of social forces as if they were 
substantive things holding definable groups together. If we focus on the idea of hybridity, 
we inevitably end up with static and familiar social categories because we begin with 
static and familiar social categories. Since the Native American literary renaissance, 
Native writers as diverse as Sherman Alexie in Indian Killer (1996) and Linda Hogan in 
Power (1998) have explicitly addressed this “between two worlds” approach to Native 
subjectivity.
7
 In the influential Red on Red (1999), Craig Womack proposes that novels 
like Ceremony amass such critical and popular attention because they focus on 
“reconnection to Native culture” as opposed to “posit[ing] that indigenous peoples 
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throughout the Americas will take back their land” as in Silko’s later novel Almanac of 
the Dead (11). He goes on to ask, “does the Native American literary renaissance, in 
addition to its many positive qualities, also play, in troubling ways, into the vanishing 
notion by allowing Native people to be fictional but not real?” (11). 
Womack’s concern with the realness of Native people as represented and read in 
Native American fiction cuts to the core of theorizing the relationship between Native 
writing and postmodernism because it exposes the problems that accompany the “social 
construction” of any identity. Womack purposefully avoids what he sees as the axiomatic 
skepticism of postmodernism in relation to Native history in Red on Red because, as he 
maintains, “it is way too premature for Native scholars to deconstruct history when we 
haven’t yet constructed it” (3).
8
 Silko herself does not seem keen on the relevance of a 
postmodern aesthetic to Native writing. In a review of Louise Erdrich’s The Beet Queen 
(1986), Silko criticizes Erdrich not for adopting what she sees as a postmodern prose 
style, but for attempting to use what she calls a “self-referential” style to “place her 
characters and action in places and points in history that are loaded with ‘referential’ 
significance” (“Review” 180). However, if we alter our view of postmodernism by 
moving away from deconstruction, demystification, and “the postmodern reality of 
hybridized traditions” (Spurgeon 76), and allow for a more material assemblage of 
categories such as “white,” “Native,” and “American,” then what becomes clear is that 
such groupings have always been under construction. To make this move is to embrace 
the proclamation of Silko’s mixed-blood, Navajo medicine man Betonie who expresses 
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the fluidity of Native culture and tradition by explaining: “You see, in many ways, the 
ceremonies have always been changing” (126). 
In Manifest Manners: Postindian Warriors of Survivance, Gerald Vizenor 
engages with Hutcheon’s theory of history as representation in The Politics of 
Postmodernism and Lyotard’s rejection of metanarratives in The Postmodern Condition 
to carve out a space for “tribal memories and the coherence of heard stories” (67). He 
defines this effort in terms of Native writing early on as the survivance and triumph of 
postindian warriors over what he calls manifest manners: 
Manifest manners are the simulations of dominance; the notions and misnomers 
that are read as the authentic and sustained as representations of Native American 
Indians. The postindian warriors are new indications of a narrative recreation, the 
simulations that overcome the manifest manners of dominance. (6) 
 
 
Similarly, in his “A Postmodern Introduction” to Narrative Chance: Postmodern 
Discourse on Native American Indian Literatures, Vizenor calls on Brian McHale’s 
articulation of postmodernism as a mode that creates new insights and coherence by 
generating more and more discourse, and goes on to argue that “Native American Indian 
literatures are tribal discourse, more discourse. The oral and written narratives are 
language games, comic discourse rather than mere responses to colonialist demands or 
social science theories” (4). Thus, for Vizenor postmodernism offers a generally useful 
approach for studying Native writing because it multiplies the meaning of “Indian,” 
allowing for infinite “recreations,” and thereby making it difficult to define Native 
Americans in static terms.
9
 Some critics of Native writing, such as Kimberly Blaeser, rely 
on Vizenor’s work insofar as it 
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check[s] the process of literary annihilation and free[s] Native American identity 
from the grasp of literary colonialism. He does this both by struggling against 
established literary and linguistic structures, practices, and images, and by 
working to create new ones: by undermining the colonial “strategies of 
containment” and replacing them with strategies of liberation. (73) 
 
 
Others, like Womack, acknowledge the value of Vizenor’s contribution on this front but 
also question whether or not there should be unlimited free rein in defining “Indian.” 
Referencing Vizenor’s theoretical faith in poststructuralism and postmodernism, 
Womack points out in a more recent essay that, “If all language is socially mediated, as 
some would claim, some native thinkers might respond, ‘Yes, but it is also mediated by 
others besides humans,’” and then asks, “Do we want to remove ‘Indian’ so far from its 
social reference that definitions are no longer possible?” (“A Single Decade” 65). I would 
answer that a theory of postmodernism that takes into consideration both Womack’s 
emphasis on “others besides humans” and his question about impossible definability 
might be able to account for the kind of fluid, yet not indefinable, conception of “Indian” 
that he envisions as ideal. In other words, postmodern fiction has the agency to 
accomplish the kind of political work that Womack and other critics see as invaluable to 
Native identity because of its investment in nonhuman actors, but this important aspect 
has been overlooked. I am not simply arguing that we should think of all Native writing 
as necessarily postmodern. Instead, what I am suggesting is that there is a significant 
overlap between a theory of postmodernism that accounts for the material and the unique 
interest of many Native fiction writers and critics in resisting the impulse to “privilege 
subject positions, that is, human perceptions” (Womack “Theorizing” 370). The 
relevance of materiality to both approaches leads to a recognition of the agency and 
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significance of nonhuman actors in the determination of human experience, which often 
manifests itself in the absence of facile distinctions between “manmade” and “natural” 
things. As the narrator of Linda Hogan’s novel Power (1998) says of her aunt’s house, 
“The house is sinking back into the earth and Ama would let it. It is the natural thing” 
(79). 
For Ceremony’s protagonist Tayo, nonhuman actors play a significant role in 
determining his social station from a very young age. Born to a prodigal Native mother 
and unknown white father, Tayo is raised alongside his cousin Rocky by his Auntie and 
her husband Robert, his uncle Josiah, and his grandmother. Rocky is bound for success, 
while Tayo seems doomed to the low position in the family his mother occupied before 
him in Auntie’s eyes. When Tayo comes into the household for good, Auntie maintains a 
distance between the two boys based on what she sees as a clear distinction in their social 
positions, and she does so using the most mundane of everyday objects: 
When she was alone with the boys, she kept Rocky close to her; while she 
kneaded bread, she gave Rocky little pieces of dough to play with; while she 
darned socks, she gave him scraps of cloth and a needle and thread to play with. 
She was careful that Rocky did not share these things with Tayo, that they kept a 
distance between themselves and him. (67) 
 
 
Rocky is supplied with the necessary materials out of which to build imaginary worlds 
and games, while Tayo is denied these things and forced to think about his empty-
handedness. Moving forward, Rocky is given other advantages intended to help him 
construct a life of success that is virtually conflated with non-nativeness by the authority 
figures in his life from his white teachers to his own mother. Rocky becomes an A-
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student and star athlete whose teachers tell him, “‘Nothing can stop you now except one 
thing: don’t let the people at home hold you back.’ Rocky understood what he had to do 
to win in the white outside world” (51). When presented with the opportunity to 
volunteer to fight in World War II, Rocky jumps at the chance. Auntie actually wants her 
son to go to war, but she explains to Grandma that Tayo should not be allowed to go: 
“Rocky is different […] but this one, he’s supposed to stay here” (73). From childhood to 
young adulthood, Tayo and Rocky are distinguished by the things and opportunities 
given them out of which to construct their respective places in the larger social world, but 
for many of the characters this construction process is overshadowed by its own products: 
the “white outside world” of America set aside for Rocky and the Native “here” where 
Tayo belongs. 
What stands out as we attend to different characters’ interactions with the material 
world throughout the novel, however, is that not all the characters are blind to the 
material construction of the social categories such as white, Native, American, Mexican 
that present themselves as irreducible. Paula Gunn Allen identifies two sets of characters 
in Ceremony, and argues that 
those in the first category belong to the earth spirit and live in harmony with her, 
even though this attunement may lead to tragedy. Those in the second are not of 
the earth but of human mechanism; they live to destroy that spirit, to enclose and 
enwrap it in their machinations, condemning all to a living death. (118) 
 
 
Extending Allen’s assertion I would like to alter the distinction by claiming that those in 
the first category are conscious of the fluidity of interactions between actors that 
constitute the social, while those in the second category are blind to the material and rely 
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on the larger and more facile categories that are said to comprise the social.
10
 Rocky’s 
desperate academic, athletic, and patriotic attempts to conform to the “white outside 
world” and become “American” are indicative of the quest for an Americanness that does 
not exist in the sense that he imagines at all because that marker is always changing. 
Rocky’s desperation and blindness in the face of the in-process matrix of social relations 
is contrasted by Betonie’s embrace of the materiality of everyday objects in the healing 
ceremony he performs to help Tayo overcome the sickness brought back from the war. 
Although Tayo’s sickness manifests itself physically through nausea, alcohol 
addiction, and vomiting, the Laguna elders and Army doctors alike seem to agree that the 
source is psychological. Despite the fact that the army doctors are unable to help Tayo 
overcome what they diagnose as the symptoms of “battle fatigue” (31), Silko does not 
merely contrast “white medicine” with “Indian medicine,” even if some characters in the 
novel do make such a distinction. Auntie reminds her mother, who is worried about Tayo 
and wants to call a medicine man, “‘You know what the Army doctor said: ‘No Indian 
medicine.’ Old Ku’oosh will bring his bag of weeds and dust. The doctor won’t like it.’” 
(34). But Old Grandma insists, and Ku’oosh is called. He comes with blue cornmeal and 
stalks of Indian tea, but the ceremony is ultimately ineffective. The Army doctors and 
Ku’oosh all prove unsuccessful in their attempts to heal Tayo because their approaches 
misunderstand the cause of his illness. The Army doctors blame the war and then liquor 
(53); Ku’oosh gestures toward “an absent white father” and the differences between 
Native and white warfare (35-36). Ku’oosh does briefly put his finger on the root of the 
sickness when he tells Tayo that “this world is fragile,” and uses a word to express 
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“fragile” that is “filled with the intricacies of a continuing process, and with a strength 
inherent in spider webs woven across paths through sand hills where early in the morning 
the sun becomes entangled in each filament of web” (35). But his remedy consists only of 
stagnant, traditional things such as the blue cornmeal and the stalks of Indian tea. The 
narrowness of the Army doctors’ and Ku’oosh’s treatments cannot account for the 
“continuing process,” or fundamental flux of the disease. Tayo’s sickness is, in fact, the 
product of something much larger that, in his own words, has “been going on for a long 
time” (53). Thus, the appropriate treatment must also be growing, changing, and 
dynamic. 
The cause of Tayo’s disease seems to be that his participation in the war has 
somehow disconnected him from his “true” identity. For the Army doctors, this means 
his affinity and empathy for his cousin and even for the dead Japanese have severed Tayo 
from his American individualized selfhood (125). For Ku’oosh, this means he has 
somehow become detached from his Laguna Puebloness in “the white people’s war” 
(36). Both treatments accordingly set out to force Tayo back into these respective social 
categories, and both treatments imagine these categories as essentially static. Their 
methods are dependent upon an understanding of the social as a stable category into 
which Tayo must merely be reinserted in order to feel better. But what if Americanness 
and Lagunaness are not preexisting categories? What if these categories are instead in-
process constructions? But how can “Laguna Pueblo” or any such category be anything 
other than an established collection of traditions and rituals passed down from generation 
to generation? Silko’s Navajo medicine man Betonie intimates that a better question 
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would be, how can any such category remain the same after being passed down from 
generation to generation?  
The fluidity of tradition is materialized in the objects that comprise the healing 
ceremony Betonie designs for Tayo. After arriving at Betonie’s hogan overlooking the 
Gallup ceremonial grounds, Tayo looks around the place at the confused and chaotic 
collection that occupies the medicine man’s home. He sees herbs, roots, hides, boxes 
bound in brass, newspapers, cardboard, clothing, rags, twigs, telephone books, Coke 
bottles, pouches and bags, hammered silver buttons, gourd rattles, deer-hoof clackers, 
calendars (119-120). Betonie’s collection of ceremonial objects does not respect the 
boundaries of either the medical practices of the Army doctors or the traditions of 
Ku’oosh. Nowhere is this observation more clear than in the calendars that Tayo notices 
and that give Betonie “some place to start” the ceremony. These Santa Fe Railroad 
calendars feature scenes with “Navajos herding sheep, deer dancers at Cochiti, and little 
Pueblo children chasing burros” (121). This commercialization of Native life is probably 
not what Tayo had expected to find in the home of a Navajo medicine man. But he soon 
remembers his uncle collecting the same calendars and thinks to himself, “on the 
reservation these calendars were more common than Coca-Cola calendars. There was no 
reason to be startled. This old man had only done the same thing” (121). When he tells 
Betonie that he recognizes two of the calendars, Betonie begins the healing ceremony by 
explaining, “‘All these things have stories alive in them’” (121). Thus, the ceremony gets 
underway with Tayo’s memories of a commodification of Native life on the pages of a 
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calendar published by a railroad company notorious for its exploitation of Native land 
and peoples. 
The calendars might be seen by white consumers as representative of an 
authentically Native way of life, while Native peoples might view them as 
misrepresentations designed to perpetuate romanticized visions of Native life in the 
minds of non-natives. Betonie recognizes them for what they are for better or worse: 
material objects that form Native identity in the eyes of both Native and non-native 
peoples.
11
 What is important about Betonie’s characterization of the calendars is the fact 
that they “have stories alive in them” (121). The living, breathing nature of the stories 
indicates that the Army doctors misunderstand the ideal of American individuality and 
that Ku’oosh misunderstands Laguna Pueblo identity to some extent because they do not 
account for the indefiniteness of these modes of being. Betonie contrasts his own healing 
ceremony with those of other Native healers such as Ku’oosh: 
The people nowadays have an idea about the ceremonies. They think the 
ceremonies must be performed exactly as they have always been done, maybe 
because one slip-up or mistake and the whole ceremony must be stopped and the 
sand painting destroyed. That much is true. They think that if a singer tampers 
with any part of the ritual, great harm can be done, great power unleashed.” He 
was quite for a while, looking up at the sky through the smoke hole. “That much 
can be true also. But long ago when the people were given these ceremonies, the 
changing began, if only in the aging of the yellow gourd rattle or the shrinking of 
the skin around the eagle’s claw, if only in the different voices from generation to 
generation, singing the chants. You see, in many ways, the ceremonies have 
always been changing. (126) 
 
 
The calendars speak to changes in perceptions of Nativeness itself by gathering images of 
Navajos, Cochitis, and Pueblos together in the pages of a single object. That is, for 
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unversed consumers, these distinct peoples might be viewed as identical, or perhaps for 
the Santa Fe Railroad Company, modern-day Natives are nothing more than the nostalgic 
representatives of a museumified way of life. Still others might view the calendars 
ironically as signs critiquing westward expansion via the railroads. The calendars are 
both illustrative and formative of concepts of Nativeness. 
Betonie’s ceremony is not designed to help Tayo reconnect with his essential 
Laguna Pueblo self or to serve as a critique of naturalized narratives of the wandering, 
disappearing, and drunken Indian that wind their way through popular lore as well as 
United States Indian policy. Instead, the ceremony provides Tayo with the necessary 
materials that enable him to contribute to the construction of Laguna Pueblo identity. In 
stark contrast to the diagnostic methodologies of the Army doctors and Ku’oosh, 
Betonie’s approach avoids the oversimplified categories that are treated as irreducible in 
favor of focusing on the more elemental and rearrangeable components of those 
categories. When Tayo wonders if his problems might stem from the fact that his mother 
was Laguna and his father white, Betonie responds, “‘nothing is that simple,’ he said, 
‘you don’t write off all the white people, just like you don’t trust all the Indians’” (128). 
The deeper problem at hand is the “witchery” that seeks to divide the otherwise complete 
world into tidy compartments. Silko presents the story of the witchery in verse rather than 
prose, and we are not entirely sure who sings, speaks, or chants it, insinuating that its 
rightful position lies outside the narrative proper. The story goes that white people are the 
products of a contest amongst a diverse collection of Native witch people to see who 
could produce the most impressive powers. Finally, one witch bests all the others by 
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telling a story about a “white skin people who see no life / when they look / they see only 
objects. / The world is a dead thing for them / the trees and rivers are not alive / the 
mountains and stones are not alive. / The deer and bear are objects / They see no life” 
(135). The witchery always seeks to create opposition, to set up binaries, for instance, 
between whites who “see only objects,” and Natives who ostensibly see something more. 
But the witchery itself is also diverse. Some of the witches at the great contest 
untie “skin bundles of disgusting objects: / dark flints, cinders from burned hogans where 
the dead lay” (134). These witches use their materials to assemble charms and powers. 
But the witch whose story speaks white people into being does not gather its charm out of 
material objects at all. It “just [tells] them to listen” (135). And after the prize is won the 
other witches ask the speaker to take back what it has said, but it responds “It’s already 
turned loose. / It’s already coming. / It can’t be called back” (138). This most sinister 
witchery presents itself not as a material construct but as an inevitable statement of what 
is the case. However, Silko ultimately refutes this idea when she reveals that even the 
witchery is constituted of material objects. Near the end of the novel, some of Tayo’s war 
buddies and fellow Indians who have grown to despise him kidnap his friend Harley in an 
attempt to draw Tayo out of hiding so they can kill him. The men are drunk, and Tayo 
has a screwdriver with which he could easily attack and kill them, saving his friend: 
This was the time. But his fingers were numb, and he fumbled with the 
screwdriver as he tried to rub warmth back into his hands. […] He moved back 
into the boulders. It had been a close call. The witchery had almost ended the 
story according to its plan; Tayo had almost jammed the screwdriver into Emo’s 
skull the way the witchery had wanted. (253) 
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The witchery is not a self-sustaining power, but rather a narrative that is propped up by 
those who fear it. That is, the witchery needs the screwdriver in Tayo’s hand to 
perpetuate its work and make Tayo into “another victim, a drunk Indian war veteran 
settling an old feud” (253). Thus, the most deadly kind of witchery is that which claims to 
have no material basis for its power to establish entire groups, but Silko demonstrates the 
material possibilities for resisting and remaking the witchery by having Tayo move back 
into the boulders and pocket the screwdriver. In that moment, rather than giving in to the 
perceived power of the witchery, Tayo reveals that this power is not some ethereal force 
but the product of the interaction of the actors involved in the conflict. 
The point here is that Nativeness itself is a process, much in the way that 
whiteness is spoken into being by a witch and thus not coeternal with the existence of the 
world. Neither of these markers is a preexisting phenomenon that determines the lives of 
those who seem to fit within its parameters, even when other networks of actors do their 
best to make it appear so. While critics have dealt with the survival, fluidity, change, and 
endurance of Native identity and culture in Ceremony,
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 a materialist attention to the 
things that constitute a significant portion of such markers reveals that identity and 
culture are much too large to serve as bases for understanding individual and collective 
identity. Everyday, nonhuman actors disrupt our understanding of the social by shifting 
the starting point entirely from some perceived individual or cultural essence to the literal 
and material interactions between calendars, screwdrivers, Coke bottles, and people that 
are the figurae of those larger categories. These objects provide a prism through which to 
reflect on the novel’s larger reconstruction of Tayo’s identity because their capacity for 
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being rearranged literally enacts a remaking of the two categories that seem to exert the 
most pressure on him: white and Laguna Pueblo. 
What should be clear by now, however, is that we cannot simply strand Tayo 
“between these two worlds” because to do so is to reinforce each of these social 
categories as a substance and not a process. It is a misunderstanding of Betonie’s healing 
ceremony to argue that “Tayo’s recovery hinges on replacing constructed beliefs with 
organic beliefs; he becomes healthy because he grows to feel an inherent relationship 
between all life forms” (Caton 108).
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 To pitch constructed beliefs against organic beliefs 
is to misunderstand “constructed” in the sense I have explained, and also to conflate the 
idea of construction with whiteness and the idea of organic with Nativeness. Silko’s 
representations of Native cultures do not contrast “constructed” and “organic.” What the 
materiality of the ceremony reveals instead is that whiteness and Laguna Puebloness are 
both processes that are constantly affected and altered by the actors out of which they are 
made, and that, in turn, the resultant networks also change the actors themselves and their 
subsequent influence on other networks. Following the healing ceremony, Silko makes 
this materialist process clear in her depiction of a folding steel chair kept in the meeting 
house on Tayo’s reservation. Tayo appears before a council of elders to update them on 
the status of his health, and, as he enters the kiva, “The old men nodded at a folding steel 
chair with ST. JOSEPH MISSION stenciled in white paint on the back. He sat down, 
wondering how far the chair had gone from the parish hall before it came to the kiva” 
(256). The chair was once one among many folding steel chairs from the St. Joseph 
Mission, but it now props Tayo up in front of the Laguna elders who occupy the room 
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alongside “boxes and trunks with tarps pulled over them to protect them from uninitiated 
eyes” (256). Although the St. Joseph Mission has spray-painted its moniker on the chair, 
even this naming cannot contain the object. Tayo wonders about the chair’s trajectory, 
imagining the path it has taken to Laguna “from the parish hall.” The chair seems 
endowed with some agency as it makes its way from St. Joseph’s Mission to the kiva at 
Laguna through some journey that Tayo cannot fathom, and yet here it is, providing him 
with a seat as he tells the story of his healing ceremony. 
What we do not discover is how far the chair might possibly go beyond the kiva. 
The chair as actor certainly plays an important part in Tayo’s ceremony as it supports him 
during the final stages, but considering how far the object has come, it seems fair to point 
out that its story is also in process. Who knows where the chair might end up next or how 
it might affect some other situation? As Womack reasons, “The objects of my 
perceptions, nonetheless, have their own stories, not just the ones I impose on them” 
(“Theorizing” 377). Betonie says something similar at the beginning of the ceremony 
when discouraging Tayo from blaming his illness on white people: “‘Look,’ Betonie said, 
pointing east to Mount Taylor towering dark blue with the last twilight. ‘They only fool 
themselves when they think it is theirs. The deeds and papers don’t mean anything. It is 
the people who belong to the mountain’” (128). Much like the caretakers at St. Joseph’s 
sought to claim the chair by branding it with the name of the mission, the philosophy of 
private property has led those who pushed across North America to entitle the land to 
themselves by recording their names on pieces of paper. In both cases, the relationship 
between material object and human subject is more complicated than anyone anticipates 
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because the things have “stories alive in them,” as Betonie says. The nonhuman actors 
have agency in the lives of human actors. Nowhere is this insight more important than in 
the moment when a group of cowboys hired to protect private land happen upon Tayo 
searching for his uncle’s stolen cattle. They apprehend him, but the mountain provides a 
mountain lion and the men are more interested in tracking the rare animal so they 
abandon Tayo. 
In this scene, both whiteness and Nativeness are cast as products of these 
characters’ respective relationships with the material world 
the destroyers had tricked the white people as completely as they had fooled the 
Indians, […] But the effects were hidden, evident only in the sterility of their art, 
which continued to feed off the vitality of other cultures, and in the dissolution of 
their consciousness into dead objects: the plastic and neon, the concrete and steel. 
(204) 
 
 
The cowboys think of the mountain itself—“these goddamn Indians got to learn whose 
property this is!”—and the lion—“greasers and Indians-we can run them down anytime. 
But it’s been a couple of years since anybody up here got a mountain lion”—in different 
terms and this is what separates them from Tayo (202). The primacy of this relationship 
to the material is crystalized through Silko’s characterization of Emo, another Indian 
veteran, and one of the men who attempts to kill Tayo. Emo’s relation to the material 
world resembles the cowboys’ much more than it resembles Tayo’s. Whenever the Indian 
veterans gather to drink at a local bar Emo always eventually breaks out his prize trophy 
from the war: a Bull Durham tobacco pouch filled with human teeth. One night Emo 
pours the teeth out onto the table and pushes “them into circles and rows like unstrung 
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beads; he scoop[s] them into his hand and [shakes] them like dice” (60). The teeth are 
described as Emo’s souvenirs, and we are told explicitly that they come from the corpse 
of a Japanese soldier. Much like the cowboys, Emo wants to arrest these objects in time 
and space. He maintains them as a physical connection to the war that, for a moment, 
allowed him, a Native person, to be American in the eyes of those who consider 
themselves to be American. 
Whiteness and Nativeness are thus not inherent modes of being or substantive 
categories into which individual human actors can be neatly situated. Instead, whiteness 
and Nativeness are processes, modes of relating to the myriad human and nonhuman 
actors that constitute the social. Emo clings to the teeth because they remind him of how 
white people in the army thought of him: “he was the best, they told him; some men 
didn’t like to feel the quiver of the man they were killing; some men got sick when they 
smelled the blood. But he was the best; he was one of them. The best. United States 
Army” (62). If whiteness and Nativeness were substantive markers then Emo’s bag of 
human teeth would operate differently because Emo is a Native person. In other words, 
the novel as a whole is working toward the processual nature of Native identity and Silko 
accomplishes this representation, in part, by aligning a Native character more closely 
with white people than with his “fellow” Natives in terms of his relationship to the 
material. Laguna Puebloness is not only a matter of blood or skin, as we know Emo looks 
down on Tayo for being “part white,” a “half-breed” (57). Emo is ostensibly not of 
mixed-blood, yet it is clear by the novel’s end that Tayo is a more ideal representative of 
Laguna Pueblo than Emo, who participates in two killings and is finally banished from 
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the reservation by the same elders who bear witness to Tayo’s healing after the 
ceremony. Thus, the markers “white,” “Native,” “American,” “Laguna,” are, in fact, the 
products of material circumstances and the interactions of human and nonhuman actors. 
Emo relies on his ancestry to establish him as Laguna but conforms his desires to those of 
the people he imagines as “real” Americans, and thus at the novel’s end we find Tayo 
more closely aligned with the elders at Laguna and Emo with the white soldiers who 
lusted after death and counted bloodshed as an indicator of Americanness during the war. 
This distinction relies on a willingness to change our perception of the 
relationship between human and nonhuman actors. Returning to Betonie’s claim that it is 
not the mountain that belongs to the people, but “the people who belong to the 
mountain,” Ceremony reveals that human actors are not merely producers, consumers, 
and users of nonhuman actors, but that we “belong” to the same network. Robinson picks 
up on this wrinkle in the typical subject/object dichotomy in Housekeeping as she shows 
how even the characters who most desperately want to maintain the status quo are 
substantially refashioned through their interaction with material objects. As we begin to 
trace a pattern across the corpus of postwar fiction, what becomes clear is that these 
narratives all seem committed in their own ways to the reconstructive agency of 
nonhuman actors. Without this reconstructive agency the social cannot truly be remade 
because the variables of the equation (static categories such as “white,” “Laguna,” 
“American”) always remain the same even when rearranged into different configurations. 
When the variables always remain the same then no matter how you organize them, the 
equation will always only produce some combination of those variables. Thus, what 
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makes fiction postmodern is its commitment to revealing how those variables themselves 
are products of more quotidian material interactions, and how there is not such a large 
gap between the significance of human subjects and material objects as actors. Paula 
Geyh reconsiders this gap when she responds to Jameson’s stark separation of subject 
and object in his formative essay on the cultural logic of late capitalism: “Jameson’s 
dichotomy (reproduced in the work of so many other literary and cultural critics) is 
rooted in a false conception of space as ‘objective’ and external to subjectivity” (104). 
Geyh’s comments reflect how postmodern critics have been leery of the subject/object 
dichotomy for some time, and reflect both Ceremony’s and Housekeeping’s attempts to 
demonstrate the significance of the nonhuman alongside the human in the construction of 
the social. 
 
No Objects Without Stories 
 
To disrupt Jameson’s dichotomy, Geyh investigates how subjects and spaces 
mutually constitute one another in Housekeeping. Also drawing from Robinson’s text, I 
would like to suggest that we look at the house that is kept in this novel, not as a space or 
concept that illuminates subjectivity, but as a material object filled with collections of 
material objects. If Gilbert and Gubar and other important feminist critics and writers 
have shown how domestic spaces and “trifles” have determined female subjectivity, I am 
also interested in how these nonhuman actors work in cooperation with human actors to 
form the very social categories that are being determined.
14
 Housekeeping is narrated in 
the first-person by a young girl named Ruth whose mother leaves her and her sister 
Lucille in the town of Fingerbone with their grandmother, Sylvia Foster, before 
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committing suicide. Ruth and Lucille are raised for some years by their grandmother, 
then briefly by her sisters-in-law after Sylvia passes away, and finally by their aunt 
Sylvie, when the sisters-in-law decide the girls are too much for them to handle. Sylvie is 
a wandering woman, heretofore uninterested in settling down anywhere. Her odd 
mannerisms resonate with Ruth but disgust Lucille, who yearns for a stereotypical 
“American girl” experience. Although the critical discussion surrounding the novel has 
acutely focused on themes of gender, family, and social constraint vital to the novel, 
these treatments often start with these concepts as frames and thus foreclose the ways in 
which the text constructs such concepts. In these respects, Housekeeping might take its 
place alongside other important postwar works of feminist literature and criticism such as 
Gloria Anzaldúa’s Borderlands/La Frontera (1987), Bobbie Ann Mason’s Shiloh and 
Other Stories (1982), and Adrienne Rich’s Snapshots of a Daughter-in-Law (1963). But 
what happens when we set aside for a moment the notion that these social categories are 
merely artificial and focus instead on how they actually get assembled? Robinson 
provides a rich array of everyday objects that offer the perfect opportunity to take 
inventory of the materials out of which the social is made, and her characters capitalize 
on these materials by building new families for themselves. 
From the 1980s to the present the vast majority of criticism dedicated to 
Housekeeping has focused on Robinson’s characterization of Ruth and Sylvie as 
subversive of social conventions related to gender. Thomas Foster calls on Julia 
Kristeva’s essay “Women’s Time” to demonstrate the value of “deconstructive critique to 
feminist theory” by showing “how an analysis like Kristeva’s might organize a narrative 
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of women’s resistance to the historical limitations imposed on them” in a novel such as 
Housekeeping (73-74). Martha Ravits also focuses primarily on the novel’s negative 
powers when she argues that “repudiation of the domestic sphere by [Robinson’s] female 
quester enlarges the central tradition to include women” (644). Marcia Aldrich, Anne-
Marie Mallon, Paula Geyh, Sonia Gernes, and Maggie Galeshouse all employ the 
language of transience/transcendence to “subvert[] convention by presenting ‘a difference 
of view,’” as Aldrich says (127), and to provide a “detailed account of the transition from 
domesticity to indigence,” as Galehouse posits.
15
 For each of these critics, transience, 
transcendence, wandering, and vagrancy are key in the novel not only because they 
demonstrate the constructed nature of social conventions regarding women and 
domesticity, but also because, as Geyh reasons, 
the present options for women do not appear to me to be limited to either 
vagrancy or inscription within the household, to Sylvie’s transient or Lucille’s 
settled subjectivity. What Robinson’s conception of the transient subject seems to 
imply instead is that the feminine subject might be constituted at present, at least 
in part, by an interaction between the two. (120) 
 
 
This body of criticism, and Geyh’s argument especially, illustrates the underlying point 
of this chapter by demonstrating that when you start with predetermined social categories 
and use them to explain other phenomena, you may discover some new arrangement, but 
you ultimately end up with the same basic categories. Geyh says as much when she 
asserts that the novel does not rework or remake the two options available to its female 
characters, but merely offers an alternative constituted by “an interaction between the 
two.” 
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Rather than starting with gender or domesticity, I begin with the constituent actors 
of these larger categories to see how their interactions form the very categories that seem 
a priori in most treatments of the novel. When we focus on these ordinary objects and 
their relations to the characters in the novel, what results is a reading in which even the 
events and entities most dedicated to preserving the illusion of the social as a substance 
wind up revealing that the social is a process. As with the calendars Betonie pulls from 
his vast assortment of things, I want to look most intently at two collections in this novel 
and the stories that these objects contain. If the calendars, screwdriver, and folding steel 
chair in Silko’s novel contain stories themselves and are thus active agents in the 
reconstruction of Tayo’s identity through the healing ceremony, then the prime difference 
between the two collections in Housekeeping is that the objects in one are allowed this 
agency while those in the other are cut off from it by being separated from their 
respective stories. 
The separation of a thing from its stories has historically been theorized in terms 
of the distinction between a thing and an object. As Brown distinguishes between thing 
and object in his seminal “Thing Theory” essay, 
we look through objects because there are codes by which our interpretive 
attention makes them meaningful, because there is a discourse of objectivity that 
allows us to use them as facts. […] the story of objects asserting themselves as 
things, then, is the story of a changed relation to the human subject and thus the 
story of how the thing really names less an object than a particular subject-object 
relation. (4) 
 
 
In a footnote to the same discussion, Brown engages with Nabokov’s idea in his novel 
Transparent Things that focusing on a material object can cause us to sink into its history 
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to point out that “we don’t apprehend things except partially or obliquely (as what’s 
beyond our apprehension). In fact, by looking at things we render them objects” (4n). 
Brown’s analysis recalls Ceremony’s white people created by witchery: “When they look 
/ they see only objects. / The world is a dead thing for them / the trees and rivers are not 
alive / the mountains and stones are not alive. / The deer and bear are objects / They see 
no life” (135). As Heidegger says in his essay on “The Thing,” “An independent, self-
supporting thing may become an object if we place it before us, whether in immediate 
perception or by bringing it to mind in a recollective re-presentation” (167). A thing is 
denied its thingness when it becomes a mere object of our attention, when it is 
overdetermined by its productive, consumptive, or use value in the hands of human 
actors. 
The tension between object and thing mirrors the tension between the social as 
substance and the social as process. When the social is treated as a substance, say in the 
presumption that gender is an established category that can illuminate other social 
phenomena, then what gets obscured is the fact that gender is a process. Gender is always 
under construction. So to start with gender is to begin where we should actually end. 
Similarly, to view a material actor as a mere object is to paper over the complex stories 
that the actor contains, whereas recognizing the actor as a thing is to acknowledge its 
various and complicated constitution. Heidegger uses a jug as his prime example of this 
problem:  
The making, it is true, lets the jug come into its own. But that which in the jug’s 
nature is its own is never brought about by its making. Now released from the 
making process, the self-supporting jug has to gather itself for the task of 
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containing. In the process of its making, of course, the jug must first show its 
outward appearance to the maker. But what shows itself here, the aspect (the 
eidos, the idea), characterizes the jug solely in the respect in which the vessel 
stands over against the maker as something to be made. (168) 
 
 
The first of Robinson’s two collections provides us with a series of nonhuman actors 
whose thingness has been eradicated by sentimentality, or in keeping with Heidegger’s 
example, have been kept from gathering themselves for their respective tasks. These 
objects correspond with a particular understanding of the social in the novel, the fixed, 
substantive social that so many literary critics have set out to demystify as “constructed” 
(read artificial). However, when we consider the material constitution of the social, then 
we realize that gender, for instance, is certainly a construct in the novel, but not in any 
artificial sense. Robinson’s subtle treatment of the two contrasting collections finally 
privileges things over objects and thus construction over critique because critique always 
already implies the existence of the social as a substance. 
The first collection belongs to Ruth’s and Lucille’s grandmother, and consists of 
odds and ends divided between two locations: the bottom drawer of a chest of drawers, 
and a hatbox on top of the wardrobe. Between these two places, Grandmother has 
collected, 
balls of twine, Christmas candles, and odd socks, […] a shot glass with two brass 
buttons in it, […] a faded wax angel that smelled of bayberry, and a black velvet 
pincushion in the shape of a heart, in a box with a San Francisco jeweler’s name 
on it […] a shoebox full of old photos, each with four patches of black, felty paper 
on the back […] a brochure of, it seemed, great and obvious significance. (90) 
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and a “dim coil of thick hair, saved from my grandmother’s girlhood […] along with my 
mother’s gray purse” (209). As Ruth narrates, she describes this collection as 
“memorabilia,” “randomly assorted, yet so neatly arranged, that we felt some large 
significance might be behind the collection as a whole. We noted that the socks, for 
example, all appeared unworn” (90). Grandmother’s collection is hidden away in private 
places where it might be discovered only by someone who knows its locations, or by 
someone cleaning, putting away laundry, organizing the house. In other words, this 
assortment of objects is reserved only for those who might participate in the domestic 
duties stereotypically set aside for women. These items are represented as keepsakes, 
memorabilia, material reminders to Ruth’s grandmother about experiences or people 
from her past. The photographs and hair are overtly symbolic, but the worn and unworn 
socks are more complicated. Why save these things? Ruth and Lucille cannot parse the 
significance of the unworn socks. Although the novel offers no explicit rationale for the 
collection, the fact that they were memorable to Sylvia Foster provides some insight into 
their significance. 
Sylvia is characterized as a conventional, traditional woman. In the wake of her 
husband’s death in a railroad accident that landed him and his fellow passengers in the 
depths of the lake in Fingerbone, Ruth explains, 
it seems that my grandmother did not consider leaving. She had lived her whole 
life in Fingerbone. And though she never spoke of it, and no doubt seldom 
thought of it, she was a religious woman. That is to say that she conceived of life 
as a road down which one traveled, […] and that one’s destination was there from 
the very beginning […] She accepted the idea that at some time she and my 
grandfather would meet again. (9-10) 
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While we cannot decipher the symbolism of the socks or the shot glass with any true 
accuracy, these items seem to be signposts on Sylvia Foster’s journey down the road of 
her life. They are emblematic of specific people, places, and events. They are true 
“objects” in Heidegger’s and Brown’s sense. Thus, rather than helping to reveal to Sylvia 
that she is one among many actors involved in the construction of her own life, these 
items are arrested in time and space. Their fixity is indicative of the larger vision of the 
social that Sylvia passes down to her daughters and granddaughters, and to which some 
turn for comfort and against which others rebel. Her oldest daughter becomes a 
missionary to China. Helen, Ruth’s and Lucille’s mother, elopes with a man and then 
shows up with “a trunk full of wedding clothes, and with a box of cut flowers and 
champagne packed in dry ice” to “salve [Ruth’s] grandmother’s feelings” (14). Sylvie 
leaves to visit Helen in Seattle and only comes home once before returning to care for the 
girls. The oldest embraces a Christian mission, the second attempts to rebel but comes 
home to soothe her mother’s feelings, the third disappears and all but refuses to return. 
And it is this third daughter, Sylvie, who assembles a collection in the Fingerbone house 
that utterly defies the sentimental things her mother saved over time. 
Sylvie’s collection comprises an odd array of objects stored in open spaces all 
over the kitchen. While her mother stored things in hatboxes and drawers, Sylvie chooses 
the kitchen table, counters, and floors as the sites for her collection of tin cans and other 
items. Ruth says of the tin cans that Sylvie “washed the labels off with soap and hot 
water. There were now many of these cans on the counters and windowsill, and they 
would have covered the table long since if Lucille and I had not removed them now and 
72 
then” (125). The cans are empty and arranged open end facing down, “except for the ones 
she used to store peach pits and the keys from sardine and coffee cans” (125). So Sylvie’s 
collection consists of tin cans, peach pits, and aluminum keys. Ruth and Lucille almost 
embrace the organization of the articles: “frankly, we had come to the point where we 
could hardly object to order in any form, though we hoped that her interest in bottles was 
a temporary aberration” (125). Whereas Grandmother’s collection is fixed in time and 
space, Sylvie’s collection is relieved of its labels and set out in the open. The labels 
would have designated specific contents, dates, brands, but without these markers all the 
cans are alike. The keys no longer serve a functional purpose, and the peach pits are 
saved, but not planted in the orchard that stretches out back behind the house. Each item 
in Grandmother’s collection looks backwards and captures distinct memories. 
Conversely, Sylvie’s collection is under constant construction. Ruth says that the tin cans 
would have taken over the entire kitchen if “Lucille and I had not removed them now and 
then” (125). Where one collection is static the other is fluid. Where one looks back to 
name specific persons, places, or events, the other constantly looks ahead and refuses to 
name anything. 
The contrast between the two collections is further illuminated by a heated 
confrontation between Ruth and Lucille in which Ruth’s behavior mirrors that of her aunt 
while Lucille’s echoes that of her grandmother. Lucille asks Ruth to help her make a 
dress based on a set of plans and patterns. The instructions call for a set of pinking shears, 
and since the girls don’t know what those are, Lucille calls for a dictionary. But rather 
than sticking to the plan and following the instructions, Ruth is sidetracked by flowers 
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pressed in between the pages of the dictionary. Far from bemused, Lucille takes the book 
by the spine and shakes it: “scores of flowers and petals fell and drifted from between the 
pages” (126). Ruth wants to save the flowers, but Lucille crushes them in her hands. 
Lucille has only one goal, to make the dress, to create all the elements of the ensemble 
that will ultimately be “coordinated.” Neither the dictionary nor the flowers fit into the 
pattern she has brought home from the store and so they must be ignored or even 
destroyed. Ruth, on the other hand, gets caught up in the process of making the dress and 
perusing the dictionary. She marvels at the relationship between the word “Queen Anne’s 
lace” and the sprig of the plant she finds on that page. After Lucille crushes the flowers, 
Ruth tries to hit her with the dictionary, and the two fight. For Lucille the dictionary can 
fill in gaps in knowledge because it contains the definitions of things, but when Ruth 
opens the dictionary she finds multiple definitions for each word. In all of her actions 
Lucille seeks a preexistent model or pattern, whereas Ruth lives in the moment and 
imagines her life as a living organism that is constantly taking shape. 
The novel’s two collections are ultimately abandoned along with the house by all 
three major characters. Lucille leaves Sylvie and Ruth to go live with her home 
economics teacher. Sylvie and Ruth decide to leave Fingerbone altogether, but cannot 
bear the thought of abandoning the house to be picked over by the townspeople and thus 
they decide to burn it down. In her explanation for why they decide to set fire to the 
house, Ruth further illuminates the significance of each collection: 
even things lost in a house abide, like forgotten sorrows and incipient dreams, and 
many household things are of purely sentimental value, like the dim coil of thick 
hair, saved from my grandmother’s girlhood, which was kept in a hatbox on top 
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of the wardrobe, along with my mother’s gray purse. In the equal light of 
disinterested scrutiny such things are not themselves. They are transformed into 
pure object, and are horrible, and must be burned. (209) 
 
 
If all things contain their own stories and not just the stories we impose on them, then 
when we do our best to scrutinize and divorce things from the stories they contain they 
become nothing more than the imaginative ciphers of human actors, “pure objects.” So 
when Ruth and Sylvie burn the house it is because the house itself and the objects it 
contains have become “pure objects,” that is, they lack a certain thingness. The objects in 
the Fingerbone house have become so pure and so fixed in human determination, and so 
divorced from their reconstructive possibilities that they are only fit for burning. It seems 
that, for Ruth and Sylvie, even the unlabeled cans, the aluminum keys, and the peach pits 
have become too representative of a particular time and place, and so they set fire to the 
house and leave Fingerbone. 
Although we follow Ruth and Sylvie in their dangerous and transcendent escape, 
Robinson demonstrates the difficulty in truly changing our way of thinking about the 
social as the fire ultimately burns itself out before destroying the house altogether. 
However, while it may be difficult to change our understanding of the social, this struggle 
does not negate the important revelation that the social as process has astounding 
implications for Ruth’s and Sylvie’s capacity to leave the house behind and set out on a 
new course. But what most critics have missed in their assessment of the novel by 
focusing mostly on Ruth and Sylvie is that it is Robinson’s characterization of Lucille 
that perhaps best illustrates the possibilities for uncovering the construction of the social. 
This blind spot is no surprise considering Lucille’s adamant desire to distance herself 
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from Ruth and Sylvie and conform to a more “normal” life. But even this “normal” ideal 
is a construction. In an essay entitled “Family” from The Death of Adam: Essays on 
Modern Thought, Robinson lays out the history of the family in its modern, Western form 
and explains how this idea of the family came to be constructed in response to 
industrialization, child labor, and economic growth. At the outset of this piece, she 
suggests that 
we are all aware that ‘family’ is a word which eludes definition, as do other 
important things, like nation, race, culture, gender, species,” and goes on to say 
that “the attempt to impose definition on indeterminacy and degree and exception 
is about the straightest road to mischief I know. (The Death 87) 
 
 
Connecting this insight to Housekeeping, it is obviously Lucille who desires to conform 
her life to the stagnant, albeit arbitrary, definition of family I have discussed in terms of 
familiar social categories. Yet, what is so important about Lucille’s desire to pattern her 
life, much like her dress, after this social category is that it is actually Lucille around 
whom a social network is refashioned, one built not solely out of biological kinship, but 
also out of reappropriated actors such as pinking shears, dictionaries, and a home 
economics teacher. 
Whereas Silko primarily relies on characters like Betonie and Tayo, those who 
represent the construction of identity, as models for remaking the social, Robinson uses 
Lucille, a character who represents an allegiance to familiar social categories, as a model 
for postmodernism’s reconstructive agency. Housekeeping reveals that the building of 
social networks is constantly taking place, even when characters are actively pursuing the 
codification of familiar social categories. Ruth and Sylvie undermine preexisting social 
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expectations, but in her attempts to fulfill such expectations an entirely new network 
forms around Lucille. After a year of Sylvie’s influence, Lucille and Ruth reach a 
crossroads at which they take separate paths. Reminiscent of Rocky in Ceremony, Lucille 
embraces school, self-improvement, exercise, and “a group of girls who ate lunch in the 
Home Economics room” (136). When the sisters go to make the case to their school 
principal that they are back on track, Ruth does not say much, leading the principal to 
encourage her to speak for herself. Lucille looks at Ruth and explains to Mr. French, “She 
has her own ways” (135). Lucille recognizes that Ruth’s ways do not conform to the 
accepted norms of social behavior that Mr. French can relate to, and to which she herself 
longs to conform. Eventually, Lucille’s detestation of Sylvie’s and Ruth’s “own ways” 
leads her to leave home and go live with the home economics teacher, Miss Royce. Ruth 
narrates, “Miss Royce gave her the spare room. In effect, she adopted her, and I had no 
sister after that night” (140). Thus, in her attempt to conform to the social category of 
“normal girl” in Fingerbone, Idaho, Lucille leaves her own family and, in effect, creates a 
new family for herself. Ruth says that Miss Royce adopts Lucille “in effect,” not legally. 
Robinson returns to Lucille’s new social situation at the end of the novel as Ruth and 
Sylvie wander the United States and speculate about what has become of their 
sister/niece: “we do not know where she is, or how to find her. ‘She’s probably married,’ 
Sylvie says, and no doubt she is” (217). So it would seem easy enough to surmise that 
Sylvie and Ruth have lambasted and burned down the social and are assembling it anew, 
while Lucille has done her best to prop up the old categories. However, the conclusion of 
the novel is vague and all-but-impossible to decipher as to what has become of Lucille. 
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The first-person narration is important here as we are asked to filter our idea of 
Lucille through Ruth’s consciousness. Ruth instructs us to 
imagine Lucille in Boston, at a table in a restaurant, waiting for a friend […] 
Sylvie and I do not flounce in through the door, smoothing the skirts of our 
oversized coats and combing our hair back with our fingers. We do not sit down 
at the table next to hers and empty our pockets in a damp heap in the middle of 
the table, and sort out the gum wrappers and ticket stubs, and add up the coins and 
dollar bills, and laugh and add them up again. (218) 
 
 
Ruth’s speculation of Lucille’s imagination throughout these final pages is representative 
of the kind of reliance on the conventional idea of social construction that I am working 
against in this chapter, the idea that our culture is somehow artificial, because it is 
manufactured, constructed. A lengthy quote from Robinson’s essay “Puritans and Prigs” 
can illuminate this point: 
Americans never think of themselves as sharing fully in the human condition, and 
therefore beset as all humankind is beset. Rather they imagine that their defects 
result from their being uniquely the products of a crude system of social 
engineering. They believe this is a quirk of their brief and peculiar history, a 
contraption knocked together out of ramshackle utilitarianism and fueled by 
devotion to the main chance. […] Clearly there is an element of truth in this. The 
error comes in the belief that they are in any degree exceptional, that there is a 
more human world in which they may earn a place if only they can rid themselves 
of the deficiencies induced by life in an invented nation and a manufactured 
culture. (The Death 154) 
 
 
Regardless of how we might disagree as to Robinson’s formulation of “the human 
condition,” Ruth’s vision of Lucille’s life in Boston, and of her own life as a transient, 
vagrant, wandering ghost ultimately stand in contrast to other lives about which nothing 
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can be known, implying that these lives they live and imagine are no less real than some 
idealized, more-human world. 
Thus, the final sentences of the novel, imaginative and contradictory as they are, 
can be read as a stylistic diagnosis of the social as process: 
No one watching this woman smear her initials in the steam on her water glass 
with her first finger, or slip cellophane packets of oyster crackers into her handbag 
for the sea gulls, could know how her thoughts are thronged by our absence, or 
know how she does not watch, does not listen, does not wait, does not hope, and 
always for me and Sylvie. (219) 
 
 
The negative/positive contradiction in these closing lines echoes that of the previous 
passage in the restaurant, and creates a sense of confusion that is left unresolved. Lucille 
does not listen, wait, or hope (negative) for specific people (positive), and yet this 
confusion is not unsettling or disturbing. In fact, confusion might not be the best word at 
all. The novel ends, less in confusion than in progress—under construction. Martha 
Ravits says that 
the novel ends with Ruth in ‘that sad and outcast state of revelation’ where she 
can reflect on the difference between housekeeping and being turned out of the 
house to comment on materialistic society that falsifies the notion of female 
identity by equating female well-being with domestic life. (665) 
 
 
However, what is so important about Ruth’s “outcast state” is that it is the state she and 
Sylvie have chosen. They could have conformed to their neighbors’ expectations, gone 
through the court system to stay together, or taken any number of other paths. But they 
choose instead to burn the house, cross the Fingerbone bridge, and wander the United 
States. Their choice not only highlights the distinction and enacts the critique Ravits 
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points out, but also constitutes the reconstruction of their mode of being, one that is no 
more and no less human, no more and no less manufactured than any other. 
The novels I examine in this chapter have typically been read as postmodern 
insofar as they critique preexisting social categories as constructed, or artificial. 
However, such readings often fall short by failing to recognize the reconstructive agency 
wrapped up in such critiques, and thus miss out on the important revelation that the social 
is, in fact, a process. The writers themselves do not make this mistake. In the essay 
“Family” referenced earlier, Robinson recounts the evolution of the Western idea of the 
family that she challenges in her fiction. She traces the terrible working conditions during 
the industrial revolution, the forced labor of children, and other horrors of the working 
class, and then exclaims, “there is nothing to wonder at, that the ideal of mother and 
children at home, and father adequately paid to keep them from need, was a thing warmly 
desired, and that for generations social reform was intended to secure this object” (The 
Death 94). Although her novel Housekeeping undermines what has become the 
normalized vision of the family she describes in the essay, this subversion does not mean 
that the familiar social idea of the family is somehow unreal.
16
 On the contrary, is it not 
the very reality of such social categories and their material effects that inspires 
postmodernism’s critique? Are the effects of socially-constructed race, nation, gender 
themselves also constructed in the sense of being artificial? No! And yet, while we are 
quick to point out the concrete economic and political impact of these social categories, 
advocates and opponents of postmodernism alike are equally quick to point out that the 
injustice of these effects is heightened by the fact that it is brought about by narratives 
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and social structures that are themselves artificial. The objects that populate postmodern 
fiction reveal that our social constructions are no less real than the materials out of which 
they are built. 
When the social categories in these two texts are revealed to be in-process 
assemblages as opposed to paint-by-number groupings or merely artificial classifications, 
we are enabled to see Tayo’s healing, Ruth’s and Sylvie’s freedom, and Lucille’s new 
family as products of a rearrangeable network of human and nonhuman actors. 
Furthermore, just as the calendars, steel chairs, coils of hair, balls of twine, and deer-hoof 
clackers operate as actors in the ongoing formation of social networks, Silko’s and 
Robinson’s novels themselves are also under construction. Ceremony ends at sunrise with 
a new day on the horizon. Housekeeping ends in an invited imagining and connection 
between narrator and reader, as Ruth instructs us to imagine Lucille not waiting and 
always for herself and Sylvie. These formal arrangements resonate with Rita Felski’s 
assertion that postmodernism is not the “end” of anything (Doing Time 6). Instead, 
postmodernism’s interest in the material represents the ultimate en medias res of 
everything. Postmodernism’s resolute materialism renders it capable of remaking the 
social categories we often perceive as fixed. For this reason, in the next chapter I turn to 
postmodernism’s interruption of the grand narratives of Enlightenment modernity in two 
novels that demonstrate how postmodern fiction avoids a steady slippage from social 
networks back into familiar social categories by foregrounding the precedence of 
inclination over otherness. Each of these texts, DeLillo’s Underworld (1997) and 
Alvarez’s How the García Girls Lost Their Accents (1991), is assembled around a 
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specific material object. These novels offer the opportunity to take a closer look at 
exactly how writers not only envision the social as a process but also structure narratives 
so as to accentuate the significance of nonhuman actors in the construction of the social. 
Because of the significance of material objects in the narrative arrangements of these two 
texts, we must also begin to consider postmodern narratives themselves, the novels as 
such, as actors in the formation of the social.
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Notes 
 
 
1
 Theorists interested in the historical implications of postmodernism, such as Lyotard and Jameson, are 
interested in postmodernism as a critique of metanarratives (Lyotard The Postmodern Condition) and as an 
“imitation of dead styles” (Jameson, Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism). Theorists 
interested in the aesthetic implications of postmodernism, such as Hutcheon, often argue that 
postmodernism lacks agency (The Politics of Postmodernism). 
 
2
 The relationship between postmodernist and feminist criticism is a complex one. As early as 1984 
Andreas Huyssen points out that “it is somewhat baffling that feminist criticism has so far largely stayed 
away from the postmodernism debate which is considered not to be pertinent to feminist concerns. The fact 
that to date only male critics have addressed the problem of modernity/postmodernity, however, does not 
mean that it does not concern women. I would argue – and here I am in full agreement with Craig Owens – 
that women’s art, literature and criticism are an important part of the postmodern culture of the 1970s and 
1980s and indeed a measure of the vitality and energy of that culture” (“Mapping the Postmodern” 28). In 
Linda Hutcheon’s The Politics of Postmodernism (1989), as we have already seen, she argues that the 
disconnect between these two conversations exists because of postmodernism’s perceived lack of agency 
(168). In contrast to the state of the debate when Huyssen addressed it in 1984, in a 1992 issue of boundary 
2, Linda Nicholson opens her theorization of feminism/postmodernism by observing that, “The discussion 
of the relation between feminism and postmodernism/poststructuralism has generated a surprising degree of 
intense feeling among feminists” (“Feminism and the Politics of Postmodernism” 53). And by the year 
2000 this debate had built a substantial body of work as evidenced by Rita Felski’s argument in Doing 
Time: Feminist Theory and Postmodern Culture: “Things have changed since 1988 when Meaghan Morris 
mourned the lack of serious engagement between feminism and postmodernism. There is now a substantial 
and mounting literature on this question” (4). 
 
3
 In his theory of narrative as a means of structuring experience, David Herman conceptualizes such 
“storyworlds” as “mental models of who did what to and with whom, when, where, why, and in what 
fashion in the world to which recipients relocate—or make a deictic shift—as they work to comprehend a 
narrative” (5). Calling on the work of Algirdas Julien Greimas in a later chapter, Herman goes on to point 
out that “actants are what enable language users to […] build a manifested universe of meaning from the 
materials provided by the immanent universe of meaning” (121). To answer the question I have just raised 
regarding the stuff of postmodern networks and narratives, this chapter focuses on critique and construction 
out of “actants” at the level of the story in postmodern fiction. 
 
4
 Both novels, for instance, are excerpted in Paula Geyh’s, Fred Leebron’s, and Andrew Levy’s 
Postmodern American Fiction: A Norton Anthology (1997). Portions of Silko’s novel are included in the 
section “Revisiting History” while a few chapters from Robinson’s novel are included in the section 
“Revising Genre.” Both novels are positioned as postmodern by the editors in terms of their active 
investments in undercutting naturalized understandings of history and genre. The literary criticism 
surrounding each of these works also tends to focus on their respective demythologizing projects, as I 
discuss further along in the chapter. 
 
5
 It should be pointed out that Vizenor views Larson’s reading of Native American Indian fiction as 
beholden to race as determinative of “the measures of tribal identities. The obscure notions of blood 
quantums, that arithmetic reduction of neat bloodlines, were dubious and uncertain measures of identities; 
so, in the end, he decided that the known ‘acceptance by one’s peers’ was a ‘more meaningful test of 
83 
 
Indianness’” (Manifest Manners 80). Larson, is hemmed in by the very kinds of boundaries that this project 
seeks to trouble. 
 
6
 See Spurgeon’s Exploding the Western: Myths of Empire on the Postmodern Frontier, especially chapter 
4 “Decolonizing Imperialism: Captivity Myths and the Postmodern World in Leslie Marmon Silko’s 
Ceremony.” 
 
7
 Alexie positions his Native protagonist, the ironically named John Smith, in the quintessential “between 
two worlds” position as he is torn from his young Native mother at birth and adopted by a white family in 
Seattle, Washington. Alexie ultimately invalidates this theorization of Native subjectivity by having Smith 
commit suicide at the novel’s conclusion. Hogan’s fictional Florida Taiga tribe barely boasts thirty living 
members, and her narrator/protagonist Omishto seems the stereotypical smart young Native woman who 
feels torn between the white world of education and the Native world of tradition. However, Hogan resists 
this easy bifurcation by constantly poking holes in each “world.” In the most obvious instance, white 
preservationists, Native traditionalists, and Natives who no longer follow tradition are all angry with Ama 
Eaton for shooting a protected Florida panther. 
 
8
 I agree with Womack’s resistance to postmodernism as it has traditionally been defined, but would argue 
that a postmodernism grounded in the material might assuage Womack’s justified leeriness of this theory. 
 
9
 Paula M. L. Moya defines the type of essentialism postmodernism seeks to avoid as “the notion that 
individuals or groups have an immutable and discoverable ‘essence’—a basic, unvariable, and presocial 
nature. As a theoretical concept, essentialism expresses itself through the tendency to see one social 
category (class, gender, race, sexuality, etc.) as determinate in the last instance for the cultural identity of 
the individual or group in question” (7). Craig Womack points out a gap in Moya’s and the broader new 
“postpositivist realist” reaction to postmodernism’s endless fictions by arguing that this reaction is “a 
version of postmodernism that describes much the same theoretical commitment as the old version, without 
any real theoretical difference but with a new theoretical jargon constituting its main distinctive feature” 
(“Theorizing” 355). The postpositive realist position is one that sees the value of postmodernism’s move 
away from foundationalism but is also leery of its inability to, as Womack expresses it, “make normative 
truth claims” (“Theorizing” 353). Womack argues that while the impulse of postpositive realists is 
promising, they “might be described as ‘having their cake and eating it too.’ They want to retain the 
theoretical sophistication of postmodernism in terms of looking at how history and culture give rise to ideas 
that are always mediated by human knowledge […] while also insisting that truth claims can be judged 
relatively true or false…” (355). 
 
10
 Latour’s distinction between the sociology of the social and the sociology of associations is helpful here 
as it further clarifies the distinction both Allen and I see between the different characters in Ceremony: “In 
most situations, we use ‘social’ to mean that which has already been assembled and acts as a whole, 
without being too picky on the precise nature of what has been gathered, bundled, and packaged together. 
When we say that ‘something is social’ or ‘has a social dimension,’ we mobilize one set of features that, so 
to speak, march in step together, even though it might be composed of radically different types of entities. 
This unproblematic use of the word is fine as long as we don’t confuse the sentence ‘Is social what goes 
together?’ with one that says, ‘social designates a particular kind of stuff.’ With the former we simply mean 
that we are dealing with a routine state of affairs whose binding together is the crucial aspect, while the 
second designates a sort of substance whose main feature lies in its differences with other types of 
materials. We imply that some assemblages are built out of social stuff instead of physical, biological, or 
economical blocks […]” (43). 
 
11
 Like Tayo, Betonie himself comes from a family in which social categories are not static, but fluid as he 
has a Navajo grandfather, Mexican grandmother, and lives on the outskirts of a Navajo reservation 
overlooking the white town of Gallup where he is ostracized by most everyone. 
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12
 See, for instance, Louis Owens’s argument that the central lesson of Ceremony is “that through the 
dynamism, adaptability, and syncretism inherent in Native American cultures, both individuals and the 
cultures within which individuals find significance and identity are able to survive, grow, and evade the 
deadly traps of stasis and sterility” (92). Chadwick Allen’s Blood Narrative, referenced earlier, includes a 
chapter titled “Blood/Land/Memory: Narrating Indigenous Identity in the American Indian Renaissance,” 
in which he emphasizes the “changing cultural and historical contexts” that Tayo must interpret in the 
novel in order to experience healing (172). Allen goes on to draw parallels between Tayo’s experiences and 
the literary aesthetic of writers such as Leslie Silko and James Welch, among others, whose 
“representations of pictographic traditions serve as metonyms for indigenous memory in the contemporary 
written text. They evoke the continuity of that memory across generations and the endurance of indigenous 
historical memory despite cultural change” (172). 
 
13
 As we saw with Spurgeon earlier, many self-proclaimed postmodern readings of Ceremony tend to reify 
familiar social categories by misunderstanding Paula Gunn Allen’s basic ideas about harmony versus 
human mechanism. In his book on Romantic theory and postmodernism Lou Caton calls on The Sacred 
Hoop as a foil against which to argue that novels like Ceremony can be most productively read in terms of 
the trope of polarity. Caton turns to Allen as critical opponent because she suggests that Tayo’s sickness 
arises from a nonnative view of the world that results in a “separation from the ancient unity of person, 
ceremony, and land” (119). Caton’s basic disagreement with Allen seems to come out of a dispute over the 
idea that Native cultures understand the world in holistic, organic terms while Western cultures understand 
the world in separatist, fragmented terms. Caton wants to find a similarity between these two views by 
arguing for a Western vision of unity in disunity. But the problem with his reliance on the binary of 
dualism and organicism is that such an approach misreads Allen’s embrace of wholeness and resistance to 
dualism. Allen’s and other critics’ rejections of this brand of polarity does not arise out of some naïve 
ignorance of the fact that “cultural difference needs to be arbitrated within a field of commonality in order 
to exist as a coherent, albeit diverse, collection of works” (Caton 102). Instead, this juxtaposition of 
wholeness to separatism and dualism stems from a legitimate concern over how such views of the world 
tend to reduce opposing cultures to their lowest common denominators to identify both difference and 
similarity. Allen does not buy into critical positions like Caton’s because such positions necessarily attempt 
to define the social collectives of Native peoples as substantive, and thus, static things. The view of the 
world Allen reads in Ceremony in The Sacred Hoop should not be understood in contrast to some perceived 
constructed view of the world because the holistic conception of the world that unfolds in the novel is much 
like the webs woven by Thought-Woman, the spider. 
 
14
 In The Madwoman in the Attic: The Woman Writer and the Nineteenth-Century Literary Imagination, 
Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar remind us that many nineteenth-century women writers were literally 
confined to their fathers’ houses (i.e. Dickinson, Brontë, and Rosetti), as were some of their characters. In 
their preface, Gilbert and Gubar explain that, “the inspiration for this study arose from a gap in the study of 
women writers in terms of what seemed to then a “distinctively female literary tradition” in which they saw 
recurrent “Images of enclosure and escape, fantasies in which maddened doubles functioned as asocial 
surrogates for docile selves, metaphors of physical discomfort manifested in frozen landscapes and fiery 
interiors” (xi). My usage of “trifles” is intended as a reference to Susan Glaspell’s famous play of that  title 
in which two women’s attention to small material objects considered to be trifles by the men in the drama 
ultimately lead them to solve a mystery the men cannot solve. 
 
15
 Each of these critics foreground their analyses of the novel with the language of transience, wandering, 
vagrancy, and/or transcendence: Marcia Aldrich writes about “The Poetics of Transience,” Anne-Marie 
Mallon about “Homelessness and Transcendence,” Sonia Gernes about “Transcendent Women” in 
Robinson and Atwood. Paula Geyh argues that “settled” and “transient” are the two options available to 
women in the novel. And Maggie Galeshouse’s essay is entitled “Their Own Private Idaho: Transience in 
Marilynne Robinson’s Housekeeping.” There are still other essays interested in these themes, but these five 
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are sufficient to demonstrate that an overwhelming percentage of attention devoted to the novel is dedicated 
to subverting social convention by way of focusing on the transience of the novel’s female characters. 
 
16
 In the preface and introduction to Literary Theory and the Claims of History: Postmodernism, 
Objectivity, Multicultural Politics, Satya P. Mohanty articulates what he sees as the shortcomings and 
possibilities of postmodernism, defining the mode much in the way that critics from Howe to Hutcheon 
have: “What is specifically postmodernist, however, is not the critique of tradition itself—for such a 
critique was central to the Enlightenment project of modernity as well—but rather the more far-reaching 
claim that truth and rationality are always socially and discursively constructed” (xi). Mohanty goes on to 
juxtapose his own view his own thesis with the postmodern “skeptical stance and the constructivist 
theoretical view that underlies or accompanies it” (16), and then explains that “the postmodernist critique 
of knowledge is limited because it does not consider reasonable alternatives to the positivist view” (18). 
And finally, in his response to Althusser’s brand of postmodernism in chapter 3, Mohanty explains that 
Althusser comes close to, but falls short of, a theory of postmodern agency. Mohanty brings us full circle 
back to Hutcheon’s distinction between postmodernism and feminism based on postmodernism’s lack of 
agency. Obviously, this chapter’s interest in how postmodernism should be understood as offering 
complicitous critique toward critical construction stands in conflict with Hutcheon and Mohanty. But these 
important critics have also provided the answer to the challenge to postmodern agency by maintaining an 
interest in construction. 
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CHAPTER III 
NARRATING THE SOCIAL: FROM OTHERNESS 
TO INCLINATION 
 
 
Nearly twenty years before Ihab Hassan asked whether postmodernism should be 
considered a social phenomenon or “perhaps even a mutation in Western humanism” 
(Orpheus 266), Leslie Fiedler had argued that the new generation associated with “post-
Modernist” fiction was rising in protest to “that bourgeois-Protestant version of 
Humanism, with its view of man as justified by rationality, work, duty, vocation, 
maturity, success” (“Mutants” 511). Originally delivered as a lecture at Rutgers 
University, Fiedler’s oft-cited 1965 essay “The New Mutants” specifically analyzes “the 
effort of young men in England and the United States to assimilate into themselves (or 
even to assimilate themselves into) that otherness, that sum total of rejected psychic 
elements which the middle-class heirs of the Renaissance have identified with ‘woman’” 
(516). Although Fiedler’s early contribution focuses especially on the ways in which 
WASP males buck the Enlightenment narrative of their sex, this idea of differentiation 
from tradition through “otherness” begins to work its way into the larger discourse of 
postmodernism until it becomes a defining trait in postmodern theories of sociality. What 
Fiedler in 1965 calls a rejection of humanism, Lyotard in 1979 famously calls an 
“incredulity toward metanarratives” (xxiv), and it is postmodernism’s incredulity toward 
hegemonic narratives of the social expressed through difference and otherness that has 
won the praise of even its staunchest critics. Fredric Jameson and Terry Eagleton (the 
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closest figures we might imagine to opponents of postmodernism—if postmodernism is 
even a position with the capacity to garner opponents) have claimed that postmodernism 
represents a “celebration of difference and differentiation” in which ideally “cultures 
around the world are placed in tolerant contact with each other in a kind of immense 
cultural pluralism” (Jameson “Cultures” 56), and that the enfranchisement of previously 
voiceless groups is the “trend’s most precious achievement” (Eagleton Illusions 121). 
From Fiedler to Lyotard to Jameson and Eagleton, the celebration of difference 
that postmodernism is said to represent reaches its full expression in the idea of 
otherness, or what Appiah terms “the manufacture of Otherness” in his 1991 essay “Is the 
Post- in Postmodernism the Post- in Postcolonial?” For Appiah, as for Lyotard and 
others, it is Max Weber’s narrative of Enlightenment rationalization and its attendant 
commodity culture that sets the stage for the emergence of postmodernism and 
postcolonialism in the second half of the twentieth century. The important distinction 
between these two “posts-” is that where postmodernism reappropriates commodity 
culture’s multiplication of difference to challenge the hegemonic social imaginary of 
Enlightenment modernity, postcolonialism teaches us that “we are all already 
contaminated by each other […] —the binarism of Self and Other—is the last of the 
shibboleths of the modernizers that we must learn to live without” (354). In other words, 
the rise of modern commodity culture showed us the need to define through distinction in 
order to clear a space in the marketplace, and postmodernism simply takes this idea of 
“the manufacture of otherness” to its absolute extreme as a means of critiquing the 
monolith of modernity. After all, how can we believe that we live in a world defined by 
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the unifying pervasion of reason and secularization when every day we witness the 
effects of authoritarian regimes and radical religious fundamentalisms? Given the 
undeniable proliferation of a vast array of different cultures, Appiah notes that “the 
beginning of postmodern wisdom is to ask whether Weberian rationalization is in fact 
what has occurred historically” (344). In his distinction between the postmodern and the 
postcolonial, Appiah begins to gesture toward the basic problem with postmodern 
theories of the social: the idea that cultures can be clearly defined through differentiation 
from one another on account of some immutable, foundational essence. It is this idea of 
difference, or otherness, that has been understood incompletely in postmodernism’s 
attempts to redress the hegemonic social imaginary of Enlightenment modernity. 
As with the misreading of postmodernism’s potential for reconstructive agency 
discussed in the last chapter, there is an important gap between the ways in which 
postmodern fiction enacts the social and the way it has been theorized by critics. Eagleton 
looks back on the rise of postmodernism in After Theory to explain that on the path to 
postmodernism “whatever linked us – whatever was the same – was noxious. Difference 
was the new catch-cry” (46 original emphasis). In his insightful “Mapping the 
Postmodern,” Andreas Huyssen describes the postwar social imaginary as made up of 
“various forms of otherness […] constitutive of postmodern culture” (50). However, as 
we saw in the novels of Silko and Robinson, setting cultures, races, and genders in 
opposition to one another necessarily requires that each category be understood as a 
definable substance and ignores its fluidity. That is, to conceive of the social as grounded 
in otherness is to assume that the entities being differentiated from one another are 
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individually autonomous, static, and substantive. And yet Tayo, for instance, is healed 
and reconciled with his people and his family in spite of what is perceived as a 
foundational difference between himself and other Lagunas (i.e. mixed blood), and 
finally able to remake his identity in cooperation with a host of human and nonhuman 
actors. In turning once again to nonhuman actors that populate DeLillo’s Underworld 
(1997) and Alvarez’s How the García Girls Lost Their Accents (1991), this chapter asks 
what we might learn by moving away from otherness as foundational to the postmodern 
construction of the social. The objects in these texts reveal that postmodern fiction is 
marked by an intrinsic interest not solely in otherness but also—and perhaps more than 
one would think—in “inclination,” or in what French philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy calls 
the clinamen of fundamentally relational beings toward one another in an “inoperative 
community” (Inoperative 3-4).
1
 
For Nancy, there is a vital distinction between a social collective identified as a 
community and one identified as a society. A society is an organized (or operative) 
association of individuals, maintained through work, and a community is “the exposure 
of singularities” (30).
2
 By “exposure of singularities” Nancy means that community is not 
the gathering of autonomous individuals under an operative structure. Rather, in building 
on Heidegger’s idea of Dasein, Nancy envisions community as a kind of being-with or 
being-in-common. Thus, for Nancy, community is the very clinamen or inclination of 
singular beings toward one another, and, at base, these beings are relational, not 
individual (3-4). Inclination is not a novel concept for Nancy or for Western philosophy 
by any means. Its roots can be followed back at least as far Lucretius’s two-thousand-
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year-old poem On the Nature of Things, in which the entire material universe is explained 
by the atom’s power “to swerve from its normal path, plus its power to cling together 
with other atoms both like and unlike itself” (Copely xii). Stephen Greenblatt defines this 
“swerve” or, in Lucretius’s Latin, this clinamen, as “an infinite number of atoms moving 
randomly through space, like dust motes in a sunbeam, colliding, hooking together, 
forming complex structures, breaking apart again, in a ceaseless process of creation and 
destruction” and later as “an unexpected, unpredictable movement of matter” (5, 7). 
Greenblatt’s recent book, The Swerve: How the World Became Modern (2011), charts the 
influence of this theory of matter throughout the European Renaissance, whereas Nancy 
culls it from Heidegger’s later discussions of being.
3
 The parallel theme in both 
treatments of the concept is that there is an unaccountable movement common to all 
matter that brings things into contact with one another. Without the clinamen, “swerve,” 
or inclination of atoms falling through the void matter would never come into contact 
with other matter. There would be no difference because there would be no staging of 
difference. While postmodern fiction is certainly invested in valorizing difference, it is 
perhaps even more interested in the inclination of actors that make this difference 
possible. 
What makes literary texts postmodern in terms of their view of the social, then, is 
not so much the fetishization of difference, as Eagleton posits, or the manufacture of 
otherness, as Appiah proposes, but the foregrounding of the inclination of what Nancy 
calls “singularities” or “singular beings.” Postmodern writers such as DeLillo and 
Alvarez do not merely enact Nancy’s idea of clinamen, but take it in a new direction by 
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asking us to include nonhuman actors in the realm of “singularities” that incline toward 
one another. Otherness has been misunderstood as foundational when it is actually only 
definable in the context of the inclination of actors toward one another in material 
formations. The obsession with otherness that has dominated the critical discourse of 
postmodernism arises, in part, out of a legitimate need to engage with the ethical 
implications of the differences we encounter when actors are exposed to one another, but 
these theories of otherness have become the foundation upon which our understanding of 
the postmodern is built. In the process, the inclination that precedes otherness has been 
pushed to the side and more often than not ignored altogether. If Silko and Robinson 
enable us to further reduce social categories that present themselves as lowest common 
denominators by highlighting the constituent material components of those categories, 
then the material domains of DeLillo’s and Alvarez’s novels help us see how it is that 
these actors incline toward one another in the first place. These texts suggest that when 
we widen our critical gaze to include nonhuman actors in the construction of the social, 
we can ultimately move away from a problematic reliance on otherness that dictates a 
view of the social as static substance. 
Recasting otherness as part and parcel of inclination is especially important now 
at a time when astute criticism is being leveled at the preoccupation with difference 
postmodernism shares with two other important –isms: poststructuralism and 
multiculturalism. For instance, Rey Chow begins her recent analysis of critical theory by 
arguing that difference has become the ultimate foundation for most philosophies of 
identity: 
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In the increasingly globalized realm of theoretical discourse, a habitual move may 
be readily discerned in critical discussion regarding marginalized groups and non-
Western cultures: the critic makes a gesture toward Western theory, but only in 
such a way as to advance the point that such theory is inadequate, negligent, and 
Eurocentric. As a consequence, what legitimates concern for the particular group, 
identity, or ethnic culture under discussion […] is its historical, cultural, gendered 
difference, which becomes in terms of the theoretical strategies involved, the 
basis for the claim of opposition and resistance. (171) 
 
 
Building on earlier critiques of postmodernism’s interest in difference such as bell 
hooks’s “Postmodern Blackness,” as well as Chow’s argument and others like it, critics 
such as Sue J. Kim have recently argued that “Otherness postmodernism, then, is the 
hegemonic idea that, by describing the anti-hegemonic in a formal way as difference, 
recuperates it back into the hegemony” and that “it fails to provide a concrete means to 
move beyond that sameness-difference binary” (22). Thus, postmodernism has finally 
been charged with committing the same crimes of Enlightenment modernity that it 
originally set out to fight. That is, in resisting the hegemonic social imaginary of 
Weberian rationalization, postmodernism has relied on heterogeneous narratives to the 
extent that it generates and perpetuates essentializing naturalizations of these different 
groups against some monolithic idea of sameness. But when we foreground the treatment 
of everyday objects in postmodern fiction, these texts uncover an inclination of various 
actors that ultimately produces the otherness that has been understood as foundational. 
The basis for a more productive understanding of the inclination of postmodern 
otherness has been present all along in Appiah’s 1991 essay on the two “posts-.” Early on 
Appiah proposes that one key feature of modern commodity culture is the need to “clear 
a space in which one is distinguished from all other producers and products—and one 
93 
does this by the construction and marking of differences” (341). A little later he defines 
postmodernism as “a retheorization of the proliferation of distinctions that reflects the 
underlying dynamic of cultural modernity, the need to clear oneself a space” (346). Just 
as Hutcheon and others saw in postmodernism unlimited potential to critique familiar 
social categories but could not see the reconstructive agency wrapped up in that critique, 
critics have recognized postmodernism’s ability to challenge hegemony by focusing on 
otherness but missed out on the all-important idea that what postmodernism actually does 
is clear space for gathering, not differentiating, by revealing the social as a process. In 
The Inoperative Community, Nancy declares that a community is “neither a work to be 
produced, nor a lost communion, but rather […] space itself” (19). And in Reassembling 
the Social, Latour, who repeatedly cautions us never to begin with what should be our 
result, proclaims that the social “is no more than an occasional spark generated by the 
shift, the shock, the slight displacement of other non-social phenomena” (36). Both Silko 
and Robinson move their characters around constantly to accomplish the interaction of 
human and nonhuman actors because without this clinamen and displacement there can 
be no social at all. Tayo goes to visit Betonie, follows him up into the mountains, makes 
his way home, and then chases the spotted cattle. Ruth and Sylvie are characterized as 
transient, vagrant, homeless, wandering, transcendent. The constant movement of actors 
that marks the social as a process necessitates open space through which they can incline 
toward one another, sometimes sticking together and sometimes breaking apart. 
Whereas the last chapter started with human actors and mapped out their 
interactions with nonhuman actors to demonstrate the significance of both in remaking 
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the social, this chapter does the reverse. Both texts I examine in this chapter start with 
particular objects whose significance results in the inclination of actors and the 
reconstruction of human and nonhuman relations. DeLillo’s magnum opus Underworld 
follows the trajectory of a famous baseball across nearly half a century as it circulates 
through the lives of numerous characters, clearing space for an inclination of human 
actors that defies the social as a static series of a priori categories. Thus, the novel 
ultimately demonstrates that community is developed out of common interactions and not 
in contrast to other “societies.” Alvarez’s How the García Girls Lost Their Accents 
features a series of objects—culminating with a toy drum brought from America to the 
Dominican Republic—that can help us reconcile Nancy’s theory of inclination with 
Latour’s theory of the social as always constituted by work. Nancy relies on clinamen, or 
the inclination of actors, which he insists “cannot arise from the domain of work” (31), 
while Latour relies on work because “if you stop making and remaking the groups, you 
stop having groups,” which he later refers to not as networks, but as “worknets” 
(Reassembling 34-35, 143). Alvarez illuminates and extends both approaches by focusing 
on the image of the hollow space contained by the toy drum, demonstrating that these two 
processes—inclination and work—are complementary. This reconciliation is essential to 
the novel’s overall goal of spinning diverse communities out of common material 
experiences. Much like Underworld and García Girls, other texts in the postwar era 
utilize nonhuman actors as the sites around which to map the inclination of other actors. 
Jayne Anne Phillips’s Machine Dreams (1984) connects actors across time and space as 
they interact with objects such as a radio and small wooden box. Nicholson Baker’s 
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Room Temperature (1990) spans innumerable narrative worlds as the narrator spends the 
novel contemplating a mobile he has built for his infant child. The piano in August 
Wilson’s The Piano Lesson (1987) draws an entire family together through conflict, but 
also introduces unfamiliar actors into the existing social formations in the drama. When 
we open up our approach to postmodern narrative to include inclination then what 
becomes clear is that these texts have the ability not only to demonstrate social categories 
as processes, but also to reveal how such categories emerge from a common material 
base. 
 
The Inclination of Actors 
 
Originally published in the October 1992 issue of Harper’s, DeLillo’s “Pafko at 
the Wall” recounts the final game of the 1951 pennant race between the New York Giants 
and the Brooklyn Dodgers, in which Bobby Thomson hits a walk-off home run to put the 
Giants in the World Series. The “Pafko” in the story’s title is the Brooklyn Dodgers 
outfielder who watches as the home run ball sails over his head and into the grandstands 
of the ballpark at New York’s Polo Grounds. When the story reappears five years later as 
the prologue to Underworld, however, it is retitled, “The Triumph of Death.” This title is 
taken from a sixteenth-century painting by Pieter Bruegel the Elder depicting a variety of 
violent and horrifying deaths in a war-torn landscape. Bruegel’s masterpiece shows up in 
the story as FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover sits watching the pennant game and a reprint of 
the painting torn from a magazine floats down over him in multiple pieces while the 
crowd throws various items onto the field. Since the Bruegel reprint appears in both the 
1992 and the 1997 versions of the story, why change the title? To complicate this 
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question further, the story was also republished as a novella under the original title, 
“Pafko at the Wall,” in October 2001 to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of 
Thomson’s homerun, whose reputation as “The Shot Heard Round the World” also 
serves as the novella’s subtitle. The most obvious answer to why DeLillo changes the 
title is also the most significant: the prologue serves a different purpose in relation to the 
novel than it does in the context of a periodical like Harper’s or as a novella. 
Most of the critical attention paid to DeLillo’s retelling of this famous game has 
focused on the contrast between blissful postwar America and the looming Soviet threat 
covered up by the baseball game, or on baseball itself as a complicated allegory of 
American society. As John Duvall notes, “Pafko at the Wall” presents a problematized 
view of American society in the postwar era. Duvall asserts that, in the ballpark, DeLillo 
exposes but fails to transcend a faulty “series of ‘us-them’ binaries of the early 1950s,” 
especially that of race relations (286). In other words, DeLillo demystifies the mythic 
social categories of postwar America, but does not offer a means of moving beyond these 
myths. I agree with Duvall’s assessment of “Pafko at the Wall,” which resonates with 
Hutcheon’s notion of postmodernism as complicitous critique. However, in its rebirth as 
“The Triumph of Death,” DeLillo’s story of that monumental day in baseball history is 
only the beginning of a much longer work, and therefore, I would argue it must be 
reconsidered in light of its function in relation to the novel proper. In that context “The 
Triumph of Death” is perhaps most important to Underworld because it provides the 
object—a baseball—whose movement throughout the rest of the narrative reveals the 
inclination of actors in the formation of a social network. The movement of the baseball 
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throughout the text might be said to develop Lucretius’s unaccountable swerve, the 
inclination of atoms, and Nancy’s theory of the “inoperative community,” but what it also 
accomplishes at least as convincingly is the remaking of relations between actors that 
cannot be explained by what Latour calls the “sociology of the social.”
4
 In other words, 
the inclination of various human and nonhuman actors around the baseball results in an 
association of actors that can only be understood in terms of how they are gathered 
together, not in terms of their fundamental differences or otherness. 
In a 1997 interview with DeLillo, Gerald Howard declares that Underworld 
belongs on a “short list of books that […] attempt to grapple with the subterranean 
history of postwar American life” (123). Howard places Underworld alongside novels 
such as William Gaddis’s The Recognitions (1955), Thomas Pynchon’s Gravity’s 
Rainbow (1973), and David Foster Wallace’s Infinite Jest (1996), to point out that a 
number of the most important texts to address the postwar era are “behemoths.”  
DeLillo’s response to this observation is both telling and useful: 
The novel is a very open form. It will accommodate large themes and 
whole landscapes of experience. The novel is here, the novel exists to give 
us a form that is fully equal to the sweeping realities of a given period. 
The novel expands, contracts, becomes essaylike, floats in pure 
consciousness—it gives the writer what he needs to produce a book that 
duplicates, a book that models the rich dense, and complex weave of 
actual experience. The novel goads the writer into surpassing himself.  
(Howard 124) 
 
 
In the tumult of Underworld’s sheer size and its exhibition of all the formal elements 
DeLillo mentions in his interview with Howard, the baseball acts as a constant force, 
enduring when other objects wane and connecting the disparate narratives that constitute 
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the novel. As the ball passes from one owner to another, its movement connects actors 
across space and time whose lives would never have overlapped otherwise. 
This inclination results in a fluid network that stands in sharp contrast to the 
crowd contained within the walls of the Polo Grounds where the ball is first introduced. 
The crowd gathered in the ballpark of “Pafko at the Wall” is representative of the static 
and stratified categories of race, class, gender, occupation, and so on that we typically 
accept as constitutive of society. The Polo Grounds stadium is ringed by ticket booths 
and turnstiles, inhabited by announcers, fans, players, coaches, any number of 
autonomous individuals playing predetermined roles. Even the sidewalks and streets 
outside the stadium are worked by vendors and “scraggy men hustling buttons and caps” 
(12). There are security guards, police officers, symbols of law and order, “black kids and 
white kids up from the subways or off the local Harlem streets […] a mick who shouts 
Geronimo” (12 original emphasis). Each of these individuals fits securely into a larger 
category, and the stratification of these categories forms the society of the ballpark. But 
as we have seen in the novels of Silko and Robinson, when we imagine any collective 
group as a lowest common denominator we obscure the agency of its constituent actors. 
As Nancy points out, “The community that becomes a single thing […] necessarily loses 
the in of being-in-common. Or, it loses the with or the together that defines it. It yields its 
being-together to a being of togetherness” (xxxix original emphasis). When we imagine 
the social in terms of categories—black, white, Irish, Indian—then we lose sight of the 
“in,” the “with,” the movement or inclination of the actors that actually forms the social 
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itself. This obfuscation ultimately leads to the reification of these categories as the lowest 
common denominators of individual identity. 
This reduction seems, at first, especially true in the case of Cotter Martin, one of 
the many “black kids” who leaps over the ticket turnstiles and steals his way into the 
game. The entire group is skipping school, and as Cotter evades Polo Grounds security 
guards he “runs up a shadowed ramp […] Then you lose him in the crowd” (14). While in 
the crowded stands, Cotter is befriended by a middle-aged white man named Bill 
Waterson. Like Cotter, Bill is ducking his responsibilities for the day, and the two 
become fast friends. Every word and action is bathed in the ritual of America’s pastime, 
complete with what Bill calls the “law of manly conduct,” in which Cotter shares his 
peanuts with Bill, and Bill must reciprocate by buying the young man a soda (22). 
However, after Bobby Thomson hits the famous home run, there is a mad dash and 
struggle to retrieve the baseball. Cotter comes up with the object, and as he runs from the 
stadium he realizes that the arm he wrenched to win it was Bill’s. In the scenes that 
follow we see DeLillo performing what critics have called a demythologizing of 
American society in the romanticized afterglow of the postwar era as the jovial 
relationship Cotter and Bill form during the game falls apart on account of the baseball.
5
 
Bill follows Cotter through the streets, trying to persuade him to give up the ball. The 
man becomes steadily more aggressive toward the boy, not realizing that Cotter is leading 
him farther and farther into “unmixed Harlem” (57). It is only when Bill notices that 
Cotter is becoming cocky, showing off with the ball, that he realizes where he is and 
backs off. Bill’s slow but powerful realization of his surroundings acts as what we might 
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think of, appropriately, as a dramatic shift in home field advantage. Cotter skips home 
triumphantly, and “Pafko at the Wall” comes to an end. Thus, as Duvall has pointed out, 
DeLillo exposes the ballpark as an idealistic view of America-as-society, and depicts a 
problematized scene of, among other things, race relations in the 1950s. 
When placed in the context of Underworld, however, “Pafko at the Wall” 
becomes “The Triumph of Death,” and much more than an exercise in demystification. 
While we might read the stand-alone “Pafko” as a fictional rendition of one of Roland 
Barthes’s insightful Mythologies, “The Triumph of Death” does not merely 
demythologize postwar American society, but as Nancy would stipulate, it literally 
interrupts this myth. Nancy distinguishes between demythologizing and interruption 
when he characterizes the former as a critique that ultimately “leaves the essence of myth 
untouched” while the latter recognizes itself as myth and is subsequently “cut off from its 
own meaning” (47, 52). By removing the ball from the Polo Grounds and unraveling the 
relationship between Cotter and Bill, DeLillo interrupts the romanticized myth of 
convivial race relations by demonstrating that the gap between white and black cannot 
simply be overcome through good feeling over peanuts and Coke at a baseball game, and 
then moving beyond that revelation to show both how it was made and how it can be 
remade. Bill beams at the young man in the stands, but later fumes as Cotter begins to 
feel safe in his own neighborhood and “holds the ball chest-high and turns it in his 
fingers, which isn’t easy when you’re running—he rotates the ball on its axis, spins it 
slowly over and around” (57). However, what makes the novel so important is what it 
does in the wake of interrupting this myth. DeLillo does not reduce the opposition 
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between Cotter and Bill to race. After shaking the older man, Cotter walks home through 
Harlem and at one point, “sees four guys from a local gang, the Alhambras, and he 
crosses the street to avoid them and then crosses back” (58). Cotter maneuvers to avoid 
the Alhambras just as he did to avoid Bill. His own father later steals the ball from him 
and sells it for himself. “The Triumph of Death” can be read as an interruption of myth 
because DeLillo is not content to expose the problems of black/white relations in the 
characters of Cotter and Bill. He goes on to show Cotter’s fear of other black characters 
and his mistreatment by his father, suggesting that race itself is not a monolith. But if 
race, among other social myths, is interrupted then how does DeLillo understand the 
phenomena that we talk about when we talk about race? Like any other collective, race is 
a matter of “being-in-common,” in unique ways, but these ways are constantly changing. 
The novel is therefore not merely interested in any preexisting category, but in the 
community that results from the inclination of its actors. 
The network that gets constructed as we trace the movement of the ball and the 
inclination it engenders among various actors stands in stark contrast to the bedlam of the 
ballpark in the aftermath of Thomson’s famous homerun. As FBI Director J. Edgar 
Hoover sits in the stands and the crowd goes crazy, someone tears a two-page printing of 
Bruegel’s The Triumph of Death from the pages of a magazine and the two halves come 
floating down into Hoover’s lap. Hoover assembles the pieces to reveal “the meatblood 
colors and massed bodies, this is a census-taking of awful ways to die. He looks at the 
flaring sky in the deep distance out beyond the headlands on the left-hand page–Death 
elsewhere” (50). Hoover’s interpretation of the painting as a “census-taking” of death 
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speaks to the sociological and political implications of gathering a mass of individuals 
together in one location. He looks at the glossy pages and sees the crowd that surrounds 
him. The overwhelming triumph of death in the painting corresponds to the madness in 
the ballpark as races, classes, and generations clamor over the monumental souvenir. But 
as the ball leaves the Polo Grounds in Cotter Martin’s hands the narrative leaves the 
ballpark behind, jumping more than forty years in time and jettisoning the ready-made 
microcosm of the society of the ballpark. 
The structure of the narrative is roughly reverse chronological, a trait Underworld 
shares with Alvarez’s García Girls. Divided into a prologue set in 1951, six main parts 
that work backwards from the narrative present of 1992 to the night following the famous 
pennant game in 1951, and an epilogue set in 1992, Underworld is essentially organized 
around revealing whether or not a baseball owned by protagonist Nick Shay in the 
novel’s present is in fact the authentic “shot heard round the world” that Bobby Thomson 
blasted into the stands and Cotter Martin pulled from the fray. While the main parts of the 
narrative move back through time, there are three smaller sections devoted to Cotter 
Martin’s father Manx at the end of parts one, three, and five that recount the initial sale of 
the ball. Manx’s narratives cover the few hours left unaccounted for by the man from 
whom Nick purchases the ball. Although DeLillo organizes the narrative in reverse-
chronological order to “create plot tensions that simply would disappear if one were to 
retell the story by reconstructing a conventional timeframe” (Duvall Reader’s 25), I want 
to reconstruct the movement of the ball in chronological order as a way of emphasizing 
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the ball’s movement through time and the social formations that result from its 
unpredictable “swerves.” 
Lest we forget the ball’s role in the interruption of the social myths of the postwar 
U.S. evidenced by Cotter’s confrontation with Bill and avoidance of the Alhambras, the 
ball is stolen from the boy by his own father on the very night of the game: “Manx steps 
into the room and sees the baseball almost at once. It is sitting in the open on the unused 
bed. This is what gets him every time. They obtain a valuable thing and don’t even bother 
to hide it. Trust fairies to watch over their valuables” (149). Piecing together the three 
narrative sections devoted to Manx, we follow him out of the apartment, down into the 
street where the super accuses him of stealing shovels from the basement of the building, 
and over to the Polo Grounds where a line is already forming at the box office as fans 
wait to buy tickets to the upcoming World Series. DeLillo bookends each of Manx’s 
sections in the novel with pages that are solid black both front and back. Manx is a man 
who views race as foundational, he is hemmed in by it on all sides. When brooding over 
how to approach the sale of the ball he reasons that he will not be successful if he 
approaches a black man: 
black man’s not gonna believe anything he says. Think I’m some fool running a 
penny hustle. Black man’s gonna look him down with that saucy eye he’s got for 
outrageous plots against his person. No. got to go white. Only way to go. Besides, 
the numbers mostly white, so it’s the percentage play. (642) 
 
 
However, in the exchange that results in the sale of the ball what takes precedence is not 
the fundamental otherness that Manx feels between himself and the white buyer, but the 
“cooperation” he encounters in the white man, Charles Wainwright Sr., who is looking 
104 
for an excuse to purchase a ball whose significance will be all but impossible to 
authenticate (647). 
DeLillo privileges inclination over otherness by foregrounding the ways in which 
the two men seem to be of one mind as they talk about the ball in straightforward terms, 
both acknowledging that Charles has a much better chance of convincing anyone of its 
authenticity than Manx. Manx facilitates the sale by doing his best to anticipate and 
answer the potential objections to the ball’s authenticity that Charles will inevitably 
encounter. He explains that his son convinced him of the ball’s genuineness and that 
while Cotter might lie about skipping school or going to the dentist, he would not lie 
about this because, as Charles says helpfully, “‘this is baseball’ […] And baseball. This 
counts.’ Manx takes heart from the man’s cooperation because he doesn’t want to suffer 
another bringdown. But at the same time he doesn’t want to think of Charlie as a sucker, 
a rube in a duffle coat, falling for an easy line” (647). Charles finishes Manx’s sentences. 
There is a bond between them that precedes their seemingly a priori racial otherness, and 
that bond is baseball. Manx “calls him Charles now, for the social aspect, gentlemen 
drinkers at the club, and the two share a drink from Charles’s flask” (650). Charles 
“Doesn’t even wipe off the rim. Just flips the flask and drinks, too deep” (650). The fact 
that Charles puts his mouth on the flask after Manx and drinks only seems significant 
because of their racial difference, but ultimately even that difference is the product of 
their inclination, their movement toward one another and in relation to the ball. If Charles 
does not move toward Manx, take up the flask, and drink deeply, the weight of his 
gesture as a reaching across distance would not be so heavy. The difference would not 
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exist if they did not incline, move, swerve toward one another in the first place, like two 
of Lucretius’s atoms clashing in the boundless void. 
While some have argued that the ball is a mere commodity in this moment, that it 
“condense[s] and reif[ies] the game’s lore into something with exchange value rather than 
mythical value” and that, “myth has been replaced by commerce” (Fitzpatrick 150), such 
interpretations overlook the reconstructive agency of the ball itself. The ball is not merely 
symbolic in its existence like a hundred-dollar bill. When Charles Wainwright Sr. buys 
the ball from Manx Martin, the emphasis is not on the amount of money, which DeLillo 
describes as “A ten, two fives, another ten, two singles, a quarter, two nickels and a 
tiddlywinks dime,” but on the fact that Wainwright gives “every nickel in [his] pocket 
above and beyond” (652). The ball has not been commodified in the sense that it has a 
particular exchange value. Just the opposite is true; the ball can never be authenticated, 
and thus can only ever be worth everything (as in Wainwright’s case) and nothing at 
once. The ball is truly an invaluable object. DeLillo washes the ball clean of both its 
utility—as Charles Wainwright Sr. would certainly never use it to play catch with his 
son—and its exchange value—as its genuineness cannot be verified. In doing so he frees 
it from the human determination that makes the “thing” an “object” as we saw in the last 
chapter in Betonie’s explanations of the stories things contain. 
The novel’s constant refutation of various forms of nostalgia reinforce this 
commitment to the social as a constant product, not a preexisting frame. In the narrative 
present of 1992, protagonist Nick Shay contacts a baseball memorabilia collector by the 
name of Marvin Lundy who is said by Nick’s coworker Brian Glassic to be in possession 
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of the famous ball. Brian visits Marvin Lundy impulsively while on a business trip and 
hears the entire convoluted history of the older man’s lifelong quest to locate the “shot 
heard round the world.” Lundy purchases the ball from the estate of a man named Rauch 
whose wife says she purchased it from the ex-wife of a man named Charles Wainwright 
Jr., who inherited the ball from his father. Lundy can trace the ball all the way back to the 
night of the pennant game, but not from Wainwright Sr. to Manx Martin, and thus not “to 
the ball making contact with Bobby Thomson’s bat” (181). Brian returns home and tells 
Nick about Lundy. When Nick calls Marvin he can’t quite articulate why he wants the 
ball. The narrative is focalized through Marvin’s thoughts as he listens to Nick: “This 
was good. Marvin liked this. It was good to hear from someone who was not palpitating 
in his mind for the old Giants or the old New York” (191). Marvin’s relief at Nick’s lack 
of nostalgia is explained by his own search for the ball: 
this was Marvin’s exact status. For years he didn’t know why he was chasing 
down exhausted objects. All that frantic passion for a baseball and he finally 
understood […] it was some terror working deep beneath the skin that made him 
gather up things, amass possessions and effects. (191) 
 
 
The unaccountable longing that both men feel for this baseball represents the inclination 
of actors toward one another, and it cannot be explained by some nostalgic desire for 
childhood summer afternoons, the smell of leather, or America’s game on television. 
What is more important in the novel the relationships that get formed as a result of this 
inclination, as in the case of Manx Martin and Charles Wainwright Sr. 
Marvin Lundy’s own search for the ball takes him to Long Island, San Francisco, 
Texas, Detroit, Eastern Europe, and beyond in a frustrating and fruitless attempt to find a 
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man named Charles Wainwright Jr., last known to be in Greenland. Material objects are 
no respecters of geography, nation, race, or creed. When Marvin hits a dead end in his 
search for Wainwright Jr. and fails to trace the ball backwards through time, he tries 
instead to start from the ballpark and work up to Wainwright Jr. He amasses photographs 
of the crowd that were taken in 1951 during the mad scramble for Thomson’s home run 
ball: 
At one point Marvin hired a man who worked in a photo lab and had 
access to special equipment. They studied news photographs of the left-
field stands at the Polo Grounds taken just after the ball went in. They 
looked at enlargements and enhancements. They went to photo agencies 
and burrowed in the archives. Marvin had people sneak him into 
newspaper morgues, into the wire services and the major magazines. (175) 
 
 
Not only does Marvin’s search take him around the world and into archives and morgues, 
but it also leads him to look at “a million photographs because this is the dot theory of 
reality, that all knowledge is available if you analyze the dots” (175). In Marvin’s self-
styled “dot theory” DeLillo explains the relationship of the thousands of individual dots 
that make up a photo to the photo as a whole. While the photo is significant as a totality, 
its existence as such does not negate the singularity of its constituent “dots.” 
Similarly, the social network that gets constructed around the movement of the 
baseball—that so far consists of Bobby Thomson, the bat, Ralph Branca, the turnstiles, 
Cotter Martin, Bill Waterson, peanuts, soda, Manx Martin, the shovels Manx is supposed 
to have stolen, the Wainwrights, the flask, Genevieve Rauch, Judson Rauch, Marvin 
Lundy, his vast collection, and all the people, places, and things these various characters 
encounter in their interactions with the ball—is the constant product of the inclination of 
108 
a host of human and nonhuman actors in relation to the movement of the baseball. 
Extending Marvin Lundy’s “dot theory of reality,” we might think here of photomosaics. 
A mosaic is “an image traditionally composed of small pieces of material,” while a 
photomosaic is “a digital image made up of other digital images” (Michelone and Medel 
58). For instance, a popular style of photomosaic is the picture of a famous historical 
figure made up of hundreds of smaller pictures, each depicting a specific moment in that 
person’s life. As Marvin Lundy investigates pictures of the grandstands in the Polo 
Grounds during the scramble for the ball, he develops his “dot theory,” which is a 
synechdotal metaphor for the larger network that gathers around the ball over the course 
of the entire narrative. The dot theory gives us a way of talking about the phenomena that 
social categories such as race and class have typically nominated by calling our attention 
away from the assemblage as a totality and toward the significance of the actors involved 
in the actual assembly process. 
When each dot, or actor, is a mediator in the construction of the social, then even 
the most seemingly insignificant outliers can play a role in shaping the assembly because 
they do not exist outside the social. The inclination of all actors has an effect on the 
groupings that get made. As we track the ball forward in time from Charles Wainwright 
Sr. who leaves it to his son, we discover that the ball falls into the hands of Wainwright 
Jr.’s ex-wife, Susan, and eventually winds up in a family by the name of Rauch. The 
narrative focalizes through Lundy’s memory again: 
1. The mother of twins in what’s that town. 
2. The man who lived in a community of chemically sensitive people, they wore 
white cotton shifts and hung their mail on clotheslines. 
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3. The woman named Bliss, which he was younger then, Marvin was, and maybe 
could have, with eyes as nice as hers, done a little something, in Indianola, 
Miss. 
4. The shock of lives unlike your own. Happy, healthy, lonely, lost. The one-
eighth Indian. Lives that are blunt and unforeseen even when they’re ordinary. 
5. Who knew a Susan somebody who spoke about a baseball with a famous past. 
Marvin forgets the tribe. (317) 
 
 
The list goes on and on to include “a hippie Christian cluster,” “the bone cancer kid in 
Utah,” “the woman with the chipped tooth,” and “the chemicals in the core of the ball 
that made the man run in place after breakfast every day” (317). But perhaps the most 
notable outlier to affect the construction of a social network around the ball is the serial 
killer whose actions ultimately bring the ball into Marvin Lundy’s possession. Without 
the demented deeds of this character who seems, at first glance, utterly cut off from the 
community of the baseball, Marvin would never find the ball, Brian would never learn of 
its existence, Nick would never call Marvin, the whole narrative would be different. 
If a serial killer who never even touches the ball himself can change the course of 
the actor and thus of all the other actors in the novel, then how can any actor be a mere 
intermediary? DeLillo devotes a number of sections of the novel to Richard, a man 
known to the American public as the Texas Highway Killer, who shoots motorists while 
they drive their vehicles across Texas highways. Richard never comes into contact with 
the ball, he does not know anyone personally who does come into contact with the ball, 
he seems completely outside the social network being constructed by the inclination of a 
host of actors in relation to the ball. And yet, when recounting the breakthrough in his 
quest, Marvin Lundy explains that he had lost years in the 1970s looking for “Judson 
Jackson Johnson” until a woman named Genevieve Rauch contacts him out of the blue 
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and says that she was once in possession of the ball, but the lead goes nowhere. Then, one 
day, “A man’s driving along in his car, someone shoots him dead. Turns out the victim is 
the long-lost former husband of Genevieve Rauch. Turns out further his name is Juddy 
Rauch, Judson Rauch. So the two rivers meet. Took homicide to reveal the connection” 
(179). Lundy’s daughter goes on to explain how Marvin had gone to Deaf Smith County, 
Texas to hire a lawyer on behalf of Genevieve Rauch 
and finally located the baseball sealed in a baggie and vouchered and numbered 
and stored in the property clerk’s office. Impounded by the police along with the 
body, the car, all the things in the car, of which this was one, crammed in a 
cardboard box filled with junky odds and ends. (180) 
 
 
Thus, it is Richard, the serial murdering Texas Highway Killer, who finally brings the 
ball out of obscurity. While it is tempting to allow the disturbing otherness of this 
murderous character to heighten the importance of all actors in the formation of the 
social, as we follow Richard home from one of his many shootings in the novel, DeLillo 
uncovers an inclination that draws the killer to commit his terrible crimes. 
Richard’s problem is not some inherent difference between himself and others. 
When alone he worries about a copy-cat crime in which someone else has been shot by a 
driver. He is an “early riser” who leaves “food for a stray cat” and cares for his aging and 
invalid parents (271-72). When we discover that he has purchased an electronic device to 
disguise his voice from “a mercenary magazine,” the narrator explains that “this was not 
a publication Richard normally perused. He was not a surveillance man or gun lover” 
(269). His problem seems to be rooted not in his essence but in his preoccupation with 
how others see him. He lives in constant fear of how others view him, so he avoids others 
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as much as possible. The only person he ever talks meaningfully with is a television news 
anchor named Sue Ann who “gave him the feeling he was taking shape as himself, 
coming into the shape he’d always been intended to take, the thing of who he really was” 
(269). Richard worries constantly about the category into which he fits. He repeatedly 
prefaces his statements to Sue Ann with phrases like, “let’s set the record straight,” and 
he worries over being incorrectly labeled a child who grew up in dysfunctional home 
with head trauma (215-217). He insists that he is not a “sniper” because he is not “an 
individual with a rifle working more or less long-range. You’re mobile here, you’re 
moving, you want to get as close to the situation as human possible without bringing the 
two vehicles into contact, whereby a paint mark might result” (217). Richard’s terrible 
actions are ultimately the result of his resistance to the inclination of actors that makes 
the social. He fears “contact,” so he gets as close as possible without actually touching 
others. Richard says to Sue Ann on national television that he singled her out to talk to 
because, as he explains, 
I saw the interview you did where you stated you’d like to keep your career, you 
know, ongoing while you hopefully raise a family and I feel like this is a thing 
whereby the superstation has the responsibility to keep the position open, okay, 
because an individual should not be penalized for lifestyle type choices. (217-28) 
 
 
He can see that identity is irreducible to mother, spouse, or news anchor, and he doesn’t 
want to be reduced to “head case” or “sniper.” His resistance to interacting with others 
distorts what little contact he does have. Even the social network that is constructed 
around the baseball is, in part, a product of Richard’s warped attempts to come into 
contact with others. 
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The ball connects literally every single one of the numerous narrative threads of 
the novel, from the prologue, to the six main parts devoted to Nick Shay’s reverse-
chronology, to the sections devoted to Manx, to the chapters set aside for Richard the 
Texas Highway Killer, to the epilogue in which the narrative voice briefly shifts to 
Nick’s first-person perspective. The ball almost resembles a deus ex machine or the 
existential feather that floats around in Robert Zemeckis’s Forrest Gump (1994). DeLillo 
himself says in an essay that writers sometimes stretch the bounds of believability: 
It is almost inevitable that the fiction writer, dealing with this reality, will violate 
any number of codes and contracts. He will engineer a swerve from the usual 
arrangements that bind a figure in history to what has been reported, rumored, 
confirmed or solemnly chanted. It is fiction’s role to imagine deeply. (“The Power 
of History” 5) 
 
DeLillo engineers the many swerves of the baseball throughout Underworld to establish 
connections between a wide array of human and nonhuman actors. Some of these actors 
search fervently for the ball, while it fortuitously intersects with the lives of others. The 
ball sits in storage for years with the other things that occupied Judson Rauch’s car when 
he was shot by Richard. All of these entities, from Nick Shay to Richard’s voice altering 
device, ultimately incline toward one another in a unique configuration that would not be 
possible without the swerve of the ball. If Silko and Robinson reveal that the social is a 
process and not a substance, then DeLillo’s baseball helps us see that this process cannot 
be explained by some “specific social ties revealing the hidden presence of some specific 
social forces” because “associations are made of ties which are themselves non-social” 
(Latour Reassembling 5, 8). In other words, it is the material actors, the humans and 
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nonhumans that account for the social through their inclinations toward one another, and 
these inclinations that account, in turn, for the social. 
In an essay written following the tragic events of September 11, 2001, DeLillo 
reimagines the significance of memorable days like the one that took place at the Polo 
Grounds in 1951 through the lens of terror when he says that “For the next 50 years, 
people who were not in the area when the attacks occurred will claim to have been there. 
In time, some of them will believe it. Others will claim to have lost friends or relatives, 
although they did not” (“Ruins” 35). But what is most evocative of Thomson’s home run 
ball is DeLillo’s interest in the objects of September 11. After rattling off an entire 
paragraph of items like cell phones and box cutters, DeLillo says, 
These are among the smaller objects and more marginal stories in the sifted ruins 
of the day. We need them, even the common tools of terrorists, to set against the 
massive spectacle that continues to seem unmanageable, too powerful a thing to 
set into our frame of practiced response. (“Ruins” 35) 
 
 
These objects, much like the baseball in Underworld, serve as reminders that no actor is 
reducible to any single association or event. When we are willing to expand our social 
horizon to include an interrogation of the myriad actors that actually constitute the social, 
and move away from a conception of the social as irreducible categories that can be 
fundamentally distinguished from one another based on their inherent differences, then 
what becomes apparent is that those differences can be overcome because they are in fact 
products of a more elemental inclination common among all actors that is uncovered in 
Underworld  and made the most of in How the García Girls Lost Their Accents. 
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Locating the Stories In Things 
 
The collections gathered by characters in Ceremony and Housekeeping 
demonstrate the reconstructive agency of nonhuman actors by foregrounding the stories 
that are “alive,” as Betonie says, in these things. When we read these novels with an 
attention to everyday things, we are better able to see how our social relations are always 
effects, results, outcomes. When we focus even more specifically on the movement of 
these objects, as DeLillo asks us to in Underworld, we are better able to understand how 
the social is formed through the mere inclination of actors toward one another. The fact 
of Charles Wainwright Sr.’s whiteness that seems significant when he drinks after Manx 
Martin, or of Tayo’s “mixed-blood” is no longer race, but the process of racialization. 
The clarity of gender against which Ruth and Sylvie are seen as strange in Lucille’s eyes 
becomes the process of gendering. It is the movement of the actors that accounts for their 
coming together and for the differences that are produced as a consequence. Alvarez’s 
first novel, How The García Girls Lost Their Accents, expands our understanding of the 
role of objects in the formation of the social by demonstrating how stories come to “live” 
in things in the first place. One character’s search for guavas, the legal paper on which 
she composes a ninth-grade speech, and a toy drum seem at first blush to accentuate the 
intersections of familiar social categories, especially nationality, gender, and age, but 
upon closer inspection these objects actually act as sites of inclination where various 
actors are brought into contact with one another in unexpected ways. These interactions 
are gathered into the history of the things themselves, into the spaces cleared by these 
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objects, and eventually become the literal source material for much of the narrator’s story 
over the course of this complex novel. 
García Girls follows the family of Carlos and Laura García from the Dominican 
Republic to the United States in the midst of the political turmoil that plagued the island 
throughout the long reign of Rafael Trujillo. In 1960, Carlos is implicated in a plot to 
unseat the Dominican dictator, and when two inspectors show up at the García house to 
question him a friend from the American Embassy is forced to intervene. The García 
family flees to the United States where the four young daughters, Carla, Sandra, Yolanda, 
and Sofía, learn English, grow up, attend stateside schools and universities, and settle 
themselves as adults. Throughout the years after their departure, the girls frequently visit 
their birthplace, but with each successive trip the disparity between life on the island and 
life in the states becomes more prominent. The novel tells this story in reverse-
chronological order over the course of three major sections, each of which is subdivided 
into five smaller chapters. Each of these chapters begins with a title and a name or series 
of names that denotes which character or characters focalizes the chapter. The first 
section crawls back in time from 1989 to 1972, and includes four chapters narrated in 
third person and one in first person by Yolanda. The second section covers the years 
1970-1960, and includes three chapters narrated in third person and two in first person: 
one seemingly by all the sisters together, and the other by Yolanda. The third section 
covers the years 1960-1956, and includes one chapter narrated half in third person and 
half in first person by Sofía, and four narrated in first person: two by Yolanda, one by 
Carla, and one by Sandra. The steady movement from a predominant use of third person 
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to a prevailing multiplicity of first-person narrations as the narrative moves back in time 
reflects the reducibility of the hegemonic social imaginary that seems to organize the 
world of adults to the heterogeneous inclination of various actors contained in an object 
as simple as a toy drum in the eyes of a young Yolanda. 
Whereas I read against the reverse-chronological structure of Underworld to 
emphasize the baseball’s movement forward through time, I want to follow Alvarez’s 
reverse-chronology back in time to demonstrate how she organizes the novel by steadily 
tracing the entire narrative present back to a single thing, the toy drum. The danger in 
following the García girls back in time is that we might come to consider the novel purely 
a story of origins, a juxtaposition of Dominican Republic as homeland and the United 
States as foreign land. In fact, Catherine Romagnolo has investigated the complexity of 
Alvarez’s “narrative beginning” alongside those of Toni Morrison in Beloved and Zora 
Neale Hurston in Their Eyes Were Watching God.
6
 Because the text is deeply invested in 
examining the Garcías’ struggle with what their Tía Carmen calls “American ways,” 
critics have often approached the text as an investigation of the complexities of bicultural, 
international, and hybridized experience. The earlier criticism especially echoes the 
binary language of multiculturalism. Jacqueline Stefanko, for instance, sees Alvarez and 
other Latina writers as “hybrid selves who cross and recross borders of language and 
culture [and] create hybrid texts in order to ‘survive in diaspora,’ to use Donna 
Haraway’s term” (50). Maribel Ortiz-Márquez turns to Homi Bhabha to blur the lines 
between various binaries in the novel, such as that between the private and public sphere, 
but ultimately reasserts a sharp division between “that social reality which lies not at the 
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core of the text, but at its margins” (236). Other critics focus on language in the novel as 
the “borderline” on which “Alvarez situates her characters” (159), as Julie Barak has 
argued, and as the source of the sisters’ conflicts “with their bicultural surroundings,” 
according to Ricardo Castells (34).
7
 Such approaches tend necessarily to begin where 
they should finally end because they rely on social categories such as nation and culture, 
and terms such as “hybrid” that unavoidably reinforce these categories as substances 
much in the way that many self-styled postmodern readings do with Ceremony.
8
 
While many otherwise insightful readings remain beholden to the “between two 
worlds” narrative,
9
 more recent investigations into Alvarez’s first novel have taken a 
decided turn toward showing how the text actually pushes beyond this reductive 
framework. Sarika Chandra convincingly claims that while older immigrant narratives 
depict immigrants as grappling with their identities in a United States culture that has the 
effect of homogenizing diverse individuals into oversimplified ethnic categories, “more 
contemporary narratives such as […] Julia Alvarez’s How the García Girls Lost their 
Accents (1991) present immigrants who conduct similar negotiations but in a much more 
interconnected world” (832). Such critics typically employ the language of globalization 
or transnationalism as opposed to that of hybridity or multiculturalism. Katarzyna 
Marciniak, for instance, asserts that writers like Alvarez compose 
characters who transgress the boundaries of established nationhood by moving 
across national borders, languages, cultures, and competing ideologies. In doing 
so, […] they show how liminal identities, with their shifting subject positions, 
complicate the dichotomous hierarchy of citizen-legal subject/stranger-illegal 
other. (59) 
 
 
118 
The difference between much of the earlier and later criticism can be found in the move 
away from binaries and dichotomies and in the direction of “interconnectedness” and the 
“trans-” national, cultural, etc. Building on this evolving critical conversation, a 
materialist reading of García Girls can help realize the type of interpretation that 
Chandra, Marciniak, and others imagine as ideal. Chandra reasons that newer 
“immigrant/ethnic” texts like García Girls “should dispel the notion that a culturalist 
identity politics can, on its own, become a refuge from and provide critical resistance to 
the contemporary forces of globalization” (848). Chandra eschews the binary, 
dichotomous language of earlier readings, but ultimately relies on the somewhat nebulous 
“forces of globalization” to explain social changes that require the political intervention 
of novels like Alvarez’s.
10
 In fact, such forces can be accounted for by the inclinations of 
the myriad human and nonhuman actors that move and swerve and cause other actors to 
do the same throughout Alvarez’s complex narrative, even a thing as simple as a guava. 
The guavas that fill the foothills of the Dominican Republic construct class 
divisions specific to the culture, language, and nation of the Dominican Republic as the 
third García sister, Yolanda, borrows a little Datsun to go collecting the tropical fruits in 
the first and chronologically latest chapter of the novel. For Alvarez, class is not a 
preexistent category that organizes the lives of individuals, but a material process by 
which actors are constantly shuffled in relation to one another and in relation to a variety 
of things. In the United States the Garcías live what we might call a fairly stable middle-
class life, but on the island they are members of the elite. In the narrative present of 1989, 
Yolanda has not lived permanently on the island for nearly three decades, and when she 
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expresses her desire to go pick guavas while on a visit to the Dominican Republic, her 
aunts’ disagreement over the prospect serves as an inventory of the language, attitude, 
and things that constitute class. One aunt offers the use of a family car, another exclaims, 
“have you lost your mind? A Volvo in the interior with the way things are!” (9). Yolanda 
only breaks the tension by offering the even more laughable alternative of taking the bus: 
“‘A bus!’ The whole group bursts out laughing. […] ‘Can’t you see it!? [Lucinda] laughs. 
‘Yoyo climbing into an old camioneta with all the campesinos and their fighting cocks 
and their goats and their pigs!’” (9). The name brand of the car, the language of the 
“interior,” and the laughter all seem to designate an established line that Yolanda should 
not cross, but she leaves the protection of the compound in the morning in the less-
impressive Datsun and makes her way into the hills where she stops at a small cantina. 
The woman who runs the cantina becomes “the long arm of [Yolanda’s] family” and 
volunteers a young boy to gather the fruit for her: “The doña will get hot, her nice clothes 
will get all dirty. José will bring the doña as many guavas as she is wanting” (16). Before 
the woman can react, Yolanda gathers a whole troop of boys into the car and they set out 
on their expedition. They are successful and “Yolanda eats several right on the spot, 
relishing the slightly bumpy feel of the skin in her hand, devouring the crunchy, sweet 
white meat. The boys watch her” (17). There is a distance between them created by the 
guavas. The boys see guavas everyday; they are a commonplace and so their novelty to 
the doña produces an otherness between them evident in the way they stand back and 
watch her. 
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The guavas also gender, racialize, and nationalize Yolanda by producing a 
tangible tension between her and a group of older men who emerge from the grove after 
the Datsun blows a tire. Yolanda sends José to a local compound to get help, but before 
he returns the men walk out of the guava trees with machetes in their hands and ask if the 
señorita is all right. The narrator notes specifically that one of the men is “no taller than 
Yolanda,” seeming to intimate that the biological differences of sex are not so acute, but 
the difference in their genders becomes stark considering the fact that “anywhere else, 
Yolanda would find [his companion] extremely attractive, but here on a lonely road, with 
the sky growing darker by seconds, his good looks seem dangerous, a lure to catch her off 
guard” (20). She freezes with fear and the men take her silence for incomprehension: 
“The handsome one smiles knowingly. […] ‘Americana,’ he says to the darker man, 
pointing to the car” (20). Her gender, light skin tone, and stateside upbringing are not 
only palpable, but produced in this moment, brought about by Yolanda’s search for a 
nostalgic snack. The chasm between her and the men is amplified when they replace the 
tire for her and she insists on paying them for their trouble. After overcoming their 
refusal she reaches for their hands: “The shorter man holds his back at first, as if not 
wanting to dirty her hand, but finally, after wiping it on the side of his pants, he gives it to 
Yolanda. The skin feels rough and dry like the bark of trees” (22). The man’s hand recalls 
the rough, “bumpy feel” of the guava skin and is juxtaposed with a Palmolive advertising 
poster illuminated by Yolanda’s headlights as she drives José back to the cantina. On the 
dish soap ad the “Palmolive woman’s skin gleams a rich white” (23). The contrast 
between the “rough” and “gleaming” skin is further exacerbated by the commodification 
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of leisure and color in an effort to sell a product that will ostensibly make one smooth and 
white. Thus, the ad actually manufactures this distinction in its effort to achieve a more 
singular goal: to have everyone share the common experience of buying the soap. 
The guavas create the space in which these things and people interact, and while 
such differences may have been produced regardless, they could not have been 
manufactured in the same way. The point is that such associations require constant work 
to be maintained. Yolanda’s gender, her affiliation with the United States, even the color 
of her skin must be developed in relation to others.
11
 But even categories less tangible 
than gender, geography, and complexion are produced by the unaccountable movements 
of actors through space. The so-called “cultural” differences that mark the generational 
gap between the García girls and their parents, especially their father, are largely formed 
by the family’s interaction with other actors, such as dolls for sale at an up-scale 
restaurant, a book celebrating the female body entitled Our Bodies, Our Selves, expectant 
parents in a maternity ward, and the spirit of the “good grey” poet, Walt Whitman 
materialized on the pages of “one of those innumerable pads of paper [Carlos] brought 
home from his office, compliments of some pharmaceutical company, advertising 
tranquilizers or antibiotics or skin cream” (134). Laura García uses these pads for her 
“inventions,” but gives up after being scooped by the person who “made a million” 
designing suitcases with wheels (139-40). She only reenlists her “pencil and pad one last 
time” to help Yolanda compose the “Teacher’s Day address at the school assembly” 
(141). The confrontation that results between Carlos, Laura, and Yolanda uncovers 
differences that have been manufactured between father, mother, and daughter. 
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The agency of the nonhuman actors in this scene is accentuated by the fact that it 
is Walt Whitman’s influence on Yolanda’s speech that most infuriates her father, yet it 
was Carlos who purchased the book of poetry for his daughter in the first place. Yolanda 
struggles with the speech-writing process and so turns to a book for inspiration. She reads 
the first lines of “Whitman’s poems in an old book with an engraved cover her father had 
picked up in a thrift shop next to his office […] The poet’s words shocked and thrilled 
her” (142). The influence of Whitman’s language is made evident not by Yolanda’s 
performance of the speech for her father, the contents of the speech are withheld from us, 
but by Carlos’s reaction: 
In barely audible Spanish, as if secret microphones or informers were all about, he 
whispered to his wife, “You will permit her to read that?” Laura’s eyebrows shot 
up, her mouth fell open. In the old country, any whisper of a challenge to 
authority could bring the secret police in their black V.W.’s. But this was 
America. People could say what they thought. “What is wrong with her speech?” 
Laura questioned him. “What ees wrrrong with her eh-speech? […] I will tell you 
what is wrong. It show no gratitude. It is boastful. I celebrate myself? The best 
student learns to destroy the teacher? […] That is insubordinate. It is improper. It 
is disrespecting of teachers— […] As your father, I forbid you to make that eh-
speech!” (145) 
 
 
Yolanda’s plagiarized words call our attention to the book of Whitman’s poems for sure, 
but it is the ensuing conflict that illuminates the material. Carlos seizes the paper and rips 
it “once, twice, three, four, countless times” into shreds (146). Mother and daughter erupt 
with fury and anguish. Laura rages at her husband: “This is America, Papi, America! You 
are not in a savage country anymore” (146). Carolos’s cultural context for thinking about 
authority and education is certainly different than Yolanda’s, but the point is that this 
free-spirited Americanness is the product of a hundred and fifty years of poetry and a 
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couple hours of reappropriation on the pages of a legal pad meant to encourage the sale of 
pharmaceuticals. Gathering the shreds of paper in her hands, Yolanda screams “he broke 
it, he broke it” (146). Her speech is not only the words or ideas contained by the words, 
but the literal paper and ink, an object that can be broken. Yolanda’s “American ways,” 
as her aunt says at one point, do not render her fundamentally “other to her father” 
because Americanness, as mother and daughter imagine it, is a thing that can be torn into 
pieces, broken, read aloud, and plagiarized. 
The guavas undermine entrenched visions of the social in Yolanda’s adulthood, 
and the torn speech enacts the role of the material in the eyes of a teenaged version of the 
same woman. As we follow the novel all the way back in time to its earliest moment, 
these two versions of the same woman seem to speak as one. In the final chapter, “The 
Drum,” Alvarez offers perhaps the most cogent and beautiful narration of how a single 
thing can contain innumerable stories and how the inclination of things and people 
ultimately constitutes the larger collectives we understand as social. The chapter opens 
with Yolanda’s recollection: 
It was a drum Mamita brought back from a trip to New York, a magnificent drum, 
its sides bright red, criss-crossed by gold wire held down by gold button heads, its 
top and bottom white. […] ‘Ah,’ I sighed, for in the hollow at the center, two 
drumsticks were stored. (275) 
 
 
The drum provides young Yolanda with an entire day’s worth of entertainment. Late in 
the afternoon Yolanda discovers a litter of kittens in the coal shed and decides to adopt 
one, naming it “Schwarz” after the retailer where her grandmother purchased the drum. 
She drops the kitten into the hollow of the drum and commences to beat on the top 
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mercilessly. The kitten is dazed when Yolanda removes the top, and the “accusing sound 
of meow” it makes generates an odd combination of guilt and anger in the young girl: “I 
wanted to dunk it into the sink and make its meowing stop. Instead, I lifted the screen and 
threw the meowing ball out the window. I heard it land with a thud, saw it moments later, 
wobbling out from under the shadow of the house, meowing and stumbling forward” 
(288). The hollow of the drum has served as home to the drumsticks, to the kitten, and 
now to young Yolanda’s fear and guilt as she fastens the top in place, and the voice of the 
narration begins to shift and fly back through the narrative toward the future. 
The narrative structure indicates that the space in between the sides, top, and 
bottom of the drum comes to contain the entire series of stories that make up the various 
chapters that Alvarez has followed back in time to this final moment. As Yolanda lies 
awake in bed that night, she is haunted by the mother cat, and as she explains in her 
narration, her guilt and the cat follow her for some years even after her family moves to 
the U.S. Over time, however, 
The cat disappeared altogether. I saw snow. I solved the riddle of an outdoors 
made mostly of concrete in New York. My grandmother grew so old she could 
not remember who she was. I went away to school. I read books. You understand 
I am collapsing all time now so that it fits in what’s left in the hollow of my story? 
(289) 
 
 
The story of the drum is the narrative space from which all of the other stories in the 
novel flow, and the drum itself is therefore the thing that contains all of these stories. 
After all, the hollow space of a drum is oddly enough the absence that produces the sound 
the drum makes when struck. This absence recalls Heidegger’s jug and how it is the 
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hollow space, the gathering, that makes the jug a thing. The narrative structure of García 
Girls is arranged in such a way as to lead us against a chronological current of time, back 
to its source in the story of the drum, or it might be more appropriate to say the story in 
the drum. All of the complex and nuanced relations of the novels earlier chapters can be 
traced back to the hollow space of the drum. Therefore, the space cleared at the heart of 
this novel ultimately reveals that communities arise out of common material experiences, 
not out of differentiation based on fundamental otherness. 
Alvarez’s emphasis on the “hollow” of Yolanda’s story brings something to the 
remaking of the social that neither Nancy nor Latour can bring on their own. In his theory 
of the social, Nancy argues that community “cannot arise from the domain of work. One 
does not produce it, one experiences or one is constituted by it as the experience of 
finitude” (31 original emphasis). Conversely, Latour maintains that “what we have lost—
a fixed list of groups—we have regained because groupings have constantly to be made, 
or remade […] if you stop making and remaking groups, you stop having groups. No 
reservoir of forces flowing from ‘social forces’ will help you” (34-35). Nancy says no 
work, Latour goes on to call the constantly made and remade groupings “worknets.” 
Alvarez helps us negotiate this seeming antinomy through the hollow space of the drum. 
The drum must certainly be made, as Latour insists, but the hollow space itself cannot be 
made; it is a void. Nancy grasps “the modern experience of community as neither a work 
to be produced, nor a lost communion, but rather as space itself” (19). Latour also 
emphasizes space when he describes the social as “no more than an occasional spark 
generated by the shift, the shock, the slight displacement of other non-social phenomena” 
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(36). Alvarez’s significant contribution to this conversation is her ability to reconcile 
non-work and work through the materiality of the drum itself. If, as I contend, the social 
is always the product that is in-process, then the toy drum is a perfect representation and 
enactment of the social. It represents the social in that its sides, top, bottom, strap, and 
sticks are certainly made, but the space it contains, the space that actually produces sound 
cannot be made because it is a void. The hollow is the space that ultimately gathers all of 
the manufactured components into a single sound that is forever the in-process product of 
the other actors. If you stop hitting the drum, you stop producing sound. 
The drum also enacts the social because it is the object that serves as the source 
for the entirety of Yolanda’s narrative. If we are following her back through time and we 
end with the drum, then the drum seems to be the thing that she remembers or thinks of 
that causes the entire series of complex stories to unfold in the first place. But it also 
enacts the social by breaking down the barrier between the novel itself and the world in 
which the novel intervenes. In other words, the drum creates a narrative moment that 
troubles the easily demarcated “worlds” of writer, text, reader.
12
 Underworld also 
disturbs these boundaries, and both texts taken together seem to imagine a blurring of 
these lines as illustrative of the larger revelations about the social that flow from the 
inclinations of human and nonhuman actors throughout postmodern fiction. Yolanda’s 
turn to the reader is the source of this complication: “You understand I am collapsing all 
time now so that it fits in what’s left in the hollow of my story?” (289). Who exactly is 
the “you”? Situated as this sentence is in the center of the novel’s last paragraph in which 
nearly every other sentence begins with a first-person singular pronoun, the odd “you” 
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stands at the heart of Yolanda’s final narration, and the “you” appeals to her audience as 
if seeking our affirmation or perhaps even our cooperation in finishing the narrative. The 
end of the narrative is also the beginning of the story, however, because we have been 
reading back in time, so it appears that at the source of the narration lies a hollow space 
that is made by the cooperation of writer, text, and reader, and through which we incline 
toward one another in the production of the entire story. 
DeLillo makes a similar move when he alters the narrative voice at the end of 
Underworld to a more sustained second-person narration than the brief sentences offered 
by Alvarez. The novel famously concludes with the one-word paragraph: “Peace.” But 
the  penultimate paragraph turns abruptly to the reader and bears quoting at length: 
And you can glance out the window for a moment, distracted by the sound of 
small kids playing a made-up game in a neighbor’s yard, some kind of kickball 
maybe, and they speak in your voice […] and you try to imagine the word on the 
screen becoming a thing in the world, taking all its meanings, its sense of 
serenities and contentments out into the streets somehow, its whisper of 
reconciliation, a word extending itself ever outward, the tone of agreement or 
treaty, the tone of repose, the sense of mollifying silence, the tone of hail and 
farewell, a word that carries the sunlit ardor of an object deep in drenching noon, 
the argument of binding touch, but it’s only a sequence of pulses on a dullish 
screen and all it can do is make you pensive—a word that spreads a longing 
through the raw sprawl of the city and out across the dreaming bourns and 
orchards to the solitary hills. (827) 
 
 
This powerfully evocative stream of consciousness is one grammatical sentence that 
fuses reader, narrator, writer, and story. There is no world of the reader and world of the 
novel.
13
 The two are one. Both DeLillo’s and Alvarez’s second-person appeals, in Roland 
Barthes’s terms, “try to abolish (or at least to diminish) the distance between writing and 
reading, in no way by intensifying the projection of the reader into the work but by 
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joining them in a single signifying practice” (162). Thus, at the heart of postmodernism 
we find a joining or inclination, not a disjunction or otherness. The baseball circulates 
through space revealing and creating the inclinations of previously unacknowledged and 
nonexistent social networks. The toy drum contains such a space, and gathers the myriad 
stories that result from such inclinations into a single thing, illuminating what it means to 
say, as Betonie does, that “things have stories alive inside them.” 
Postmodernism’s reputation as a primarily playful, experimental, and self-
reflexive aesthetic has historically led critics to focus on such formal devices as the 
second-person narration I examine in DeLillo and Alvarez, but the attention paid to form, 
the relationship between form and content, and language has overshadowed the 
reconstructive agency of material objects in postmodern fiction. For this reason the next 
chapter turns to perhaps one of the most canonical works of postmodern metafiction—
Barth’s Lost in the Funhouse—and a rewriting of that story by a writer a few generations 
removed—Wallace’s “Westward the Course of Empire Takes Its Way.” These analyses 
hinge on an important question about the relationship between poststructuralism’s 
obsession with language and postmodernism’s perceived performance of that obsession 
that opens up new vistas in thinking about the political contributions of postmodern 
fiction. But these new vistas rely on the two basic insights that Silko, Robinson, DeLillo, 
and Alvarez have offered in their respective novels. First, the social is always a product 
of an ongoing process involving both human and nonhuman actors, as evidenced earlier 
by Tayo’s successful healing ceremony and Ruth and Sylvie’s transient capacity to leave 
Fingerbone. Second, the individual social connections that get forged between actors are 
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the results of their fundamental inclinations toward one another in the space cleared by 
the construction of the larger networks. With these two principles in mind as the basic 
components of postmodern materialism, Barth and Wallace can be reread in new ways 
that are irreducible to language as the basis of all knowledge, interaction, and experience 
in postmodern fiction.
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Notes 
 
 
1
 This notion of inclination, or clinamen, can be traced back at least to Lucretius, the Hellenic poet who 
expanded the atomic philosophy of Epicurus in his touchstone work On the Nature of Things. Lucretius 
explains that collisions between atoms occur due to unaccountable movements, or what he calls the 
“swerve” of atoms toward each other in space: “And if they did not swerve, they all would fall / downward 
like raindrops through the boundless void; / no clashes would occur, no blows befall / the atoms; nature 
would never have made a thing” (221-224). Thus, without the inclination of atoms toward one another, for 
Lucretius, there would be no world as we know it, let alone the vast and complex networks of subjects and 
objects that we understand as making and remaking various social groups. 
 
2
 While this distinction between society and community can be traced back to Plato’s Laws and Republic 
and perhaps further, Ferdinand Tӧnnies’ classic work Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft (Community and 
Society) played a key role in popularizing theories of community in Germany and the West in the late 19
th
 
century and following. 
 
3
 See Christopher Fynsk’s helpful “Foreword” to The Inoperative Community pages xii-xiii. 
 
4
 We will recall that for Latour, under the sociology of the social, society or the social order is a “domain of 
reality” distinct from “other domains such as economics, geography, biology, psychology, law, science, and 
politics” (Reassembling 3). This approach views the social as substance, phenomenon, source that can be 
used to illuminate other phenomena. 
 
5
 This “demythologizing” is the subject of Duvall’s essay, “Baseball as Aesthetic Ideology: Cold War 
History, Race, and DeLillo’s ‘Pafko at the Wall’” referenced earlier. Also see Donald J. Greiner’s “John 
Updike, Don DeLillo, and the Sustaining Power of Myth.” But, as I discuss in the introduction and first 
chapter, this “spirit of criticism” (Howe 429), has been cast as characteristic of postmodern fiction on the 
whole (see Hutcheon’s The Politics of Postmodernism; Maltby’s Dissident Postmodernists; and even 
Felski’s “Suspicious Minds”). Not all critics read DeLillo’s retelling of the 1951 pennant game as an 
exposure of myth, as John Duvall does, or as an interruption of myth, as I do. Donald J. Greiner, for 
example, argues that “The point is not that myth fosters forgetfulness but that myth offers renewal” (108). 
Greiner calls on “The Power of History” to suggest that in Underworld DeLillo uses “Thomson’s home run 
as a feat of strength and skill that both mythologizes a moment in history and forges unity among the 
living” (109). 
 
6
 Romagnolo argues that “texts such as Zora Neale Hurston’s Their Eyes Were Watching God, Toni 
Morrison’s Beloved and Julia Alvarez’s How the García Girls Lost Their Accents, to name just a few, 
highlight the interwoven signification of conceptual and formal beginnings” (184). Romagnolo’s goal in 
investigating narrative beginnings is especially important in a novel like Alvarez’s where the chronological 
beginning can literally be found in the novel’s end, and the beginning of the novel is, as she argues 
“discursive.” That is, the beginning of Alvarez’s novel is not the literal beginning of the story, but only a 
beginning at the level of narrative discourse. 
 
7
 See also Joan M. Hoffman’s essay “‘She Wants to Be Called Yolanda Now’: Identity, Language, and the 
Third Sister in How the García Girls Lost Their Accents”; Juan Pablo Rivera’s “Language Allergy: 
Seduction and Second Languages in How the García Girls Lost The Accents”; Manuela Matas Llorente’s 
“And Why Did the García Girls Lose Their Accents? Language, Identity and the Immigrant Experience in 
Julia Alvarez’s How the García Girls Lost The Accents.” 
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8
 Recall Sara Spurgeon’s Exploding the Western: Myths of Empire on the Postmodern Frontier and Lou 
Caton’s Reading American Novels and Multicultural Aesthetics: Romancing the Postmodern Novel that 
both discuss Tayo’s identity in terms of the clash and hybridization of Native and nonnative cultures. 
 
9
 William Luis argues that “Yolanda is caught between two worlds, the Hispanic and the North American 
ones” (846). See “A Search for Identity in Julia Alvarez’s How the García Girls Lost Their Accents.” 
 
10
 Here we should bear in mind Latour’s most elemental argument in Reassembling the Social, name that 
“the social is not some glue that could fix everything including what other glues cannot fix; it is what is 
glued together by many other types of connectors” (5). And as later wonders about the use of the term 
“social forces”: “When I begin to ask naïve questions about what is really meant by social explanation, I 
am told not to take the existence of social forces ‘literally,’ since no reasonable sociologists ever claimed 
that they could really substitute society for the object it explains” (103 original emphasis). 
 
11
 The men are clearly discomfited at the thought of being compensated by a “lady in distress.” The time 
she spends geographically in the United States affects her countenance, her bearing, her ability to speak 
fluent Spanish. Her sister Sandi wonders at a young age whether Egyptian mummies would emerge from 
their wrappings with “dark Egyptian” skin or if their skin would have “turned pale after such long 
bondage—like American skin under all these heavy clothes for the winter that was just starting” (172). 
Each of these markers is a product of traditions that must be upheld, geographical displacement, and 
exposure to the sun. 
 
12
 Postmodernism’s blurring of the lines between form and content—its self-aware appeal to the world of 
the reader as something not wholly separate from the world of the characters—sets it apart from 
modernism’s experimentalism. In her seminal essay “Against Interpretation,” Susan Sontag argues against 
modern modes of interpreting literary texts as they have created a gap between form and content, “based on 
the highly dubious theory that a work of art is composed of items of content,” which “makes art into an 
article for use, for arrangement into a mental scheme of categories” (10). She goes on to point out that this 
critical malaise is especially the situation in American literature as well as criticism: “Interpretation runs 
rampant here in those arts with a feeble and negligible avant-garde: fiction and drama. Most American 
novelists and playwrights are really either journalists or gentlemen sociologists and psychologists. They are 
writing the literary equivalent of program music. And so rudimentary, uninspired, and stagnant has been 
the sense of what might be done with form in fiction and drama that even when the content isn’t simply 
information, news, it is still peculiarly visible, handier, more exposed. To the extent that novels and plays 
(in America), unlike poetry and painting and music, don’t reflect any interesting concern with changes in 
their form, these arts remain prone to assault by interpretation” (10-11). Sontag’s essay was first published 
in Evergreen Review in 1964, just five years after Irving Howe tied the emergence of “post-modern fiction” 
to the rise of an American mass culture that rejected the “familiar social categories” implicit in modernist 
fiction. And just three years later in 1967, John Barth’s “The Literature of Exhaustion” would make an 
attempt at describing this new postmodern literary aesthetic, an aesthetic that, in seeking to defend itself 
from the “assault by interpretation,” developed a form-content relationship that has rendered it especially 
effective as both a transporter and transformer of social narratives and networks. 
 
13
 The novel, in particular, becomes a style-obsessed mode under postmodernism, and by that I mean a 
form that is not only concerned with experimentation in voice, focalization, or theme, but more 
interestingly with examining itself as a form. In “The Literature of Exhaustion,” Barth addresses the idea 
that “narrative literature generally, if not the printed word altogether, has by this hour of the world just 
about shot its bolt,” by suggesting that a new generation of avant-garde writers has sprung up to revitalize 
narrative by poking and prodding at the form itself in addition to taking on important themes and ideas 
(71). In other words, the form and content have become a single, inseparable entity. Barth characterizes his 
own work as representative of that group of texts described by Howe and Sontag as “novels which imitate 
the form of the Novel, by an author who imitates the role of Author” (72). It is this self-obsession with 
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form, with style, with what Barth calls the “technical,”  as inseparable from some perceived content or 
theme that renders postmodern fiction especially well-suited to demonstrate the material construction of our 
social networks and narratives and to perform as a material actor in the construction of those networks and 
narratives. It takes time for significant aesthetic shifts to come into view, of course, but Howe sees the 
postmodern turn coming in 1959, and by Ihab Hassan’s first edition of The Dismemberment of Orpheus: 
Toward a Postmodern Literature in 1971, a host of postmodern fiction writers seems readily identifiable: 
“In recent American fiction, its votaries include Joseph Heller, Thomas Pynchon, James Purdy, J. P. 
Donleavy, Terry Southern, Thomas Berger, Donald Barthelme, Ishmael Reed, Richard Brautigan, and 
Raymond Federman, among others” (254). Novels by these writers, alongside the emerging work of 
authors such as Leslie Silko, Marilynne Robinson, and Don DeLillo can only now truly be approached in 
the critical fullness of time, and understood as experimenting with form not simply for the sake of 
experimentation, but to call attention to fiction itself as an influential actor in the formation of cultural 
narratives. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
WRITING THE SOCIAL: FROM POSTSTRUCTURALISM 
TO POSTMODERNISM 
 
 
The literature most often identified as postmodern has taken on many names over 
the last half century, including metafiction, surfiction, the literature of exhaustion, and the 
literature of silence. Although such monikers can often distract from the texts themselves, 
they all point in some way to the prominent trend of making writing itself the subject of 
postmodern narrative. Just as these fictional forms began to build momentum in the late 
1960s and early 1970s, two influential waves washed over literary studies. The first, often 
referred to as the “linguistic turn,” is most thoroughly examined in Richard Rorty’s 1967 
collection of the same name in which he defines his topic as “the view that philosophical 
problems are problems which may be solved (or dissolved) either by reforming language, 
or by understanding more about the language we presently use” (3). The second, 
poststructuralism, made its way from France to the United States via the work of Jacques 
Derrida and then Paul de Man, teaching us that the world is constituted by language and 
that the sign is a “structure of difference.” Each of these modes of thought relies heavily 
on the scholarship of Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure and imagines not only writing 
but society at large as semiotic systems in which individual elements derive their 
identities or meanings from their places within the system. 
Geoffrey Galt Harpham explains the significance of both the linguistic turn and 
poststructuralism to postmodernism when he suggests that “for many postmodernists and 
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fellow travelers, the defining discovery of the era was that language determines or 
structures society rather than the other way around” (13). However, as early as 1985, 
critics such as Andreas Huyssen were raising questions about the relationship between 
poststructuralism and literary postmodernism. In his pivotal essay “Mapping the 
Postmodern” Huyssen acknowledges an overlap between poststructuralism and postwar 
literature but questions “the way in which this impact is automatically evaluated in the 
U.S. as postmodern and thus sucked into the orbit of the kind of critical discourse that 
emphasizes radical rupture and discontinuity” (37). Yet by 1991 Paul Maltby is able to 
foreground his insightful Dissident Postmodernists by providing an overview of “key 
issues which currently inform discussions about postmodern art, culture, and society,” 
perhaps the most important of which is that the postmodern artist “seeks to demonstrate 
that reality as perceived does not speak for itself but is always signified” and that art, 
“like all discourses, […] is understood to constitute its object of study” (4-5 original 
emphasis). 
Although the critical discourse may seem to have swept any potential disjunction 
between postmodernism and poststructuralism under the theoretical rug—after all, not 
even Huyssen disputes some connection between the two—the rift has resurfaced 
periodically. In fact, a mere fifteen pages after his articulation of postmodernism as an 
aesthetic that imagines language as the structural determiner of society, Maltby 
parenthetically states that 
the concepts of structuralism/post-structuralism have undoubtedly been of value 
in articulating the linguistic-philosophical concerns of postmodernist writers, but 
we should not necessarily assume that these writers were structuralists/post-
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structuralists avant la lettre. The precise connections—theoretical and temporal—
between post-Saussurean theory and postmodernism need to be researched. (20) 
 
 
Harpham synthesizes much of the ensuing research eleven years later in Language Alone: 
The Critical Fetish of Modernity, where he points out that “Saussure is ritually invoked 
by the thinkers of postmodernity as the genius who first articulated the two principles on 
which postmodernism is founded, the system without a center, and differences without 
positivity” (28). However, critics working in conversation with Huyssen occasionally 
continue to complicate the connection between the Saussurean-influenced 
poststructuralism and postmodernism. Marianne DeKoven, for instance, sees 
“poststructuralism not as postmodern but rather as the epitome of modernist thought and 
language,” although it certainly plays “a key role in initiating postmodernism […] by 
theorizing its multiplicities and indeterminacies, and by critiquing the governing 
hierarchical dualisms of modernity” (52). Building on the work of Huyssen and 
DeKoven, I would agree that there is a certain slippage between poststructuralism and 
postmodernism. However, as Harpham has indicated, the vast majority of 
postmodernism’s critical discourse is overwhelmingly preoccupied with poststructuralism 
and thus with language. Thus, my goal so far has been to ground my theory of 
postmodern materialism in the reconstructive agency and inclination of human and 
nonhuman actors with minimal reference to poststructuralism. Now that this foundation 
has been established I want to turn to a few texts that overtly call our attention to 
linguistic play and reread them in this way to see what a non-linguistic-centered analysis 
can reveal. 
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The results are surprising in the context of postmodern literary criticism, but not 
so surprising in the context of this study. When we are willing to expand our approach to 
postmodern fiction beyond the linguistic realm to include the material objects of 
everyday life, what becomes clear is that all actors great and small function as what 
Latour calls “mediators” instead of as “intermediaries.” For Latour, an intermediary is an 
actor that “transports meaning or force without transformation,” whereas a mediator 
“cannot be counted as just one” (Reassembling 39). Halfway through Reassembling the 
Social Latour composes a dialogue between an imaginary student and professor in which 
the two go back and forth about whether or not Actor-Network-Theory (Latour’s theory 
of the social as what is gathered as opposed to a substance) is applicable to the student’s 
field of organizational studies. At one point the student exclaims in exasperation that his 
work is about “finding the hidden structure that explains the behavior of those agents you 
thought were doing something but in fact are simply placeholders for something else.” 
The professor responds: “So you are a structuralist! You’ve finally come out of the 
closet. Placeholders, isn’t that what you call actors?” (153). The professor reformulates 
this initial response a little later when he says, “either you have actors who realize 
potentialities and thus are not actors at all, or you describe actors who are rendering 
virtualities actual” (155). Reading the material domain of postmodern fiction as 
populated with “actors who are rendering virtualities actual” reveals that sometimes in 
spite of themselves these texts imagine the social as what Latour calls a “worknet” in 
which “it’s the work, and the movement, and the flow, and the changes that should be 
stressed” (143). The benefit of this approach is that if all actors count for something then 
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rearranging even the most quotidian object can have a potentially serious impact on the 
social. 
The narrative structures of the texts I have already examined are strong examples 
of the constant work required to sustain the social and the potential effects of its 
remaking. Silko’s Ceremony literally ends with “Sunrise,” a new day for Tayo, while 
Robinson’s Housekeeping winds down as its narrator Ruth asks us to imagine how she 
and Sylvie might one day just miss out on reuniting with her sister Lucille who sits in a 
restaurant “not” waiting for them. Similarly, DeLillo’s Underworld wraps up in a state of 
ongoing imagination and a blessing of peace, and the narrative of Alvarez’s How the 
García Girls Lost Their Accents closes at the literal beginning of the story which has no 
ending. Each of these narratives embraces the openness of construction, assembly, and 
remaking in which the actors themselves continually fashion and refashion the relations 
that affect their day-to-day experiences. The postmodern indeterminacy DeKoven 
references is a product of the open-ended flux of continual movement and change. Rather 
than representing a mere enactment of poststructuralist language play, as we have so 
often been told, postmodern fiction’s focus on the role of nonhuman actors materializes 
the social to account for the ongoing formation, reformation, and transformation of our 
relations. The texts I turn to in this chapter share the narrative open-endedness of the 
novels I address in the earlier chapters, and they also overtly call our attention to non-
linguistic elements of postmodernism despite, or sometimes even because of, their 
preoccupations with language. 
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Along with Vladimir Nabokov’s Pale Fire (1962), Kurt Vonnegut’s 
Slaughterhouse-Five (1969), Robert Coover’s A Night at the Movies, or You Must 
Remember This (1987), and many others, John Barth’s classic work of metafiction Lost in 
the Funhouse (1968) has been a staple in discussions of postmodernism’s self-reflexive 
wheel-spinning over the course of the last four decades. Although the book seems to have 
passed its critical prime, there have been a few recent critics, such as William Solomon, 
who have begun to point out that Barth has more to offer than a fictional meditation on 
fiction.
1
 I extend this conversation by focusing on the ever-increasing presence of 
material objects in the Ambrose cycle of stories, culminating in Barth’s emphasis on a 
“name-coin” in the collection’s title story. Perhaps the most notable reappearance of 
Barth’s famous story does not occur in the pages of literary criticism but in the final 
installment of David Foster Wallace’s first collection of short fiction Girl With Curious 
Hair (1989). In what amounts to a novella entitled “Westward the Course of Empire 
Takes Its Way,” Wallace rewrites “Lost in the Funhouse,” casting Barth’s protagonist 
Ambrose as a professor of creative writing at East Chesapeake Trade School in 
Baltimore, Maryland. But in reimagining Barth’s metafictional funhouse, Wallace writes 
an arrow into the heart of his story, a material object whose presence cannot be reduced 
to the realm of the linguistic and whose unceasing trajectory implies a Zeno’s paradox of 
the social as constant process and product. Reading these two stories side-by-side reveals 
a material dimension to postmodern fiction echoed in “Here and There,” an earlier story 
in Girl With Curious Hair. “Here and There,” like Lost in the Funhouse and “Westward,” 
withholds closure and features human and nonhuman actors working in cooperation and 
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opposition to demonstrate the utter flux of our in-process existence. The interaction of 
objects in each of these stories ultimately reveals not a preoccupation with language, but 
a fascination with the significance of the material. Barth accentuates this significance by 
using material objects to reimagine his protagonist’s family unit, while Wallace revises 
romantic love. In both cases, connections between characters that seem to hinge on 
language play are finally reduced to the more mundane things that constitute those 
relations, and are then rearranged to bring the characters to moments of personal 
revelation. 
 
Words and Things 
 
In the “Author’s Note” to Lost in the Funhouse Barth calls his unique collection a 
“series” of stories “meant to be received ‘all at once’” (ix). Consisting of fourteen stories 
in total, the series opens with a “Frame-Tale,” before moving into six stories that bounce 
back and forth between inventive narrative experiments and a sequenced, straightforward 
account of the birth, early childhood, and coming-of-age of a character named Ambrose 
that culminates with the book’s title story. The final seven stories comprise an 
entertainingly self-reflexive meditation on the complex relationship between artist, text, 
subject matter, and audience, focusing especially on the process of generating fiction. 
The second half of the series comes to fruition in Barth’s rewriting of a handful of figures 
and events from ancient Greek mythology that has received much critical attention. From 
the experimental “Frame-Tale,” to the blurring of the lines between author, narrator, and 
audience, Barth’s funhouse of fiction embraces the mediating influence of its people, 
things, and words in the ever-changing construction of the social, echoed even in the 
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series’ subtitle: “Fiction for print, tape, live voice.” Barth also explains in the “Author’s 
Note” that some stories 
take the printed medium for granted but lose or gain nothing in oral recitation,” 
while others make “somewhat separate but equally valid senses in several media: 
print, monophonic recorded authorial voice, stereophonic ditto in dialogue with 
itself, live authorial voice, live ditto in dialogue with monophonic ditto 
aforementioned, and live ditto interlocutory with stereophonic et cetera. (ix-x) 
 
 
In fact, Barth’s earliest explanations of these stories were not solely written, but delivered 
live on a reading tour. 
Throughout the year before Funhouse was published in 1968, Barth spent time on 
the road reading selections from his earlier novels in various public forums. In The 
Friday Book he includes some short introductory remarks originally prepared when he 
decided to introduce a few excerpts from Lost in the Funhouse into the set list for these 
readings. Barth explains that in all of the pieces, “for better or worse, the process of 
narration becomes the content of the narrative, to some degree and in various ways; or the 
form or medium has metaphorical value and dramatical relevance. The medium really is 
part of the message.” He goes on to say that most of the stories “exploit, one way or 
another, ambiguities of language and narrative view point” (79). In other words, Lost in 
the Funhouse takes writing itself as its subject but also as its object of inquiry. Thus, it 
should be no surprise that the vast majority of critical attention paid to Barth’s 
experiment has zeroed in on its playful structure and its preoccupation with the power of 
language to construct the world in which we live. Although my own materialist reading 
builds on the three most common approaches to Lost in the Funhouse, it also differs 
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substantially by asking what the text may ultimately be interested in beyond language 
itself and how these less overtly linguistic interests might enrich our reading of the text. 
Two basic approaches have dominated the conversation surrounding Lost in the 
Funhouse, and each of these readings, in some way, revolves around Barth’s obsession 
with language in general and writing in particular. Much of the early criticism focuses on 
Barth’s rewriting of both classical and eighteenth- and nineteenth-century narratives. 
Charles Altieri, for instance, proposes that for Barth, “reader, writer, and material remain 
moving about in a closed system which is nonetheless in continual motion and offering, 
on its uninterrupted surface, an infinite field of possible recognitions and 
interrelationships” and that this mode takes its cue from “Ovid’s Metamorphoses where 
for the first time a writer clearly accepted and turned to his own purposes the field for 
free play created by the utter fictiveness of the myths he inherited” (32). Carol Kyle 
adopts Northrop Frye’s idea of anatomy to read Funhouse as a rewriting of eighteenth-
century experiments such as Tristram Shandy and nineteenth-century American 
adolescent novels such as The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, concluding that, in the 
tradition of the American novel, Barth’s “funhouse (the novel itself) replaces the 
wilderness in which one got lost to find oneself” (40). 
Perhaps best represented by critics such as Christopher Morris, Jerome 
Klinkowitz, and the exemplary artist-critic Raymond Federman, the other prominent 
approach to Funhouse focuses on Barth’s manipulation of and play with language as a 
complication of the relationship between words and things. Morris argues that “the 
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funhouse world resembles the universally neurotic one described by the French post-
structuralist Jacques Lacan” in which 
the Moebius strip becomes a symbol of the paradox by providing an image which 
is simultaneously one and two and also asserts that the signifiers which compose 
it have no connection with anything outside themselves (i.e. the ‘signified’ is 
nothing at all). (70) 
 
 
With regard to writing specifically, Klinkowitz points out that “for Barth, it seems, fiction 
should forever be an imitation of an action, and not an action itself” (14). Federman 
situates Barth amongst a host of writers who demonstrate that “the real world is now 
inside language, and can only be recreated by language” and who reveal that “words and 
things—LES MOTS ET LES CHOSES, as Michel Foucault so well demonstrated—no 
longer stick to each other, because language too is an autonomous reality” (Critifiction 
13). Each of these critical approaches, from Altieri to Federman, is invested in the 
languaging process—in writing—as a determiner of all knowledge. 
A third approach has emerged in which a few critics have begun to challenge the 
conclusions of these earlier readings on the grounds that they inevitably result in the 
denial of “any dimension beyond language” (Woolley 460). Deborah Woolley recounts 
the spirit of contemporary criticism that has grown up around the work of writers such as 
Barth: “The ‘text’ heroically foregoes the old securities of presence—signification, 
thematic unity, totalizing form—and accepts the existentialist challenge to confront the 
lack of a center at the heart of language and to dwell in that void” (460). She says of 
Barth in particular that his fiction is often cited as an “example of the ‘empty’ 
postmodern ‘text’” (463). Woolley’s argument is that while postmodern fiction writ large 
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may very well seem “preoccupied with the deterioration of language in general and of 
narrative forms in particular,” it “does not follow that self-reflexive fiction […] is devoid 
of ‘presence’” (465). Similarly, Max Schulz has contended that while Funhouse may 
appear to be “the ultimate instance of metafiction forever adrift in the mirrored 
reflections of its own and its literary predecessors’ words, forever imitating ‘its own 
processes,’ there is a pattern discernible that questions and inverts, if it does not outright 
reject or deny, what critics superficially have taken Barth to represent” (10). Both of 
these critics insist that Barth is, in fact, breathing life back into language and into the 
Western literary tradition. While Woolley and Schulz continue to rely on post-Saussurean 
langue, their insightful dissatisfaction with the idea of Barth’s playfulness as solely 
linguistic, or as offering an abstract poststructuralist critique as an end in itself, opens the 
door for a reading of Barth that is not primarily beholden to language games. 
If we work from the material domain of Barth’s Ambrose cycle of stories, the 
funhouse of fiction might indeed seem to “outright reject [and] deny what critics have 
taken Barth to represent” because it deflates even a cultural semiotics that does not create 
an impassable gap between words and things. At the end of the introductory remarks to 
his first public readings from Funhouse that I referenced earlier, Barth says the subject of 
literature is, in the words of Aristotle, “human life, its happiness and its misery,” which is 
why 
we object to the word experimental. It suggests cold exercises in technique, and 
technique in art, we all know, has the same importance as technique in love: 
Heartless skill has its appeal; so does heartfelt ineptitude; but what we want is 
passionate virtuosity. If these pieces aren’t also moving, then the experiment is 
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unsuccessful, and their author is lost in the funhouse indeed. (79 original 
emphasis) 
 
 
The point here is that Barth does not imagine the funhouse itself as the symbolic state of 
the world. The funhouse is not the point. Instead, he envisions the work of both writer 
and reader as seeking out cracks in this system. Rather than a mere demonstration that the 
funhouse of language is all that is the case, to borrow a phrase, Barth seems, at the very 
least, to be poking holes in the funhouse walls, leaving the back door open for an 
interpretation that might encompass language as one element in a larger network of 
human and nonhuman actors. 
As we turn to the text itself, Barth’s opening “Frame-Tale” might seem an 
immediate obstacle to the argument for Funhouse as a movement away from a linguistic, 
textual, poststructuralist reading and toward a materialist approach. The “tale” is actually 
a Moebius strip the narrator instructs us to physically cut out of the book, twist into a 
circle, and fasten end to end. The resultant text endlessly reads, “ONCE UPON A TIME 
THERE WAS A STORY THAT BEGAN” (1-2). However, while the Moebius strip is 
certainly a circuitous language game, an overtly closed system, I would point out that it 
comes to us unclosed. That is, in order for the strip of paper to become a true Moebius 
strip, it must be literally cut from the text by the reader. We do the closing; we trap 
ourselves in the game. The only way to close this system is to remove it from the book, 
and even then some might object that “ONCE UPON A TIME THERE WAS A STORY 
THAT BEGAN” does not constitute a narrative at all.
2
 Although Max Schulz, among 
others, has argued that the “Frame-Tale” represents one of two “binary support 
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system[s]” in the novel that “confirm the hold on Barth’s imagination of a searching 
skeptical faith in the central tradition of storytelling” (6), the material circumstances 
through which the actual Moebius strip is produced suggest that Barth is at least as 
interested in the rupture of such binaries and systems since his narrator asks the reader to 
excise a physical portion of the text. The Moebius strip acts as a material obstacle to our 
reading whose instructions, if followed, render the reader complicit in the composition of 
her own cultural myths as she literally enacts the endless cycle of the idyllic fairy tale-
opening, “Once upon a time.” What seems like a language game becomes a material 
interruption in the text that, whether intended or not, calls our attention away from the 
words and toward the paper, a pair of scissors, and perhaps some masking tape. 
Throughout the rest of the series, Barth often supplements more traditional narrative 
techniques with material disruptions that break the chain of social signification, 
especially in the stories about a young boy named Ambrose which prominently feature 
nonhuman actors. 
Material objects play an ever-increasing role across the Ambrose cycle of stories 
that constitutes the first half of Funhouse. As the presence of these objects becomes more 
and more conspicuous, Barth’s interest in what gets related—rather than in the idea of 
relationality itself—uncovers a trail of things that connect actors alongside, or sometimes 
in the resounding absence of, language. The stories “Ambrose His Mark,” “Water-
Message,” and the title story, “Lost in the Funhouse,” all chart the life of Ambrose, a 
baby born into a strange family who grows into a contemplative teenager. As we follow 
Ambrose from his birth in “Ambrose His Mark” to his early adolescence in “Lost in the 
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Funhouse,” we also follow Barth’s movement from an interrogation of signs, symbols, 
and other hidden structures to a description of the various actors that constantly poke 
holes in such systems and come together to make and remake networks defined by 
movement, change, and metamorphosis. Reading these stories with an eye toward the 
material reveals that Barth steadily moves from an overt preoccupation with language as 
primary determiner of our experience to a more problematized view of the preeminence 
of language. 
“Ambrose His Mark” is largely invested in exploring the gap between signifier 
and signified that we typically imagine as the cornerstone of language play in postmodern 
metafiction. However, each textual moment that seems dominated by the linguistic also 
lends itself to a materialist reading that can expand our interpretation. The story is 
narrated by Ambrose himself as he looks back on his early childhood. Our good faith as 
readers is immediately challenged when Ambrose explains the “hectic circumstances” of 
his own birth, but what is important is that the infant goes many months without a proper 
name (14). His family refers to him sometimes as “Honig” and other times as “Christine,” 
all the while he is alternately ignored and impulsively smothered by his flighty mother 
Andrea. The final decision to name the young child Ambrose is a byproduct of the main 
action of the story, which is devoted to a dispute between Ambrose’s Grandfather and a 
bee-keeping neighbor named Willy Erdmann. The two elderly men are in a contest to 
woo a swarm of bees to their respective hives. The swarm arrives one Sunday morning as 
Andrea, often prone to breast feeding her child in a very public manner, lies in the 
backyard hammock with her little Honig. The bees alight on Andrea’s breast, covering 
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her and the baby. The older men each attempt to lure the bees, and the scene erupts when 
the bees go wild. The men fight and are eventually separated by congregants from the 
church across the street amidst shouted insults including Erdmann’s remark that the baby 
has “no more father’n a drone bee” (29). In the aftermath, Aunt Rosa points out that the 
baby’s birthmark resembles a bee, and the family decides that the mark is a naming-sign. 
The ensuing debate over what to name the child finds Barth doing his best to 
close the gap between signifier and signified, but continuing to rely on the linguistic sign 
as fundamental building block of identity. After Aunt Rosa exclaims that the baby’s 
birthmark resembles a bee, Uncle Konrad spends the afternoon consulting The Book of 
Knowledge, whereby he comes up with “a number of historical parallels to [the child’s] 
experiences in the hammock” (32). The history of Western thought turns up Plato, 
Sophocles, Xenophon, and Saint Ambrose as potential namesakes who all were said to 
have swarms of bees alight on their mouths as children and then grew up to become wise 
speakers. Andrea detests the first three names, but is fond of the fourth, and so Ambrose 
explains: “the conversation turned to other matters, but thenceforward I was called Saint 
Ambrose, in jest, as often as Honig, and Ambrose by degrees became my name” (34). 
Honig, the German equivalent of the English “honey,” signifies that the child is literally 
honey, the object. After the bee incident Aunt Rosa remarks, “All the time he was our 
Honig, that’s what drew the bees” (32). Thus, the child is the thing, the object that draws 
the swarm. This moniker stands in contrast to “Christine,” Andrea’s desired name for a 
potential baby girl based on her adoration for Greta Garbo in the 1930 film Anna 
Christie. When Aunt Rosa refers to the child as “our Honig” he is literally honey drawing 
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the swarm, while “Christine” is a tribute, a reminder of something, or in this case 
someone, else. “Ambrose” is a combination of these two name-signs; it is at once the 
ambrosia or honey, and, simultaneously, a tribute to the great thinkers and history of the 
Western tradition, both a thing and a name. Barth’s joining of thing and name in the 
character of Ambrose troubles the relationship between the material and the linguistic 
more generally. Is Ambrose literally the honey that draws the bees, or is he the 
reincarnated Plato or Xenophon, a symbol of wisdom? Ambrose meditates on his 
complicated relationship with his name at the end of the story: “Vanity frets about his 
name, Pride vaunts it, Knowledge retches at its sound, Understanding sighs; all live 
outside it, knowing well that I and my sign are neither one nor quite two” (34). The sign 
is immaterial, separate from the person: “Yet only give it voice: whisper ‘Ambrose,’ as at 
rare times certain people have—see what-all leaves off to answer!” (34). 
Ambrose’s invitation to “see what-all leaves off to answer” when a sign is spoken 
is indicative of the slight opening Barth leaves for us to consider the story from a 
perspective not wholly dominated by language. The invitation is not to see what the 
answer is, but to see “what-all” does the answering. And if we proceed to whisper 
“Ambrose,” to consider his name and the process of his naming, then what we may seem 
to find at first is a host of independent language systems that constitute and maintain 
static social categories. For instance, in an early discussion regarding Andrea’s 
procrastination in naming her son, Uncle Konrad declares that “the American Indians 
[…] had the right idea. ‘They never named a boy right off. What they did, they watched 
to find out who he was. They’d look for the right sign to tell them what to call him’” (17). 
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As they wait for the swarm to arrive later on, Uncle Konrad continues to wax 
philosophical on how other cultures have imagined the family’s present situation: 
A swarm on the house was thought by the Austrians to augur good fortune, by the 
Romans to warn of ill, and by the Greeks to herald strangers; that in Switzerland a 
swarm on a dry twig presaged the death of someone in the family, et cetera—but 
before ever he had got to the Bretons and Transylvanians his wife was his only 
auditor. (22) 
 
 
In each of these educational asides, Uncle Konrad’s illuminations are dependent upon the 
interpretation of signs unique to a particular nation or culture, insinuating that each of 
these collectives would provide a different approach to thinking about signs because of 
some inherent essence that constitutes their social existence. Thus, we might whisper 
“Ambrose” and see how each of these groupings might leave off to answer. 
However, if we turn from signs, turn from language and consider other elements 
of the story, such as the bees, the scented stick used to attract the bees, the shotgun Willy 
Erdmann brings to the quarrel, then all we can see is the gathering of various actors 
irrespective of the ways in which they might “leave off to answer” when hearing 
Ambrose’s name. This assembling becomes especially noticeable as the situation 
between Grandfather and Erdmann reaches its climax and Ambrose’s family is brought 
into contact with the local Methodist congregation. Ambrose explains earlier that “ours 
was a family mired in apostasy […] none of us went to church” (22-23). Although the 
house of worship stands just across the street, Uncle Konrad faithfully attends Bible 
class, and Grandfather “had lettered, gratis, In Remembrance of Me on the oak 
communion table,” the family is cut off from the congregation. Perhaps it is because 
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Ambrose’s mother nurses him in public “oblivious to the frowns of passing Christians” 
(23). Whatever the reason, Ambrose makes clear that the family is outside of Grace as he 
narrates the action in the church conterminously with the conflict between Grandfather 
and Erdmann: “in Grace meanwhile the service had proceeded despite shotgun-blast and 
clang of pans, which however were acknowledged with small stirs and meetings of the 
eyes” (27). When the violence erupts and the bees swarm with Ambrose’s mother in their 
midst, Aunt Rosa runs across the street and bursts into the church shrieking, “First-degree 
murder!” (28). In a flash, a delegation of lay-leaders is in the family’s backyard while 
Aunt Rosa and baby Ambrose are taken to shelter in the parsonage. Joe Voegler, the local 
blacksmith, leads the intervention and both the family and the congregation are 
thoroughly mingled together in one roiling mass. The bees, clanging pans, and shotgun 
blast create the conflict between the older men that results in the fusion of the 
congregation and the family. Rosa and baby Ambrose are in the church parsonage, the 
lay-leaders are in the family’s backyard along with Erdmann, and the doctor comes to the 
house to attend to Andrea who is stung in the altercation. The community gets 
constructed in this wild sequence of events ultimately defies the seemingly clear social 
lines that once divided Ambrose’s family from the families in the church. 
While these actors, the bees in particular, may seem too overtly symbolic, and 
thus not distant enough from language to stretch the bounds of typical linguistic readings 
of this metafictional story, the next installment of the cycle provides us with a glass bottle 
whose mundanity stands in stark contrast to the overtly representational letter it contains. 
“Water-Message” illustrates the significance of the material through the shattered 
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remains of a glass bottle, as Ambrose and his friend Perse tag along with some older boys 
in the formation of a club called the Occult Order of the Sphinx. The boys have a 
clubhouse out in the woods along the Eastern Shore tidewater, but even though Ambrose 
came up with the name of the Order, the older boys won’t let him come into the 
clubhouse and participate in their secret meetings. Ambrose is a precocious and 
obviously odd young boy who counters the threats of bullies and older boys by making 
fun of himself and playing word games to confuse and distract his tormenters. Much like 
his naming of the Occult Order of the Sphinx, Ambrose has come up with mythic names 
for a number of local places “after reading through The Book of Knowledge,” the 
recurring book that also appears in “Ambrose His Mark” (41). As the story nears its end, 
Ambrose and Perse are both banished from the clubhouse by the older boys and forced to 
settle for exploring the tidewater’s edge. Not wanting to appear as outcast as Perse, 
Ambrose pretends to be communicating with the older boys back at the Den through a 
series of intricate hand signs, but Perse does not believe this ruse, saying “There ain’t no 
sign,” calling Ambrose’s bluff (54). However, when Ambrose feigns to be receiving 
communications from the older boys instructing him and Perse to go farther up the beach, 
Perse follows along. Their exclusion from the Order has pushed Ambrose to develop his 
own sign system from which he can exclude Perse and thus feel special himself. 
Ambrose’s invented language comes to seem hollow in contrast to the object 
Perse pulls from the water as the boys trudge the shoreline. The bottle is clear glass and 
recalls Sylvie’s can collection in Housekeeping because its label has been scraped off, 
“all but some white strips where the glue was thickest” (55). In the excitement Perse 
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“forg[ets] to be cynical” exclaiming “Where in the world do you think it come from?” 
(55 original emphasis). Ambrose also forgets his many troubles and sees only that 
the sea-wreathed bottle was an emblem. Westward it lay, to westward, where the 
tide ran from East Dorset. Past the river and the Bay, from continents beyond, this 
messenger had come. Borne by currents as yet uncharted, nosed by fishes as yet 
unnamed, it had bobbed for ages beneath strange stars. Then out of the oceans it 
had strayed; past cape and cove, black can, red nun, the word had wandered willy-
nilly to his threshold. (55) 
 
 
The bottle seems no more than a means of conveyance for the message it contains. It is an 
“emblem,” after all, connecting continents, unnamed fish, stars, and Ambrose. To reduce 
the bottle to a mere object of delivery, however, is to miss out on the more complex 
nature of the relationship between the bottle as a thing, in Heidegger’s, Silko’s, and 
Alavrez’s sense, and the message as part and parcel of the thing. The boys remove the 
cap and try to retrieve the note from the bottle, but it refuses to come out. They first try 
shaking the bottle, then they try a stick, but finally Perse shouts, “For pity’s sake bust it!” 
(55). The breaking of the bottle might seem to signify its subordination to the message, 
but Barth frustrates that interpretation by rendering the message devoid of content. 
The empty note can certainly be read as a meditation on the arbitrary nature of the 
sign, but it can also point us back to the void in the bottle that has been destroyed. It takes 
three violent swings before Ambrose is able to shatter the bottle. Perse retrieves the note, 
but Ambrose promptly takes it from him and unfolds it: 
 On a top line was penned in deep red ink: 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN 
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On the next-to-bottom: 
YOURS TRULY 
 
 
Apart from the salutation and the closing the note is blank, no message, no name. Perse 
has run off to throw oyster shells at Ambrose, and as Ambrose shifts the note to his left 
hand to better fire projectiles in retaliation he thinks to himself that “those shiny bits in 
the paper’s texture were splinters of wood pulp. Often as he’d seen them in the leaves of 
cheap tablets, he had not thitherto embraced that fact” (57). At the absent center of 
language lies a void constituted by the materiality of wood pulp. Far from being the 
structural determiner of all knowledge and far from constituting the material world we 
encounter through our senses, language is part and parcel of the material, made out of the 
material. The bottle must be broken to get at the message, and when the message is 
empty, splinters of wood pulp constitute its essence. The void of language can convey no 
meaning, but the void of the bottle can convey the message itself. Ambrose does not stop 
to ponder the missing words, but marvels at the novelty of something as mundane as the 
fact that paper is made from trees. 
The letter’s open-endedness, apart from the basic form of salutation and close, has 
led some to conclude that “the message consists in the fact of its occurrence” (Woolley 
476), and that “the content of a message is irrelevant in comparison with the importance 
of the act of writing that message” (Krier 114). Ultimately, there is no message at all. The 
message fails in its mission where the bottle succeeds. The bottle’s job was to carry the 
message; the message’s job was to convey a communication through language. Even in 
its destruction the bottle accomplishes its purpose. The sparkling shards of glass that litter 
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the water’s edge materialize the impossibility of language alone as the foundation for 
organizing our understanding of the world and its various connections across continents, 
currents, capes, and coves. Whereas “Ambrose His Mark” begins this work by making 
the referent into a sign (Ambrose is “the honig” that attracts the bees), “Water-Message” 
reveals that language itself is wrapped up in and contained by the material. While Barth 
continues to rely on some type of recognizable form in the salutation and complimentary 
closing of the letter, there is a movement here toward openness in the broken bottle that is 
mirrored in the intersection of Ambrose’s family and the Grace Methodist congregation 
in “Ambrose His Mark” and also in the perhaps undigested representation of the family’s 
housekeeper Hattie in “Water-Message.” 
Hattie’s overtly racialized presence in “Water-Message” can be read generously 
or ungenerously, but any interpretation must account for the way in which she constitutes 
the family as vitally as does Uncle Konrad, Andrea, or Ambrose himself.
3
 Before the 
discovery of the bottle, Ambrose evades bullies on his way home from school by 
imitating his father’s limp in order to earn scornful laughter as opposed to violent 
beatings. Andrea insists that the boys who would pick on her son are not brave, and as 
Ambrose is just about to defend this notion of masculinity, “colored Hattie walked in 
then, snapping gum, to ask what wanted ironing” (44). Immediately, her inquiry 
highlights that it is a “what” that wants ironing and not a “who,” as if to say that the shirts 
themselves call to be ironed and not Ambrose’s mother. Hattie’s question nuances the 
hierarchical relationship between employer and employee while simultaneously assigning 
an agency to things. Furthermore, because of her husband’s addiction to gambling on 
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horses, “when vanilla-fudge Hattie was in the kitchen, Mother’s afternoon programs went 
by the board” as Hattie co-opts the radio to listen to the race broadcasts from “Bowie to 
Pimlico” (44). But it is the music that Hattie listens to in between the races that “affected 
Ambrose strongly: it was not at all of a stripe with what they played on Fitch Bandwagon 
or national Barn Dance; this between races was classical music” (44-45). Andrea does not 
dispute Hattie’s right to the radio dial; the housekeeper seems just as entitled to the 
frequency as does her employer. The implicit danger here is that we might reify race as a 
static, preexisting category about which literature can tell us something. However, as we 
will also see in the next story of the cycle, Barth does not rely solely on the racialization 
of characters to interrupt the family’s everyday operations. Instead, what is important is 
how the material objects in the story illuminate a commonality where difference and 
hierarchy seem natural. Hattie’s control over the radio gestures toward the enfranchising 
possibilities of a materialist reading that resurfaces in the title story, “Lost in the 
Funhouse,” as Ambrose’s family travels to the beach accompanied by a neighbor girl 
named Magda. 
“Lost in the Funhouse” is packed full of the quotidian items of everyday life. The 
story follows a now-thirteen-year-old Ambrose on a family trip to Ocean City, Maryland 
with his father, mother, Uncle Karl, brother Peter, and their neighbor Magda. Magda’s 
presence, much like Hattie’s in “Water-Message,” signals the interruption of the nuclear 
family, but it is the increased presence of nonhuman actors that draws our attention to the 
larger significance of the social as a process. Material objects overpopulate the world of 
this story: “Under the boardwalk, matchbook covers, grainy other things” (79); “El 
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Producto cigar butts, treasured with Lucky Strike cigarette stubs, Coca-Cola caps, gritty 
turds, cardboard lollipop sticks, matchbook covers” (80); “the world winks at him 
through its objects, grabs grinning at his coat” (88); and most importantly, Barth 
introduces a “name-coin” that serves as a central motif throughout the story. A boardwalk 
and amusement park staple, the name-coin is explained by the presence of “a machine 
that stamped your name around a white-metal coin with a star in the middle: A____” (85). 
While this object might seem to symbolize Ambrose’s ultimate induction into the 
language system by literally rendering his name currency—and what system could be 
more purely abstract and relational with no outside referents—the fact is the ticket-
woman rejects the coin as payment for entrance into the boardwalk’s funhouse. The 
name-coin is not valid currency. 
Yet Ambrose certainly does gain access to the funhouse, and it is the funhouse 
that has drawn the most critical attention to Barth’s postmodern narrative as a 
metafictional meditation on language and narration as the determiners of our lived 
experience. Christopher Morris describes Ambrose’s tour of the funhouse as a “gradual 
confrontation with the absent center of language” (73). Because Ambrose never escapes 
the funhouse but instead takes “a wrong turn, stray[s] into the pass wherein he lingers 
yet” (97), Morris suggests that Barth is illustrating the semiotic nature of language as 
both linguistic and cultural reality. In his analysis of Ambrose running across a couple 
having sex under the boardwalk prior to entering the funhouse, Morris proposes that “the 
meaning of the act is inseparable from the recollected signs of it which, in themselves are 
empty” (74). Although she moves away from the rhetoric of emptiness, Deborah Woolley 
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echoes Morris’s perspective: “As the self-reflexive language undermines language’s 
referential function, it undermines our sense of the narrator as person” (472). This 
revelation is the culmination of the first seven stories in the series that have followed 
Ambrose from conception and birth to adolescence. “At the same time,” says Max 
Schulz, “they self-reflexively rehearse the questioning awareness and insistence of this 
fictional character that he is the progenitor and author of his own story” (7). However, 
have we considered that perhaps Barth’s very point in stranding Ambrose in the funhouse 
is to break the metafictive cycle of writer—author—text—reader—word—thing—
character—narrator? After all, while Ambrose seems to “linger yet” in the realm of the 
funhouse, the rest of his family, along with Magda, make their escape, and Ambrose 
himself has seen cracks in the funhouse walls. 
While the critical conversation has justifiably tended to focus on Ambrose at the 
end of the story, Barth actually leaves us with two narrative arcs to follow: Ambrose’s 
and his family’s. Ambrose’s story is well known: “He wishes he had never entered the 
funhouse. But he has. Then he wishes he were dead. But he’s not. Therefore he will 
construct funhouses for others and be their secret operator—though he would rather be 
among the lovers for whom funhouses are designed” (97). But why have we not given an 
equal amount of attention to Ambrose’s family, who at the end of the story is “going 
home” (97). Why have we lingered in the funhouse with Ambrose while his family leaves 
Ocean City behind? While there may be no satisfactory answer to such a question, what 
seems at least as important is the series of constructions of the social that have taken 
place over the course of the three stories and that have led Ambrose to this moment. The 
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bees amalgamate Ambrose’s family with the congregants in Grace Methodist church, the 
glass bottle connects Ambrose and Perse with distant geographies, and the name-coin 
creates the narrative conflict that renders Ambrose a stranger to himself. Ambrose 
unknowingly loses the name-coin upon entrance to the funhouse and then later recovers 
it, believing it to belong to someone else despite the fact that it is imprinted with his own 
name: AMBROSE. 
If the funhouse is a metafictional metaphor for language as so many have claimed, 
then Barth is not embracing the funhouse but exposing it as a farcical trap for those who 
get caught up in searching for some hidden structure to explain everything, sometimes in 
spite of themselves. The structures that Barth is interested in are constantly being made, 
not out of language, but out of the material circumstances of everyday life. As the family 
travels to Ocean City, the narrator reminisces about similar trips taken by Ambrose’s 
father when he was his son’s age. On these excursions, “many families from the same 
neighborhood used to travel together, with dependent relatives and often with Negro 
servants; […] everyone shared everyone else’s Maryland fried chicken, Virginia ham, 
deviled eggs, potato salad, beaten biscuits, iced tea” (73). This image of a vast and 
sprawling social network is contrasted with that of the narrative present in which, “the 
journey is made by automobile—more comfortably and quickly though without the extra 
fun though without the camaraderie of a general excursion. It’s all part of the 
deterioration of American life, their father declares” (73 original emphasis). The father’s 
comment about the deterioration of American life certainly implies a whole or unified 
American life that is now crumbling apart, but the material circumstances imply 
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construction, not demolition. The combination of the automobile and the lack of shared 
items leads to a different model of American life, one in which neighborhood families, 
relatives, and servants live in much more compartmentalized relation to one another. The 
seemingly unself-conscious reference to “Negro servants” may also stand as witness to 
the in-process nature of the social here as the technological advancements that 
accompany the proliferation of the automobile have perhaps rendered the services of such 
employees unnecessary. At the very least, the fact that Magda seems to have replaced 
Hattie as the non-biological family member in between “Water-Message” and “Lost in 
the Funhouse” demonstrates that the social is changing. 
Lest we fail to give Barth what credit he is due for reimagining the social through 
his references to characters of color, we must examine one of the story’s possible endings 
in which Ambrose teams up and perhaps falls in love with another person lost in the dark 
funhouse who might turn out to be both a “Negro” and “a girl” (87). At the end of the 
story when Ambrose envisions himself among the other members of his family as they go 
home, he imagines his Uncle Karl teasing him “over the fact that the comrade with whom 
he’d fought his way shoulder to shoulder through the funhouse had turned out to be a 
blind Negro girl—to their mutual discomfort, as they’d opened their souls” (97). William 
Solomon has argued convincingly that this 
second and less sexually charged fantasy of racial commingling may be more 
politically dangerous, more unthinkable in regard to historical norms than the 
first. […] The former could be considered simply a part of growing into white 
manhood, domination of an attractive Other a means of gaining control over 
oneself. In contrast, the latter, insofar as it rejects power as the basis of a biracial 
friendship, strikes a blow against social convention in a manner roughly 
consistent with the ambitions of the civil rights movement. (489) 
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What is equally as important as the potential deconstruction of social convention here, 
however, is the fact that the attendant construction of some social configuration that is 
not beholden to the familiar category of race is merely imaginary for Ambrose because of 
his role as an intermediary. In other words, Ambrose’s entrapment in the funhouse of 
language ultimately renders Solomon’s ideal interpretation of the story unrealized in 
practice. When approached from this direction, “Lost in the Funhouse” can be read as a 
warning against a language-obsessed reading of postmodern fiction. If we generously buy 
Barth’s “blow against social convention” as a critique of whiteness in Solomon’s sense, 
then we must also accept that this blow is ultimately not delivered, for Ambrose is indeed 
lost in the funhouse. However, regardless of this possible shortcoming, Barth’s story does 
lend itself to the enfranchising possibilities that attend the changes that have taken place 
in the world of the narrative from the time that Ambrose’s father was a boy to the present. 
At the very least, it can be argued that Barth emphasizes Ambrose’s helpless state at the 
end of the story to warn us away from the funhouse of language. 
The continual presence of unfinished sentences in the story is a sore reminder of 
this helplessness, and points us back to how Manx Martin and Charles Wainwright Sr. are 
able to finish each other’s thoughts in DeLillo’s Underworld. Throughout the story, the 
narrator repeatedly begins descriptions but fails to finish them: “The smell of Uncle 
Karl’s cigar smoke reminded one of” (74). The period that follows “of” signals the 
grammatical end of the sentence, but the thought is left up to the reader to complete. At 
the root of this game lies an acknowledgment that although the smell of Uncle Karl’s 
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cigar smoke might remind us all of something slightly different, the things of which we 
are reminded are ultimately inconsequential in comparison with the differences 
themselves. But are our unique reminiscences not borne out of a common material 
experience with the smell of cigar smoke? Whereas Barth’s language game leaves the 
sentences incomplete, DeLillo enables his characters to finish one another’s statements 
because the common experiences are materialized in the baseball. Thus, if we recall 
Barth’s pronouncement in his introductory remarks from the earliest readings of these 
stories, then we are left with no other way to interpret the presence of the funhouse of 
language than as a misguided lens through which to view the world rather than as a 
representation of the world itself: “If these pieces aren’t also moving, then the experiment 
is unsuccessful, and their author is lost in the funhouse indeed” (The Friday Book 79 
original emphasis). 
Barth’s reticence at the thought of being “lost in the funhouse indeed” betrays his 
dissatisfaction with endless language play, and perhaps more importantly shows that the 
funhouse is not necessarily the state of things. Charting the ever-growing presence of the 
material from the bees and shotgun blasts of “Ambrose His Mark,” to the bottle and 
wood-pulp paper of “Water-Message,” and finally its overabundance in the lists and 
name-coin of “Lost in the Funhouse” reveals the cracks in the funhouse walls, or as the 
narrator says of Ambrose, “He’d found a crack of light—not a door, it turned out, but a 
seam between the plyboard wall panels” (87). Although this metafictional marvel has 
been critically recycled as an enactment of the reality of the poststructural funhouse of 
language as determiner of our social structures, Wallace’s rewriting of the story points us 
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toward the possibilities of a non-linguistic reading of postmodern fiction that is able to 
account for the world by attending to the materiality of everyday experience. 
 
Things and People 
 
The final story in Wallace’s 1989 collection Girl With Curious Hair is actually a 
lengthy novella entitled “Westward the Course of Empire Takes its Way.” Wallace’s very 
title can be read as a reconsideration of Barth’s story in that it seems to suggest no matter 
how much time we spend lost in the funhouse parsing language, “linguistic turns,” and 
various structuralisms, the empire that such philosophies spin out of marches on. Because 
the characters in the novel travel westward from Maryland to Illinois—perhaps recalling 
the trajectory of Ambrose’s bottle (westward it lay, to westward)— we might even 
interpret this story from the very start as illustrative of the course of Manifest Destiny 
that persists in stretching across the United States in the late-twentieth century, albeit in 
the ever-new and various forms of the commercial age. The westward course of empire 
may even break the geographical boundaries of the United States as the looming specter 
that haunts this story is the McDonald’s corporation that currently claims over thirty 
thousand franchises worldwide. 
Taking the opening line from “Lost in the Funhouse” as an epigraph, the novella 
revisits the sights and sounds of Barth’s classic metafictional story en route to what 
James Rother calls a “sendup-cum-homage that is nearly six times as long as its source 
text” (218). The story spins itself out of the creative writing workshop taught by 
Professor Ambrose at East Chesapeake Tradeschool, and much like Barth’s Ambrose and 
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his family in “Lost in the Funhouse,” Wallace’s main characters, D.L. Eberhardt, Mark 
Nechtr, and Tom Sternberg embark on a journey to a fantastical destination: 
the scheduled Reunion of everyone who has ever been in a McDonald’s 
commercial, arranged by J.D. Steelritter Advertising and featuring a party to end 
all parties, a spectacular collective Reunion commercial, the ribbon-cutting 
revelation of the new Funhouse franchises’ flagship discotheque. (235) 
 
 
D.L., a self-proclaimed postmodernist, and Mark, a trust fund college student with a heart 
of gold, seem an unlikely romantic pairing. They are polar opposites in nearly every way, 
and yet when Mark witnesses D.L. fleeing the scene after writing something nasty about 
Professor Ambrose on the chalkboard one day prior to workshop, he does not rat her out, 
and somehow a connection is forged between the two. D.L. claims to be—but is in fact 
not—pregnant, and thus Mark marries her out of a sense of noble obligation and 
accompanies D.L. on the reunion journey, along with Tom Sternberg, a fellow 
commercial alum and friend of D.L. Through a series of unlikely events interlaced with 
various characters’ memories, narrations, and narrative interjections reminiscent of those 
in Barth’s story, the group arrives in Illinois where they are to be picked up and 
transported to the reunion by advertising mogul J.D. Steelritter and his hapless son 
DeHaven, another unlikely pair. But the Central Illinois Airport barely marks the halfway 
point in the journey, much less the narrative. The story bogs down, along with 
DeHaven’s car, before the group ever arrives at its destination, marked by huge golden 
arches that the characters can see towering over the endless cornfields of the American 
Midwest. 
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The novella-as-rewrite of Barth’s “Lost in the Funhouse” has been the primary 
focus of the few studies of “Westward,” but critics tend to disagree as to Wallace’s 
feelings toward the so-called “first generation” postmodern writers such as Barth, Robert 
Coover, and Thomas Pynchon. As mentioned earlier, James Rother reads “Westward” as 
both tribute and critique. Paul Giles proposes that “Wallace’s story suggests that Barth’s 
notion of ironic reflexivity has become thoroughly institutionalized, as much a syndicated 
brand as McDonald’s itself” (331). Other critics have recognized in Wallace’s Professor 
Ambrose a fictional version of Barth himself, “presented as the foremost theorist of 
postmodernism in Westward – which draws heavily on Barth’s seminal story ‘Lost in the 
Funhouse’ in order to unmask the often shallow strategies of metafiction” (Staes 468). In 
one of the few book-length treatments of Wallace’s work, Marshall Boswell says outright 
that “Westward should be read as a metafictional critique of metafiction that seeks to 
demolish even metafiction’s own claim to imperious self-consciousness” (104). Across 
this diverse range of perspectives on Wallace’s relation to Barth the common ground 
appears to be that the novella sees the early metafiction of Barth and his cohorts as 
coming up empty. Boswell characterizes this critique as Wallace entering the “prison 
house of postmodern self-reflexivity” while maintaining a firm hold on “the world of the 
real, the world outside the text, that is, the text’s transcendent referent” (112). Rather than 
continue to depend upon the binary opposition of world to text, inside to outside, a 
materialist reading reveals that Wallace asks us to embrace the paradoxical conflation of 
inner and outer embodied in the presence of an arrow given to Mark Nechtr as a gift. 
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Initially given to Mark as a wedding present by his former YWCA archery coach, 
the woman who also took his virginity, the Dexter Aluminum Target Arrow materially 
prevents Mark, D.L., and Tom from meeting up with Steelritter and DeHaven on time 
when they arrive at Central Illinois Airport: “The LordAloft pilot, a Polynesian in a just 
bitching three-piece and mirrored glasses, wouldn’t allow Mark’s disassembled bow or 
quiver on the helicopter. […] Target arrows are deadly weapons, after all” (248). The 
circulation of this object throughout the novella uncovers a Zeno’s paradox between text 
and world in which we never seem to get outside the text, but at the same time we 
obviously do, just as Zeno’s arrow never hits the target, but, of course, it does. There is 
an insurmountable gap between text and world, yet we surmount it every day; empire is 
merely the product of language and yet the Native peoples that we most associate with 
the bow and arrow are living on fractionated plots of land across the United States. 
Barth’s Ambrose is hopelessly trapped forever within the confines of the funhouse, yet 
the alternate versions of the story place him in the car with his family on the way home 
being teased by his Uncle Karl for coming through the funhouse “shoulder to shoulder” 
with “ a blind Negro girl.” Mark, D.L., Tom, Steelritter, and DeHaven never arrive at the 
reunion, yet they do arrive. Barth most explicitly enacts this paradox at the end of 
“Funhouse” when Ambrose accepts his fate and yet purposes to “construct funhouses for 
others” (97). At its most fundamental level, the funhouse is something that is made, 
constructed, assembled, and can thus be remade, reconstructed, and reassembled. 
Wallace’s story, much like Barth’s metafictional funhouse, is not merely a meditation on 
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language, but an exploration of how communities assemble themselves out of common 
experiences with material things. 
While it might seem a stretch to assume that Wallace is directly engaging with the 
critical overlap between poststructuralism and postmodernism, he makes much of the fact 
that D.L. self-identifies as a postmodernist: “she actually went around calling herself a 
postmodernist. No matter where you are, you Don’t Do This” (234 original emphasis). 
Wallace has Professor Ambrose, Barth’s fictional incarnation, condemn this style by 
characterizing it as having a “certain ‘Look-Mom-no-hands quality’” (234). Wallace 
associates the infinitely playful poststructuralist experimentation with language with 
those who claim to be postmodern, but he dissociates his Barthean character from that 
crowd. Whereas Barth was trying to get at the essence of narration to explore the ultimate 
connections and ruptures between things, people, and words, Wallace represents those 
who follow in his footsteps for the sake of some abstract idea of the artist as “coldly 
fertile” (234). In other words, Wallace’s gripe seems to be with the critical conversation 
surrounding “Lost in the Funhouse” not with the story itself because Barth is not invested 
in the infinite deferral of meaning, but in the material interruption of what we take for 
granted as familiar social categories. Barth’s bees, bottles, matchbooks, and name-coins 
construct communities, and Wallace follows suit, shooting Mark Nechtr’s arrow through 
the heart of the story to create a trajectory whose wake gathers an odd band of travelers 
into one really odd collective. 
Much like the texts examined in the earlier chapters, and much like Lost in the 
Funhouse, “Westward” makes a narrative move toward openness and process 
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foreshadowed in the presence and movement of material items. This openness might also 
be understood as a correlation rather than a separation between the world and the text. As 
Mark, D.L. and Tom stand in the rental car line after being refused passage on the 
LordAloft helicopter on account of the arrow, Mark does his best to conceal the arrow 
under his shirt. After a little while, he removes the object so that he can sit down, and 
commences to play table-top games with it: “Mark idly flips his arrow up and over and 
down and into the lounge’s round table, where the razor-sharp Dexter target-tip sticks” 
(273). Tom comes along and tries the trick, but winds up sending the arrow into a fellow-
diner’s dessert. The man whose dessert has been ruined is enraged, and the woman eating 
with him, one of the flight attendants, has her clothes stained by the incident. It turns out, 
however, that this woman, Magda, is also on her way to the Reunion, and hours later, 
when they’ve all finally met up with Steelritter and DeHaven and are packed into 
DeHaven’s car on their way to the Reunion, Mark realizes that he doesn’t have his arrow, 
only to be reassured by Magda that she has put it in her carry-on. The narrator muses: 
The thing cannot be lost. Even shot it at the sea once. Off an old wharf. Except it 
floated, though, glinting; hung in the water by its cedar knock; come in on the 
sluggish tide within hours. And Mark had waited for it. On the crumbled wharf 
that smelled of fish. The fact that the arrow can’t disappear is both a comfort and 
a worry. It makes Nechtr feel special, true. But from special it’s not very far to 
Alone. (308) 
 
 
Reminiscent of the bottle that a young Ambrose finds on the tidewater’s edge, the arrow 
makes its way to shore across the hours and tides. The arrow refuses to cooperate with 
Tom. The thing obediently flips end-over-end and sticks in the table top for Mark, but in 
Tom’s hands it nearly causes a fight. The object’s agency in this moment is important in 
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two ways. First, it has the power to decline the group a ride on the helicopter. Second, it 
does not make itself amenable to all human actors equally. 
The arrow is not what it seems to be, and its properties defy human determination. 
The narrator of “Westward” explains this defiance in relation to the practice of target 
shooting: 
As you stand shoulder-first across thirty orthogonal meters between you and the 
red thing that encloses the gold chroma, […] the point of your arrow, at full draw, 
is somewhere between three and nine centimeters to the left of the true straight 
line to the bull’s-eye, even though the arrow’s nock, fucked by the string, is on 
that line. The bow gets in the way, see. So logically it seems like if your sight and 
aim are truly true, the arrow should always land just to the left of target-center 
[…] But the straight-aimed and so off-angled target arrow will stab the center, 
right in the heart, every time. It is an archer’s law that makes no sense. (294) 
 
 
The narrator says that the explanation for this unaccountable phenomenon “lies in what 
happens to the well-aimed arrow when it’s released; what happens while it’s traveling to 
the waiting target” (294 original emphasis). Taking Mark’s arrow itself as an important 
actor in the interaction of other actors in the story, we find that it has already played a 
role in bringing Magda together with Mark, D.L., and Tom Sternberg when Tom’s foiled 
attempt to flip the arrow lands it in the dessert that stains Magda’s dress, but its work is 
not done. Because of their missed helicopter flight, the three original travelers, along with 
their new companion, end up being transported to the Reunion in the personal car of 
DeHaven Steelritter, along with his father J.D. 
As with Barth’s broken bottle in “Water-Message,” the means of conveyance 
here, DeHaven’s car, plays a significant part in helping us understand how the assembled 
nature of social aggregates also implies their capacity to be remade. Barth’s glass bottle is 
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shattered into pieces, DeHaven’s car is assembled out of “parts”: “I built this baby from 
scratch. It’s not technically an anything” (298). When D.L. refuses to ride in anything but 
a Datsun, J.D. Steelritter compromises: “‘Tell you what, Eberhardt […] we write 
DATSUN in the shameful no-pride dust on the kid’s rear window, here’ […] It both 
relieved Sternberg and gave him the creeps. ‘An instant Datsun?’” (298). Unlike the 
Datsun in Alvarez’s novel, DeHaven’s car cannot be easily placed on the hierarchical 
scale of automobile brands that provides a clear-cut sense of what social class the driver 
occupies. D.L.’s problematic, yet characteristic, refusal to ride in anything but a Datsun 
marks her as a “postmodernist” prisoner to language games. But the fact that DeHaven’s 
car isn’t “technically an anything” means that this imprisonment does not correspond to 
the material order of things in the world of the story. The “instant Datsun” is an 
amalgamated means of conveying the group that is constantly falling apart and being 
rebuilt out of different parts. Thus, when the car eventually bogs down in the Illinois mud 
a few short miles from the Reunion site, the narrator says with still thirty pages left to go, 
“This is pretty much the climax of the whole journey, by the way, pending arrival” (345). 
The arrow and car have brought us to the “while its traveling” of the narrative, the literal 
rising action that Wallace treats as the climax of the story in Freitagian terms.  
Much has been made of Barth’s inclusion of a literal Freitag’s Triangle in the text 
of “Lost in the Funhouse.”
4
 As “Lost in the Funhouse” spins out of control, Barth’s 
narrator explains, “A long time ago we should have passed the apex of Freitag’s Triangle 
and made brief work of the dénouement; the plot doesn’t rise by meaningful steps but 
winds upon itself, digresses, retreats, hesitates, sighs, collapses, expires” (96). Similarly, 
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as DeHaven’s car fails to reach its goal and instead “digresses, retreats, hesitates, sighs, 
collapses, expires,” the abusive father who has demeaned and bullied him throughout the 
story seems to soften toward his son, and D.L. “can tell DeHaven Steelritter and J.D. love 
each other, deep down, and this affects her” (345). The arrow does not arrive at its target, 
the group does not make it to the reunion within the bounds of the narrative, but do we 
not arrive anywhere at all? We arrive in-process as DeHaven seeks assistance from a 
local farmer to pull the car out of the mud, thus growing the strange little community 
again by one, well two if we count the horse the farmer brings to help extract the “instant 
Datsun.” What Wallace privileges in this simultaneously penultimate and ultimate 
moment of his narrative is the very fact of process. At the end of Housekeeping, Lucille 
does “not watch, does not listen, does not wait, does not hope, and always for me and 
Sylvie” (219). The ragtag band of travelers in Wallace’s novella does not arrive, does not 
enjoy the reunion, “but in time, they’ll arrive at what’s been built” (372).  
Even the possibility of this eventual arrival is interrupted by the narrator’s 
insertion of the story that a struggling Mark finally writes for Professor Ambrose’s 
workshop. Mark’s protagonist, Dave, is convicted of murdering his wife even though she 
stabs herself in the neck with an arrow. Dave is both guilty and not guilty, or as the 
narrator explains, he is “guilty of being Not Guilty” (360). As we flash back and forth 
between Mark’s story and Wallace’s, it becomes clear that things, people, and words do 
not float in endless chains of signification, but constantly change and transform as they 
interact. The wheels of DeHaven’s car spin in the Illinois mud, and the narrator turns 
explicitly to the reader, much as Alvarez’s and DeLillo’s narrators do, and says, “So trust 
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me: we will arrive. Cross my heart. Stick a needle. To tell the truth, we might already be 
there. […] But the wheel! Bound by nothing, the Goodyear spins and spins, has lost its 
ringing hub” (373). This exclamation might seem indicative of the linguistic system with 
no center that literary and cultural critics maintain lies at the heart of postmodernism. 
However, the loss of the hub “has disclosed a radial’s spokes,” and the narrator prepares 
us to “hold rapt for that impossible delay, that best interruption: that moment in all radial 
time when something unseen inside the blur of spokes seems to sputter, catch, and spin 
against the spin” (373). When the center is not missing but broken, the infinite reaching 
tendrils of the individual spokes sprawl out of radial time and erode any inner/outer 
binary by refusing that inevitable “Not only…but also,” that Latour decries as 
perpetuating the false distinction between subjective and objective reality in which 
“objectivity is always on the other side of the fence” (145). 
Wallace completely abandons this fence in an earlier story from Girl With 
Curious Hair by entirely erasing the gap between subjective and objective through his 
conflation of story and narrative discourse.
5
 Among the earliest pieces of fiction Wallace 
ever published, the story “Here and There” does not contain any narration. That is, there 
is not a single word in the story that is outside of quotation marks. Thus, there is literally 
nothing outside the story, no narration, no commentary. Furthermore, the entire story is a 
session of so-called “fiction therapy” in which the protagonist Bruce, a brilliant MIT 
graduate in electrical engineering, recounts the dissolution of his relationship with a 
young woman by speaking in both his own voice and his ex-girlfriend’s voice in an 
attempt, as his therapist says, “‘to construct an instance in which for once your interests 
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are to be subordinated to those of another’” (153). However, what may seem at first like 
the ultimate incarnation of Derrida’s il n’y a pas de hors-texte is, in fact, something else. 
Rather than making all the world into an abstract and semiotic text, Wallace materializes 
all textual constructions by focusing on a stove at the story’s end that contains all of 
Bruce’s fears and anxieties, much like the toy drum at the end of García Girls contains 
all the narrative threads of the novel. It should come as no surprise that the second story 
of Barth’s Lost in the Funhouse, the “Night-Sea Journey” of a sperm fertilizing an egg, 
also takes place entirely in the world of direct discourse. In the world of “Here and 
There” there is only story, only action; there is no separate world of narration. Bruce 
finds himself spiraling down into the labyrinth of language only to have the semiosis of 
the system disrupted by the stubbornness of a 1960s electric stove. 
Similar to the way in which the Möebius strip in Barth’s “Frame-Tale” requires 
the material intervention of the reader in order to complete its work, “Here and There” 
asks us to piece its story together without the help of any narrative discourse. Throughout 
the story we follow Bruce’s obsession with the erosion of language as a “correlative” 
system. Bruce explains, “Words as fulfillers of the function of signification in artistic 
communication will wither like the rules of form before them. Meaning will be clean” 
(155). He describes his ideal vision of the language-meaning-system as “the icy beauty of 
the perfect signification of fabricated nonverbal symbols and their relation through 
agreed-on rules” (167). As he goes on to recreate the dissolution of his romantic 
relationship in the fiction therapy session, Bruce recalls a trip he takes to his aunt’s and 
uncle’s house in Maine, where he begins to feel a separation between his emotions and 
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the source of those emotions, which he describes as “something outside” himself. He 
explains that he is overcome with 
an urge to ‘write it all out,’ to confront the past and present as a community of 
signs, but this requires a special distance I seem to have left behind. For a few 
days I exercise instead—go for long, shambling runs in jeans and sneakers, move 
some heavy mechanical clutter out of my uncle’s backyard. (165-66) 
 
 
Instead of turning to language, or to the people who seem to draw their very breath from 
language, Bruce turns to physical activity, to manual labor and material experience. 
In fact, Bruce seems to see no marked difference between things and people in his 
attempts to understand himself, but his valuation of the material renders all things 
intermediaries, not mediating actors. He calls his brother Leonard on the phone and gives 
an “involved and scrupulously fair edition” of his break up, and subsequent unhappiness. 
Leonard insists that, like their mother, Bruce suffers from “an unhappy and basically silly 
desire to be perfect” the fulfillment of which would ultimately render a person’s life 
boring (166). When Bruce responds that being boring is an imperfection and “would by 
definition be impossible for a perfect person,” Leonard retorts that his brother has 
“always enjoyed playing games with words in order to dodge the real meanings of 
things” which Bruce thinks “segues with suspicious neatness into [his] intuitions about 
the impending death of lexical utterance” (166). Bruce’s therapist counters that Leonard 
was simply trying to point out the impossibility of perfection, but Bruce retorts: “There is 
no shortage of things that are perfect for the function that defines them. Peano’s axioms. 
A chameleon’s coat. A Turing Machine” (167). The therapist points out, “Those aren’t 
persons,” but Bruce insists, “No one has ever argued persuasively that that has anything 
174 
to do with it. My professors stopped trying” (166-67). For Bruce, all human and 
nonhuman entities are mere placeholders in “systems of information and energy-transfer” 
(154). In his language-dominated world, actors do not count for more than just one, and 
thus the possibility for remaking the social cannot be realized. 
Bruce is the ultimate Ambrose teetering on the edge of an earth-shattering 
revelation in his subsequent encounter with his Aunt’s stove. The interruption of Bruce’s 
theory of the “icy beauty of the perfect signification” occurs as the result of what Brown 
has called, “the suddenness with which things seem to assert their presence and power” 
(“Thing Theory” 3). As Bruce waits for his uncle to get home from work one day, his 
aunt asks him to take a look at their old stove because it is not working properly. She 
needs to get some chili heated up for lunch, but also needs to prepare for a quiz in the 
French class she’s taking at the local university. With an electrical engineering degree 
from MIT, fixing an electric stove shouldn’t be that complicated, but Bruce quickly 
makes a mess of the stove’s wiring. He understands the workings of the circuits, jacks, 
and burners, but has never “personally bound a system of wire” (170). Instead, he 
explains 
the work that interests me is done with a pencil and a sheet of paper. Rarely even 
a calculator. At the cutting edge of electrical engineering, almost everything 
interesting is resolvable via the manipulation of variables. I’ve never once been 
stumped on an exam. Ever. And I appear to have broken this miserable piece-of-
shit stove. (170) 
 
 
Bruce’s frustration is grounded in his lack of assurance about what he can and cannot 
know. He cannot adjust for all the variables necessary to fix the stove without 
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information that is unavailable to him, in part, because of the age of the appliance. He 
laments, “There is no way to know without data on the resistance ratios in the metal 
composition of the burners” (170-71 original emphasis). The therapist interjects: “You’re 
unable to fix an electric stove?” The stove resists Bruce’s ideal world in which all things, 
people, and words count for just one, where we are all intermediaries. This stove, a relic 
of the Kennedy era as Bruce is often reminded, is comprised of numbers, systems, and 
functions, and should be a sure fix. Instead, the gap Bruce has created between word and 
world renders him not only unable to mend the stove, but also oddly fearful of the thing 
itself. 
This fear is an important crack in the walls of Bruce’s personal funhouse of 
signification as his frustration gives way to fright: “Suddenly the inside of this stove is 
the very last place on earth I want to be. I begin to be frightened of the stove” (171). This 
fear drives Bruce to begin behaving strangely, putting on a performance that only 
multiplies his agitation: “I rattle a screwdriver against the inside of the stove so my aunt 
thinks I’m doing something. I get more and more frightened” (171). At this point we 
experience a lighting-paced exchange between Bruce, his imagining of his ex-girlfriend’s 
voice, and the therapist in which Bruce’s fascination with the systematization of 
knowledge through signification finally crumbles altogether in the face of his fear. He 
explains, “I’m so scared behind this dirty old stove I can’t breathe. I rattle tools” (171). 
The ultimate merger of knowledge and experience, word and world, subjective and 
objective takes place as Bruce’s aunt kneels down next to him “to lay her hand on [his] 
shoulder,” and he concludes “I’m afraid of absolutely everything there is” (172). More 
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than just a fracture in his theory of the world, Wallace characterizes this fear as an 
invitation to the world. The final line of the story belongs to the therapist, who responds 
to Bruce’s fearful confession with the simple phrase, “Then welcome” (172). Thus, the 
shattering of Bruce’s attempts to treat all words, things, and even people as mere 
placeholders in the galaxy of his life simultaneously constitutes his entrance into what it 
means to be in the world. 
Bruce’s fear in “Here and There” recalls the opening sentences from “Lost in the 
Funhouse,” the first of which Wallace employs as an epigraph to “Westward”: “For 
whom is the funhouse fun? Perhaps for lovers. For Ambrose it is a place of fear and 
confusion” (Funhouse 72 original emphasis). In “Lost in the Funhouse” Ambrose gets 
turned around and caught up in the funhouse and spends his time telling stories and 
looking for the cracks in the walls he ran across earlier in his journey. D.L. Eberhardt, 
Mark Nechtr, and the rest of the gang in “Westward” are all bogged down in Wallace’s 
purposefully unending rewriting of Barth. Finally, in “Here and There,” Bruce is mired in 
the “icy beauty of the perfect signification” (167). What becomes apparent if we read 
each of these stories in light of Barth’s question, “For whom is the funhouse fun?” and in 
light of the possible answer, “perhaps for lovers,” is that none of the main characters 
featured in these stories are lovers. Instead, like Ambrose, they are all either fearful, or 
confused, or both. The funhouse can be fun for lovers because lovers have a form of 
relation that is not dependent on the funhouse. They do not come to the funhouse for the 
sake of the funhouse itself, but to heighten the effects of their already-existing 
relationships. Barth’s narrator explains Ambrose’s realization of this fact as he scrambles 
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along the floor of the funhouse: “shamefaced he saw that to get through expeditiously 
was not the point” (92). For lovers, the funhouse represents an opportunity to perform 
their love in new ways, but for those who focus on the amusement itself, the funhouse 
represents an endless preoccupation with the funhouse. 
At the risk of overstating the case, I think Barth’s seminal story can be read as a 
cautionary tale against approaching fiction, society, love, or fear as ends in themselves. 
To do so is to cut the Mobius strip from the “Frame-Tale” and spend the rest of our lives 
riding its circuitous contours as opposed to acknowledging the reconstructive possibilities 
it represents. Wallace’s rewriting of “Lost in the Funhouse,” then, is a critical correction 
to the misreading of Barth as a sage who demonstrates that language is all that is the case, 
when, in fact, what makes writers such as Barth, Silko, DeLillo, Robinson, Alvarez, and 
Wallace postmodern, are the ways in which they view language as one component of 
experience alongside others. If, as Barth suggests and Wallace echoes, the funhouse is 
fun for lovers, then the final lines of “Westward” are especially significant: 
See this thing. See inside what spins without purchase. Close your eye. 
Absolutely no salesmen will call. Relax. Lie back. I want nothing from you. Lie 
back. Relax. Quality soil washes right out. Lie back. Open. Face directions. Look. 
Listen. Use ears I’d be proud to call our own. Listen to the silence behind the 
engines’ noise. Jesus, Sweets, listen. Hear it? It’s a love song. For whom? You are 
loved. (373) 
 
 
Wallace, like both DeLillo and Alvarez, makes an appeal to the reader, opening his 
narrative to us, and explains that we are loved. If we will only recognize our status as 
lovers, then we will also come to understand that the funhouse can be fun for us, not as an 
end in itself as it is for the fearful and confused such as Ambrose and Bruce, but as one 
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component of our experience, one means of adding dimensions to our in-process lives as 
lovers. Wallace ends “Here and There” with the word “welcome” because realizing the 
mediating properties of material actors like the stove is only the first step toward a 
reimagining of the social itself. 
When the funhouse of language becomes one component in a larger network 
comprised of a vast array of human and nonhuman actors, and we expand our readings of 
postmodern fiction to include the material objects of everyday life, then metafiction, 
surfiction, the literature of exhaustion, the literature of silence can render “the solid 
objects of today into the fluid states where their connections with humans may make 
sense” (Reassembling 82). Or as Latour goes on to say, we may come to understand that 
“objects are never assembled together to form some other realm anyhow […] even as 
textual entities, objects overflow their makers, intermediaries become mediators” (85). 
This revelation has serious ramifications for the study of literature, certainly, but perhaps 
even more so for what the study of literature can tell us about the social. If all actors, 
whether human or nonhuman, are best understood as mediators then we can actively 
redress the various forms of disenfranchisement that manifest themselves in the 
marginalization of specific communities based on static definitions of the social. That is, 
if Barth can call our attention to the process of racialization in 1968 in the characters of 
Hattie and the “Negro servants,” then what can be accomplished in the wake of this 
revelation? Perhaps we can see relations with new eyes and valorize actors themselves as 
makers of “everything, including their own frames, their own theories, their own 
contexts, their own metaphysics, even their own ontologies” (Reassembling 147). Thus, 
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disenfranchisement and marginalization cannot be blamed on some ambiguous scapegoat 
such as the social structure or the social system since such ethereal ties do not exist. 
Instead, the responsibility lies with identifiable actors who have constantly made and 
remade their frames of relation to procure such treatment of groups of actors whose 
collectiveness is also the ongoing product of construction. 
With this insight in mind, the next chapter examines two texts that map a series of 
successful and unsuccessful remakings of the social in relation to the same kind of object. 
As three characters in Morrison’s Jazz (1992) develop an unexpected community as a 
result of one’s search for a ring, two characters from recognizably fixed social categories 
in Lethem’s The Fortress of Solitude (2003) demonstrate the construction and dissolution 
of a network as they become fast friends and then alienated strangers, also in relation to a 
ring. The ring that plays such a central role in each of these texts forms a literal link 
between other actors, but this link can be infinitely reforged to allow for the connection 
of previously unrelated actors. The inclinations of actors in each of these novels 
demonstrates postmodern fiction’s unwillingness to set aside questions of the material to 
focus on questions of knowledge, and this constant attention to “what is there” as 
opposed to “how we know” enacts the central idea of Wallace’s stories by demonstrating 
that the way we talk about the social is only one component in the larger process of its 
construction.
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Notes 
 
 
1
 In his essay “Secret Integrations: Black Humor and the Critique of Whiteness,” Solomon argues that 
Barth is invested in demonstrating “the way racialized acts of impersonation can help facilitate the 
construction of heterosexual identities” (486). This argument about Barth is situated within a larger 
framework in which Solomon suggests that an examination of black humor during the civil rights era 
uncovers an anticipation of a more contemporary interest in the idea of self-fashioning. 
 
2
 Roland Barthes, for instance, in his “Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narratives” suggests that a 
narrative is made up of the representation of at least two events, and in Unlikely Stories, Brian Richardson 
argues that these events must even be related causally. 
 
3
 In his depiction of Hattie, Barth walks a precarious line between perpetuating what Toni Morrison 
understands as the “Africanist presence” in American literature in Playing in the Dark and what William 
Solomon reads as a subtle critique of whiteness in his analysis of Barth’s title story, “Lost in the 
Funhouse.” See Solomon’s “Secret Integrations: Black Humor and the Critique of Whiteness,” pages 484-
89. 
 
4
 See Woolley’s “Empty ‘Text,’ Fecund Voice: Self-Reflexivity in Barth’s Lost in the Funhouse” (471); 
Morris’s “Barth and Lacan: The World of the Moebius Strip” (73); Kyle’s “The Unity of Anatomy: The 
Structure of Barth’s Lost in the Funhouse “ (40). 
 
5
 I am following the direction of Jonathan Culler in “Story and Discourse in the Analysis of Narrative” 
from The Pursuit of Signs: Semiotics, Literature, Deconstruction, in which he problematizes the 
conventional narratological distinction between story and discourse by suggesting that there is only 
discourse. However, I am doing so under the rubric of my own argument that complicates our 
understanding of discourse in poststructural terms. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
REMAKING THE SOCIAL: FROM HOW WE KNOW 
TO WHAT IS THERE 
 
 
In the mid-1990s, when the critical discourse of postmodernism was at the climax 
of its popularity, influence, and relevance, the cultural studies journal Social Text 
published a special issue devoted to the “Science Wars.” Editor Andrew Ross explains in 
his introduction that although the sciences have been represented as monopolizing the 
market on rationality, a closer look at their ties to governments, big business, and 
political organizations necessitates inquiry into the “ideology of objectivity and truth […] 
defenders of the faith are being rallied around” (6). Ross goes on to compare resistance to 
this scrutiny on the part of some scientists to that of traditionalists in the humanities who 
dig in their heels at the thought of “curricular displacements of T. S. Eliot by Toni 
Morrison” (8). What Ross did not know as he penned this introduction was that one of 
the articles the editors had chosen to include was intended to undercut their intellectual 
mission. About a month after the issue was released, one of the contributors, physicist 
Alan Sokal, published a statement in the journal Lingua Franca in which he confessed 
that his contribution was “nonsense,” “a spoof,” and “egregious” (62-63). Sokal explains 
that he wanted to see if “a leading North American journal of cultural studies [would] 
publish an article liberally salted with nonsense if (a) it sounded good and (b) it flattered 
the editors’ ideological preconceptions” (62). He then provides numerous examples of 
factual inaccuracies, ludicrous claims, and unsupported conclusions in his article, 
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characterizing the Social Text crowd and their ilk as examples of “the intellectual 
arrogance of Theory—postmodernist literary theory, that is—carried to its logical 
extreme” (63 original emphasis). Two important questions motivate Sokal’s objections to 
postmodernism as a theoretical approach: “Is it now dogma in cultural studies that there 
exists no external world? Or that there exists an external world but science obtains no 
knowledge of it?” (62). Sokal’s questions uncover a disjunction between theories of 
existence and theories of knowledge that has plagued discussions of postmodernism and 
led to its characterization as abstract and immaterial, uninterested in the “real” world. 
High-theory happenings such as the Sokal affair may seem to have mercifully 
faded from our critical horizon, but I recall our attention to this singular battle in the so-
called “culture wars” because it is representative of a misreading of postmodernism in 
general and postmodern fiction in particular, which has perpetuated what Rita Felski calls 
the practice of “suspicious reading” as the only legitimate mode of interpretation. In 
conversation with other literary scholars such as Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Stephen Best, 
and Sharon Marcus, Felski points out that our current critical frame of mind is “one of 
wariness, vigilance, and distrust” toward the text (216). Building on Paul Ricoeur’s 
coinage of a “hermeneutics of suspicion,” she argues that suspicious reading “is not just 
an intellectual exercise in demystification but also a distinctive style and sensibility with 
its own specific pleasures” (216).
1
 The element of Felski’s diagnosis of literary critique 
most immediately relevant to postmodern fiction is her assertion that there are some texts, 
for example those often classified as “postmodern metafiction,” that lend themselves 
especially well to certain modes of suspicious reading in which it seems “we do not need 
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to be suspicious of the text […] because it is already doing the work of suspicion for us, 
because it is engaged in the negative work of subverting the self-evident, challenging the 
commonplace, relentlessly questioning idées fixes and idées recus” (217). Thus, 
postmodernism is often understood as suspicious or dismissive of “objective realities” 
because it seems to be questioning the foundations of being and thinking that many see as 
indisputably obvious. The misunderstanding here can be traced back to the discussion of 
epistemology and ontology that has dominated theories of postmodern fiction since the 
late 1980s.
2
 Rather than merely retreading an old argument, I want to revisit it with a 
materialist bent: what happens when we shift our focus from questions of how we know 
to questions about what is there? 
In a recent essay entitled “Why Has Critique Run Out of Steam?” Latour contends 
that the willingness to build entire structures of thinking on what are widely accepted as 
“matters of fact” is to “muddle[] entirely the question, What is there? With the question, 
How do we know it?” (244). Alan Sokal justifies his “modest (though admittedly 
uncontrolled) experiment” as necessary to expose “a particular kind of nonsense and 
sloppy thinking: one that denies the existence of objective realities, or (when challenged) 
admits their existence but downplays their practical relevance” (63). Sokal confuses 
questions of “what is there” with questions of “how we know it” as he continues, 
At its best, a journal like Social Text raises important issues that no scientist 
should ignore—questions, for example, about how corporate and government 
funding influence scientific work. Unfortunately, epistemic relativism does little 
to further the discussion of these matters. (63) 
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Sokal’s indictment of postmodernism on a count of “epistemic relativism” for the 
supposed crime of denying the existence and practical relevance of “objective realities” is 
tantamount to accusing a thief of perjury; the charge does not fit the crime. But the Social 
Text editors do not capitalize on this confusion. Instead, they make it clear that the 
“postmodern, social constructionist, [and] anti-foundational critiques of positivism” are 
old hat in their field and in no way conflict with the “existence of facts, objective 
realities, and gravitational forces” (Ross et al. 56). Both Sokal’s and the editors’ 
willingness to bracket the existence of “objective realities” so that they can forge ahead 
arguing in support of their respective theories about that reality can be read as 
symptomatic of a more problematic trend: the desire to focus our critical insight on the 
pleasures of debunking and demystifying existing social structures instead of on the 
possibilities of reassembling and remaking the social. 
When we bracket “objective realities” we hastily accept that, yes, the world is real 
and accessible, and turn our attention away from the materiality of what is there in favor 
of focusing on theories of knowledge. When this displacement becomes convention the 
capacity to rearrange what is there gets obscured by the new ultimate reality of whose 
epistemology is most accurate. In other words, when we approach the material world as a 
given and spend our critical capital on epistemological inquiry, we overlook the ways in 
which “what is there” constantly shapes “how we know.” Despite a discursive tradition 
that emphasizes the ontological over the epistemological, we have already seen how 
postmodernism is often represented as the apotheosis of epistemological demystification. 
Beginning with the assumptions inherent in such an approach, it is no wonder that smart 
185 
people like Alan Sokal cry foul when “postmodernist literary theory” constantly seems to 
come up empty. Comparing the demythologizing work of the critic to that of a detective, 
Felski observes that “the critic shares the detective’s desire to track down and bring to 
light obscured patterns of causality—in this context, the social forces that underpin and 
motivate the symptomatic tensions and contradictions of the literary text” (225). But what 
if postmodern fiction does not set out to bring “social forces” to light? What if 
postmodern critique does not imagine the social as a substance or force at all, but as a 
continuous gathering of human and nonhuman actors into various assemblies? What if 
the social, and our knowledge of the social, is constantly in process and not the mere 
object of “epistemic relativism” as Sokal would have it? Postmodern fiction does not set 
out to expose the power structures that form social relations, instead as Latour claims, 
“power, like society, is the final result of a process and not a reservoir, a stock, or a 
capital that will automatically provide explanation” (Reassembling 64). Or, as Ian 
Hacking synthesizes Foucault’s writing on power, “when Foucault wrote of power, he did 
not usually have in mind the power exerted upon us by a discernible agent or authority or 
system. It is rather we who participate in anonymous, unowned arrangements that he 
called power” (3). This chapter, then, is devoted to analyses of texts that own up to such 
arrangements and that also highlight the dangers of failing to do so. 
Such analyses are made possible by postmodern fiction’s unwillingness to bracket 
“objective reality” through its commitment to the material domain of everyday life. When 
we bracket the material world in favor of endless epistemological inquiry, we get bogged 
down by the very social categories that postmodern fiction refashions into social 
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networks that are revealed as constantly in-process. When we approach any text or task 
through the lens of race, class, nation, gender, we may come out on the other side with a 
different configuration of these categories, but we will still inevitably end up with the 
same categories. On the other hand, when we turn our attention to the myriad human and 
nonhuman actors, and especially the material objects of postmodern fiction, what 
becomes clear is that postmodernism’s gaze is fixed on the “external world” with an eye 
toward understanding how the networks that constitute our physical existence also shape 
our knowledge of the world itself. Just as importantly, this fiction demonstrates the 
plasticity of these material networks. Thus, rather than starting with the familiar social 
categories that have typically dominated discussions of Morrison’s Jazz (1992) and 
Lethem’s The Fortress of Solitude (2003), I begin with the most important material 
objects that populate the worlds of these texts and work up to the larger communities 
through which Morrison’s characters reconstruct race as racialization and Lethem’s 
characters fail reimagine class in the face of gentrification. 
Before I can move into the foregrounding and analysis of Morrison’s and 
Lethem’s particular texts and objects, the influence of the familiar social categories I so 
desperately want to avoid starting with necessitates at least a very brief treatment. In his 
seminal work on race and fiction, Being and Race—which, it should be noted, takes as its 
epigraph this line from French dramatist and essayist Prosper Mérimée: “In fiction there 
must be a theoretical basis to the most minute details. Even a single glove must have its 
theory”—Charles Johnson says of race and much of the literary tradition of the United 
States that “whites in this history act; blacks can only react” (7). Johnson traces the Afro-
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American literary lineage from the poetry of Phillis Wheatley and the personal narrative 
of Gustavus Vassa, through William Wells Brown’s first novel, to the stories of Charles 
Chesnutt, the creative explosion of the Harlem Renaissance, and the full force and 
aftershocks of the Black Arts Movement. He summarizes by pointing out that black 
writers’ concern with meaning and life in literature 
has led to the creation of various racial ideologies for the African experience. […] 
There is an almost point-by-point correspondence among esthetics, social theory, 
and the conception of humanity here; but let us come down to cases: the problem 
with all this is that it is ideology. While ideology may create a fascinating vision 
of the universe, and also fascinating literary movements, it closes off the free 
investigation of phenomena. (26) 
 
 
With his finger on the pulse of the very problem I examine in this study, Johnson has 
called our attention to the circuitous difficulty of starting with race as a frame for 
understanding the social. However, by treating both a black and a white writer’s 
representations of race in this chapter I do not pretend to ignore the vast and serious 
implications of this marker in American literary history. Neither do I minimize race itself 
as a marker by asserting that it is “merely” constructed. Rather, recalling the argument I 
make in the first chapter regarding the significance of not theorizing “constructed” as 
synonymous with artificial, this chapter demonstrates that a remaking of the social is 
possible, even taking into account the weight of a marker such as race. The social is 
malleable not because these markers are constructed and thus somehow fake or unreal, 
but because every actor that constitutes these categories is important. When every actor 
matters, the rearrangement of even the most everyday objects can lead to a remaking of 
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the larger social network, although the resulting configurations may not always prove 
liberatory or ideal. 
Both Morrison’s Jazz and Lethem’s Fortress feature rings among their most 
prominent material actors with the capacity to remake social relations among human 
actors. Much like the link of chain given to Ralph Ellison’s unnamed protagonist in 
Invisible Man (1952), these rings serve as literal links between various characters in 
Morrison’s and Lethem’s novels.
3
 The basic difference between the characterizations of 
the material agency of the rings is that Morrison’s opal ring uncovers and enacts the 
possibilities of a material construction of the social, while Lethem’s silver ring offers the 
promise of remaking but allows that promise to go unfulfilled. Although I look briefly at 
other material objects in each text, I focus predominantly on the rings because of the 
thematic connections they uncover between the two novels. More specifically, the rings 
in each text serve as links between characters that might not otherwise have been joined. 
Both Morrison and Lethem are invested in rewriting the social parameters drawn by race 
and class when we use these familiar social categories as foundational building blocks in 
our construction of the social. However, where Morrison’s characters are able to 
assemble a new version of the social that adapts and redefines understandings of race and 
class across time, Lethem’s characters succumb to the boundaries of these familiar social 
categories even in the face of the material potential of social reconstruction. A notable 
number of other works of postmodern fiction also chart the trajectories of unique material 
actors to generate social collectives that accomplish similar revelations as those found in 
Morrison and Lethem. Bharati Mukherjee’s The Holder of the World (1993) and Jonathan 
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Safran Foer’s Extremely Loud & Incredibly Close (2005) are organized around searches 
for a diamond and a key, respectively, and these quests ultimately lead characters to 
construct social networks across lines of race, nation, and ethnicity. Foer’s first novel, 
Everything is Illuminated (2002), even features a ring as a vital link in connecting the 
various historical narratives present in the novel. Tim O’Brien’s classic The Things They 
Carried (1990) not only provides copious lists of objects that are used to cobble 
communities together on the fly, but also tracks a small pebble carried by one soldier 
throughout his tenure in Vietnam. There is perhaps no other writer of the postwar and 
post-Cold War era as attuned to the materiality of our everyday existence as Morrison. 
Jazz, the middle book in a trilogy bookended by Beloved (1987) and Paradise (1997), 
features a ring stolen by a mother and given as a gift to a daughter that reveals our 
propensity for bracketing the world while simultaneously refusing to allow us to do so. 
 
The Possibilities of What Is There 
 
The late Billy Taylor, an iconic musician, educator, and activist, describes jazz 
music as “spontaneous composition,” implying the constant and immediate assembly and 
reassembly of recognizable components into ever-new configurations. In a lecture given 
at the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts, Taylor elaborates, arguing that 
“most people have a wrong idea of what improvisation is. Improvisation is spontaneous 
composition, and in order to compose spontaneously you have to have some sense of 
form. You have to have a sense of content. You have to know the language that you’re 
using” (“What is Jazz Music?”). If we take Miles Davis’s rendition of the stunning 
“Autumn Leaves” as a case study, then what we find in the typical jazz composition is 
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the performance of a familiar melody by Davis on the trumpet, followed by a series of 
improvisations of this melody played on the piano and saxophone until Davis cuts back 
in, returning to the original melody. Thus, the heart of any jazz number is the 
spontaneous reassembly of the various components of the central melody into new 
configurations. This understanding of jazz music provides an illuminating rationale for 
the title Morrison chooses for Jazz, which Marcel Cornis-Pope has described as 
“interested in re-creating rather than merely representing black experience” (235). The 
unique structure of jazz music resonates with the materialist approach to postwar fiction 
because of its investment in the making and remaking of the familiar. Jazz improvisation 
spontaneously composes—meaning literally that it gathers in the moment—notes that 
have typically been connected in familiar configurations into arrangements ranging from 
the eerily similar to the utterly unrecognizable. The mathematically endless possibilities 
of this form highlight the value of its in-processness, and uncover its flexibility to 
account for unexpected changes. Although Morrison does not mention jazz anywhere 
inside the covers of Jazz, the novel’s interest in its own material construction and in the 
material actors that populate its pages suggests a commitment to spontaneous 
composition that can be read as representative of the material remaking of the social we 
have seen in a variety of texts that have often been described as postmodern. 
In an interview given the year after she published Jazz, Morrison says of the novel 
that she “put the whole plot on the first page. In fact, in the first edition the plot was on 
the cover, so that a person in a bookstore could read the cover and know right away what 
the book was about” (“Toni Morrison” 109). In the span of the first five sentences 
191 
Morrison’s enigmatic narrator does, indeed, give away the book’s central conflict as well 
as its resolution: 
Sth, I know that woman. She used to live with a flock of birds on Lenox Avenue. 
Know her husband, too. He fell for an eighteen-year-old girl with one of those 
deepdown, spooky loves that made him so sad and happy he shot her just to keep 
the feeling going. When the woman, her name is Violet, went to the funeral to see 
the girl and to cut her dead face they threw her to the floor and out of the church. 
(3) 
 
 
The early revelation of the narrative’s driving events and entities frees Morrison to 
construct a jazz-inspired meditation on the historical complexities that have set this plot 
in motion. The novel is resolutely historical and structurally “jazz-like,” as Morrison 
herself has said (“Toni Morrison” 110), because like any good jazz number it supplies us 
with the basic melody up front and then proceeds to improvise on that melody, offering a 
variety of renditions and perspectives from different instruments and voices before finally 
returning to the original melody which we then hear with new ears. Jazz begins with the 
tragic story of Joe Trace, his wife Violet Trace, and Dorcas Manfred, moves on through a 
series of historical retellings of key moments in these characters’ lives, and ends after 
Dorcas’s death with the new trio of Joe Trace, Violet Trace, and Dorcas’s friend Felice. 
However, what is significant about the return to what sounds like the original melody at 
the end of the novel in which Felice has simply replaced Dorcas in the triangular 
relationship with Joe and Violet is that the intervening improvisations have had a 
profound effect on this familiar story; they have, in fact, changed the tune, revealing the 
transformative power of historical reconstruction. But what has been overlooked in 
readings of this complex narrative is the essential role of material objects in the success 
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of its composition, and of one object in particular: an opal ring given to Dorcas’s friend 
Felice by her mother. 
Nearly every reading of Jazz focuses to some extent on the novel’s mysterious 
narrator. From the opening to the closing sentences of the book, this narrator speaks 
directly to us, calling attention to her/him/itself while simultaneously resisting 
identification. The first sentence reads: “Sth, I know that woman” (3). The “Sth” should 
be familiar to anyone who has ever attempted to capture someone’s attention in a moment 
of secrecy, and in this moment it seems the narrator is about to share a secret with us 
about “that woman” she/he/it knows. The oft-cited final sentences read: “You are free to 
do it and I am free to let you because look, look. Look where your hands are. Now” 
(229). Thus, the novel is framed by a voice addressing the reader, but the body of the text 
provides little unambiguous evidence as to the nature of this voice. Shirley Ann Stave has 
reasoned that, perhaps like many other characters in the book who have populated the 
waves of the Great Migration, “the narrator herself appears to be yet another rural 
immigrant seduced by the City” (65). Like Stave, Cornis-Pope also suspects a “female 
voice” (264). Eusebio Rodrigues argues that the narrator is the “thunder goddess” (261). 
Paula Eckard has offered the compelling argument that the narrator is jazz itself or the 
embodiment of this eclectic form (13-14). Caroline Rody’s insightful reading of Jazz in 
the larger context of the trilogy it comprises with Beloved and Paradise leads her to 
assert that “the narrative voice of Jazz seems to inherit the ghostlike presence, the here-
but-not-here, human-but-not-human quality of [Beloved’s] ghost” (624). Morrison 
herself, in an interview with Belle Lettres, has said “the voice is the voice of a talking 
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book,” in other words, the book itself is its own narrator (“Toni Morrison” 42). I will 
return to the implications of the book itself as narrator following my analysis of the ring 
as central in the remaking of the social world of the novel, but suffice it to say for now 
that Morrison’s own perception of the novel, the material thing as narrator, suggests that 
its complex and jazz-like structure can only be gathered into a coherent narrative, or 
song, by the material remaking of its central melody. By this I simply mean that the 
improvisations on the story Morrison provides up front can only successfully remake the 
love triangle because of the presence of the ring. 
The narrative structure itself is, at times, difficult to follow, much like any jazz 
improvisation of a familiar tune. Jürgen Grandt observes that most readings of the novel 
have focused on its “narrative structure and language” (305). Grandt offers his own 
analysis of the devastating love triangle between Joe, Violet, and Dorcas as the “the 
melody on which the disembodied first-person narrative voice improvises a story, or 
several stories, constantly adding, revising, inventing, shifting back and forth among 
various characters, going back in time as far as antebellum Virginia” (304). Connecting 
the enigmatic narrative voice to the organization of the text itself, Andrew Scheiber 
explains that the “first-person narrator, whose melismatic flourishes make time stop and 
double back on itself as giddily as a Louis Armstrong solo, gives literary form to the 
music of the novel’s title” (471-72). Caroline Brown characterizes the text as, 
“Nonchronological, melodic, emotionally slippery, repetitious, sometimes irrational, and 
filled with contradictions,” and continues, arguing that “what results is that the written 
text, though excluded from the arena of the musical due to its very silence, mimics the 
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most fundamental element of jazz: its abstraction” (632). Extending this conversation, 
what I want to point out is that in any jazz composition it is the familiarity of the central 
melody that renders the improvisations abstract. In other words, the assemblages that take 
place in the midst of what Billy Taylor calls jazz music’s “spontaneous composition,” 
only strike us as new, unfamiliar, or difficult to follow because they are being made on 
the spot, and remade in contrast to the original melody. Nancy Peterson is helpful here as 
she reveals that the narrative revisions of Golden Gray’s story, one of the novel’s many 
narrative threads, are not examples of the narrator’s willingness “to overlook Golden 
Gray’s faults,” but that the “commitment to looking again brings more details into the 
picture, which pose[s] new contradictions, and thus her former narrative can no longer 
offer neat evaluations” (212). Peterson’s insight is so poignant here because it enables us 
to see that the novel’s desire to constantly make and remake historical moments is 
intended to complicate our understanding of the present. However, if we continue to rely 
on human actors alone, on the social categories the novel seems at first to be 
problematizing, then we lose sight of the material means by which Morrison envisions 
the remaking of our social world. 
Morrison chooses an opal ring as the object around which her band of narratives 
rallies to move from its complicated weave of improvisations back into the central story 
of the novel. After Dorcas’s funeral, her friend Felice goes to the Traces’ home in search 
of an opal ring she had loaned the dead woman. Felice strikes up a friendship with Joe 
and Violet, and they invite her back for dinner on another occasion. As the novel winds 
down Joe, Violet, and Felice are cultivating a friendship that does not seem destined to 
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end in the way that we might suspect given Joe’s track record with Dorcas. In fact, as 
Peterson has pointed out, “Violet, Joe, and Felice do not reenact the lover’s triangle that 
previously led to tragedy. They instead make possible a future for themselves” (214). 
Peterson even remarks on the ring, noting that “Felice initially comes to the Traces’ 
apartment to get some help in recovering the opal ring from her mother that she had lent 
to Dorcas and to tell Joe not to be so broken up about Dorcas” (214). What I want to 
emphasize here is the centrality of the ring as an actor in the remaking of the story’s 
central melody. Lest we overlook the significance of the return to the triangular 
relationship that was laid out at the novel’s beginning, Morrison insists in her “Art of 
Fiction” interview with the Paris Review that “the jazz-like structure wasn’t a secondary 
thing for me—it was the raison d’étre of the book” (“Toni Morrison” 110). Without 
Felice’s need to search for the ring, she does not ascend the steps of Joe’s and Violet’s 
building, she does not inquire after her ring, she is not invited inside, or questioned, or 
engaged in conversation, or asked to return. The characters do not “make possible a 
future for themselves,” as Peterson has so eloquently stated, without Felice’s search for 
this singular object. Thus, we must trace the circulation of this object to understand 
Morrison’s “jazz-like” structure, and further, to move away for a while from questions of 
“how do we know” to focus on questions of “what is there.” But in order to conceptualize 
the weight of the work the ring accomplishes we must attend, briefly, to the complex 
variety of narrative improvisations that separate the initial and final melodies. 
Divided into ten sections or chapters dedicated to revising history, Jazz opens in 
1920s Harlem with Joe and Violet Trace’s marriage on the rocks. Morrison’s novel 
196 
shares its historical preoccupation with a number of other important postwar novels such 
as E.L. Doctorow’s Ragtime (1975), Don DeLillo’s Libra (1988), and Julia Alvarez’s In 
the Time of the Butterflies (1994). What sets Jazz apart is that much has been made of the 
odd fact that for a historical novel, it does not have much to say about the Jazz Age or 
Harlem Renaissance at all (Grandt 304; Peterson 201). Andrew Schreiber points to Alice 
Manfred’s suspicion of the “lowdown music” she hears in the city (478), and there are 
other points of contact such as the setting of Joe’s and Violet’s apartment on Lenox 
Avenue, a prominent street in literary representations of Harlem that shows up in 
explicitly musical stories such as James Baldwin’s “Sonny’s Blues.” Ultimately, 
however, I must agree with Peterson that the novel “offers for full view almost none of 
the artistic, cultural, or political milestones that African Americans achieved in those 
years” (201). Perhaps that is because the jazz of the novel’s title is not only the jazz age 
of the 1920s in the United States, but also, as numerous critics have explained, the 
aesthetic approach of the novel itself. While the present action of the first three and last 
three sections is set primarily in 1926, the heart of the novel (sections 4-7) ranges as far 
back as the antebellum South as Morrison’s unique narrator traces the complicated 
branches of the family trees that ultimately produce Joe and Violet Trace. 
Perhaps the most representative example of the narrative improvisation of Jazz’s 
structure can be found in the narrative thread devoted to the young, racially-mixed man 
Violet’s slave, then ex-slave grandmother, True Belle has helped raise. Midway through 
the novel the young man, Golden Gray, discovers that his father is a black man and goes 
in search of Henry Lestory, known locally in Virginia as Hunter’s Hunter. Golden’s 
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arrival at Lestory’s home is narrated at least three times from three different perspectives. 
The first is from the point of view of Golden himself as he looks around the property and 
sees a rider on a horse who turns out to be a young man who works for Lestory: “Might 
you be related to Lestory? Henry LesTroy or whatever his name is? The rider doesn’t 
blink. ‘No, sir. Vienna. Be back direcklin’” (149). A few pages later the same scene is 
narrated from the young man’s point of view: “He would have said, ‘Morning,’ although 
it wasn’t, but he thought the man lurching down the steps was white and not to be spoken 
to without leave” (155). Finally, we see through Lestory’s eyes upon his return home: 
“When Henry Lestory […] got back and saw the buggy and the beautiful horse tied near 
his stall, he was instantly alarmed” (168). Golden Gray’s narrative thread is so important 
to the larger fabric of the novel because it connects Joe’s and Violet’s threads in ways 
that only the reader can see as we know that Golden was raised, in part, by Violet’s 
grandmother, and that he picks up a wild woman who smashes her head against a tree 
branch on his way to Lestory’s house. This wild woman, it would appear, is Joe Trace’s 
mother. Joe and Violet are connected even in ways that they do not understand, and so as 
the score turns away from its historical improvisations and back toward the central 
melody in the 1920s it can be no accident that Morrison uses an everyday object like the 
ring to gather up the various threads that have been purposefully unraveled over the 
course of the novel’s four middle sections. 
The ring enters the narrative abruptly and without any contextual explanation 
when the narration is handed over for a time to Felice. Felice explains that she grew up in 
her grandmother’s house as both of her parents worked in the neighboring town of 
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Tuxedo and spent most of their time there and on trains between her grandmother’s home 
and their boss’s home: “When they’d come home, they’d kiss me and give me things, like 
my opal ring” (198). This moment marks the first mention of the ring in the entire novel, 
and then a few pages later when recounting the local gossip about Violet Trace, Felice 
says of the talkers, “They’re wrong about her. I went to look for my ring and there is 
nothing crazy about her at all” (202). Felice’s story of the ring unfolds awkwardly, with 
her first mentioning the thing out of nowhere, and then implying that the ring has been 
lost, and only then diving backwards into the object’s complicated history. Immediately 
following her declaration of Violet’s sanity, Felice exclaims, “I know my mother stole 
that ring,” and proceeds to recount how the ring came into her possession as a gift from 
her mother following an embarrassing incident at Tiffany’s. Felice and her mother visit 
the store to pick up a package for Felice’s mother’s boss, and as they wait they look at a 
velvet tray filled with rings, trying some of them on. After a moment a man comes over 
and shakes his head. Felice’s mother explains, “I’m waiting for a package for Mrs. 
Nicolson,” and the man smiles and responds, “of course. It’s just policy. We have to be 
careful” (202-203). Although Felice cannot say definitively that the ring is stolen, when 
her mother presents her with an identical piece the next morning saying her boss lady had 
given it to her, Felice reaffirms her suspicions, “Maybe they made lots of them, but I 
know my mother took it from the velvet tray” (203). Who could blame Felice’s mother? 
She is an honest, hard-working woman doing her best for her children, someone who 
gives “quarters she finds on the seat to conductors on the trolley,” someone “so honest 
she makes people laugh” (215). The clerk’s suspicion seems so damaging and deadly 
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because it is reproduced in Felice, who sees her mother’s act as a kind of valor imposed 
upon her by the degradation of racial prejudice. 
The ring might easily be read as a symbol that enacts a critique of race in the 
Tiffany’s jewelry department. However, when we bracket the material and continue to 
treat the social as a familiar category we end up with the same old “hermeneutics of 
suspicion” that Felski and others associate with a very particular literary and critical 
mode, a mode that I claim much postmodern fiction moves beyond. In other words, if we 
pay less attention to the ring itself than we do to the social categories we take for granted 
in this exchange, such as race and class, then of course we end up with a critique of race 
because we treat both whiteness and blackness as recognizable markers whose definitions 
are clear and undisputed. But when we refuse to bracket “what is there” in favor of 
spinning our wheels endlessly over “how we know it,” Morrison’s ring becomes an actor 
among actors in the larger remaking of a social network that does not ignore the existence 
of differences that have typically been defined as racial, but that also does not draw its 
parameters solely from those differences. When we focus on the ring itself rather than on 
the abstract systems of relation it might critique, we can follow the assembly of a 
community that both resembles and remakes the triangular relationship between Joe, 
Violet, and Dorcas in a new configuration that does not have to end in death. This 
remaking of the social is immediately obvious once we value the ring equally with the 
human actors in terms of the novel’s narrative progression. What is less obvious, perhaps, 
is the new way of seeing herself in the context of her larger social world that the ring 
creates for Felice. 
200 
There is no question that Morrison places herself and her work squarely in the 
lineage of African American literature and history: “a very large part of my own literary 
heritage is the autobiography. In this country the print origins of black literature (as 
distinguished from the oral origins) were slave narratives” (“The Site of Memory” 103). 
Notably, however, one significant aspect of Morrison’s fiction is its investment in the 
living, breathing, fluidity of that tradition, its adaptability, strength, endurance, and utter 
resistance to statis. Felice’s search for the ring highlights this element of Morrison’s work 
as the object reveals to Felice that the various actors, both human and nonhuman, that 
constitute her social world can be reconfigured in such a way so as to change the dynamic 
of her understanding of race by no longer imagining blackness and whiteness as 
oppositional forces. This revelation comes to Felice in the contrast between how she 
imagines her mother and Violet would each interact with the opal ring. During her initial 
visit to the Traces’ apartment to look for the ring, Violet invites Felice to return some 
night to eat a catfish dinner with them, and Felice agrees although she does not truly plan 
to come back the next Friday. The following Thursday she decides to go after recalling 
the way Violet had talked about the “me” inside herself during her previous visit: “The 
way she said it. Not like the ‘me’ was some tough somebody she had put together for a 
show. But like, like somebody she favored and could count on. A secret somebody you 
didn’t have to feel sorry for or have to fight for” (210). Felice then contrasts this 
“somebody” with the honest “somebody” who would return lost quarters on the trolley 
and yet who needed to “steal a ring to get back at whitepeople and then lie and say it was 
a present from them” (210). The contrast Morrison establishes here between two African 
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American women in relation to the same material object speaks to the complex 
heterogeneity that often gets papered over when we fail to account for how society is held 
together and focus instead on using society to explain some other phenomenon. Whether 
or not Violet would ever steal a ring is secondary to the fact that Felice cannot imagine 
her doing it to get back at white people, much less turning around and saying that it was a 
gift from white people. Violet’s identity, her “me,” comes from within herself, whereas 
Felice’s mother seems to define herself in juxtaposition to the white people whose lives 
she haunts. 
Felice’s imagining of the ring as the central object that shows up the contrast 
between her mother and Violet Trace calls our attention away from oversimplified racial 
narratives in which the ring must be a symbol of Felice’s mother’s actions. Felice says 
that her mother dared “to do something like that to get back at the whiteman who thought 
she was stealing even when she wasn’t” (215). If we allow the text to do the work of 
suspicion for us, as Felski would say of deconstructive modes of reading, then what we 
end up with is a black woman who fulfills the inevitable stereotype of thief that the white 
man imposes upon her through his own suspicion when she would never in her life have 
stolen that ring for any other reason. However, if we follow the ring itself then we come 
to realize that Felice’s mother’s actions are merely one response. Thus, the shift that the 
material object makes possible by contrasting the mother’s vindictive theft with Violet’s 
imagined response complicates the impulse to characterize “black people” as a unified 
category that can be used to make sense of other phenomenon. For this reason Morrison 
also repeatedly uses the category “whitepeople” throughout the novel to throw into relief 
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the cultural tendency in the United States to speak of “black people” as a hegemonic 
group and “white people” as a heterogeneous group. The hypocrisy of these categories is 
palpable in this novel, but the ring blazes a trail through all such taxonomies, connecting 
the “whiteman” clerk in Tiffany’s with Felice and her mother, who invokes her own 
white boss as the giver of this gift. The thing is then loaned to Dorcas to impress her new 
love interest Acton, and is buried with Dorcas following her murder at the hands of Joe 
Trace. The missing ring finally pulls Felice into the gravitational field of the Traces, and 
its absence at the novel’s end is transformed into a presence by the burgeoning network 
its circulation has established between Joe, Violet, and Felice. 
Morrison’s movement away from recognizable narratives of the social and away 
from capital “H” history in favor of “jazz-like” narratives of the local and in-progress is 
indicative of her resistance to the all-encompassing versions of history that result in the 
inevitable. In other words, if we simply accept the existence of black and white as 
identifiable, knowable, and static categories, then of course the ring is there to critique 
our understanding of racial identity in 1920s America. However, if we refuse to bracket 
“what is there,” in this case the ring, and look at the material world that Morrison crafts 
in the novel, then what becomes apparent is that Morrison avoids, as Peterson has argued, 
“creating a master narrative in which there is no space to articulate any local narratives 
that run counter to it” (209). Peterson goes on to claim that the problem with such 
“master narratives” is that the outcome is already decided “and so individual players are 
unimportant except as they contribute to this final already-determined conclusion” (209). 
This argument connects back to the emphasis on postmodern fiction’s resistance to 
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systematicity and embrace of the network model in the previous chapter in conversation 
with Latour’s point that all actors in a closed system count for just one. Thus, Peterson’s 
reading of Morrison’s narrative and historical structure provides a theoretical framework 
that my emphasis on the material presence of the ring serves to flesh out and render even 
more practicable when considered in the context of the ring’s importance. 
While the ring is the object that gathers Joe, Violet, and Felice into a new social 
configuration, any discussion of the material in relation to Jazz must include at least a 
caveat for the book itself. After all, it is the book that gathers all of the disparate narrative 
threads together into a unified, yet polyphonic composition. Earlier I referenced 
Morrison’s characterization of the book itself as the narrator of Jazz. What are we to 
make of the physical text as a narrator? What are the implications of a thing that speaks 
to us? We must first acknowledge that Morrison’s self-proclaimed talking book marks a 
single waypoint in a much longer tradition treated at length by Henry Louis Gates Jr. in 
his seminal study The Signifying Monkey: A Theory of African-American Literary 
Criticism, which provides helpful context for reading Jazz in the larger trajectory of 
African American literature.
4
 We might also consider the psychoanalytic theory of object 
relations that originates with Sigmund Freud, evolves through the work of Melanie Klein, 
and has even been offered explicitly as a lens for reading Jazz.
5
 However, the weakness 
of this approach is its dedication to the immaterial space between writer and reader. A 
materialist reading, on the other hand, emphasizes the significance of the book as an actor 
in erasing the gap, or at least minimizing the distance, between writer, reader, and text as 
a useful means of shifting our theory of reading away from a binary between sociality 
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and materiality. Tracking a shift from the social/material binary treats the social and 
material both as parts and products of one another. As Latour observes, “when any state 
of affairs is split into one material component to which is added as an appendix a social 
one, one thing is sure: this is an artificial division imposed by the disciplinary disputes, 
not by any empirical requirement” (83). By making the book itself the narrator of its own 
story, Morrison creates a material object that is also a social object. Rather than 
deepening the divide between material and social, this complex narrative voice is a thing 
we can hold in our hands, look at, listen to, read aloud. Erasing the distinction between 
the social and the material demonstrates that the novel and its various relational networks 
are living, breathing organisms that are constantly being made and can thus be remade to 
account for changes in their material environments. 
Much like the ring contained within the novel, the novel itself gathers familiar 
actors, both human and nonhuman, into new assemblies and thus operates much like 
Heidegger’s famous jug referenced in earlier chapters. Heidegger distinguishes between 
the jug as “object” and the jug as “thing” by pointing out that the jug is an object when it 
is only seen as the product of making, and can be considered a thing when it is self-
supporting. Latour rereads Heidegger’s classic distinction between “thing” and “object” 
by arguing that the philosopher’s 
handmade jug can be a thing, while the industrially made can of Coke remains an 
object. While the latter is abandoned to the empty mastery of science and 
technology, only the former, cradled in the respectful idiom of art, craftsmanship, 
and poetry, could deploy and gather its rich set of connections. (“Why Has 
Critique” 233) 
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Following Latour, what if we were to do away with this differentiation? What if we were 
to view Morrison’s novel, not as a produced object or a self-sufficient thing? Instead, 
what if the book is a thing just like the ring is a thing? In other words, what if we were to 
stop constantly separating our understanding of the world into the two oversimplified 
categories of “the world” and “our perception of the world”? Jazz overtly invites the 
erasure of this binary, and in some ways makes this question possible in its recursivity 
and historical rewriting. The book itself, like the ring, is also a thing that re-creates and 
regathers the narrative threads of history into a unique fabric of social connectivity as 
Joe, Violet, and Felice dance together in the Traces’ apartment, utterly unbeholden to the 
Joe-Violet-Dorcas triangle that resulted in death and tragedy. Thus, when the novel ends 
by speaking to us about Joe, Violet, and Felice we are also being gathered into the 
narrative remaking of a history that includes the fictional world of the novel and the 
world in which we sit reading it 
But I can’t say that aloud; I can’t tell anyone that I have been waiting for this all 
my life and that being chosen to wait is the reason I can. If I were able I’d say it. 
Say make me, remake me. You are free to do it and I am free to let you because 
look, look. Look where your hands are. Now. (229) 
 
 
The ring has remade the social world in which Joe, Violet, and Felice live and operate, 
but it has also extended that network beyond the pages of the book by pulling the reader 
into the very same orbit. Just as the narrator “know[s] that woman” we are also known. 
If Jazz is literally a jazz composition, then what we know about that musical form 
suggests the novel is fundamentally invested in recollecting a variety of familiar sounds, 
events, and entities into ever-unique combinations. This aesthetic makes possible both the 
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unthinkable and the mundane, but its seemingly endless configurations are always the 
product of available and recognizable materials. Now I want to stretch the limits of 
interpretation by tracing the object Morrison employs toward the end of her narrative into 
another text. Lethem’s The Fortress of Solitude is certainly not overtly influenced by 
Morrison’s Jazz in any discernible way, and yet the points of contact between the two 
books are overwhelming. Music is also a significant presence in Fortress as Lethem’s 
protagonist is a young white boy named Dylan who befriends a young black boy named 
Mingus and grows up to become a freelance music writer for Rolling Stone. The novel 
also features a ring that has stumped reviewers and critics alike in their treatments of the 
text. The challenge this ring poses to our bifurcations of what is reality and what is 
fantasy sheds new light on Morrison’s historical rememory and social remaking by 
demonstrating just how damaging the failure to remake the social can be. 
 
The Unfulfilled Promise of How We Know 
 
The Fortress of Solitude, Lethem’s most ambitious, messy, and sprawling novel, 
is divided into two halves by a short middle section of liner notes written by the novel’s 
protagonist, Dylan Ebdus, to commemorate a box set of CDs capturing the life’s work of 
his best friend’s father. The first half of the novel, “Underberg,” is set in the 1970s and 
narrated in a third person omniscient voice that follows Dylan in his evolving friendship 
with fellow stickball-playing, graffiti-tagging, comic book-loving, Dean Street hero 
Mingus Rude. Dylan and Mingus come from two very different families. Dylan’s parents, 
especially his mother, are social progressives who see themselves as helping to integrate 
a minority community by moving in to the Gowanus neighborhood of Brooklyn, and 
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especially Dean Street, which is dominated by African American and Puerto Rican 
residents. However, Isabel Vendle, the aristocratic matriarch of the neighborhood, 
envisions the Ebduses as the first white building block in a gentrification project that will 
convert Gowanus into the swank “Boerum Hill” of her dreams. Mingus’s parents have 
recently divorced, and he has come to Gowanus with his father, Barrett Rude Jr., a former 
R & B soul singer and icon with the group The Subtle Distinctions. After a stint in prison, 
Barrett Rude Sr. also joins the household. Dylan’s and Mingus’s friendship is worked out 
in the street games they play with other kids on the block, and solidified on the walls, 
billboards, and train cars of Brooklyn as they share the graffiti tag “Dose.” Mingus 
constantly vouches for Dylan and lends him the ultimate credibility by allowing him the 
use of the tag when Dylan fails to come up with an alter ego of his own 
It’s a happy solution for both. The black kid gets to see his tag spread farther […] 
What’s in it for the white kid? Well, he’s been allowed to merge his identity in 
this way with the black kid’s, to lose his funkymusicwhiteboy geekdom in the 
illusion that he and his friend Mingus Rude are both Dose, no more and no less. 
(136) 
 
 
Lethem’s experiment with race, gentrification, class, and history reaches its apotheosis in 
the small silver ring given to Dylan by a black derelict. 
The ring empowers Dylan with the magic of flight, which he then shares with 
Mingus through the object of the ring, paying his friend back for “Dose” with the 
superhero figure “Aeroman.” In a novel characterized by its “realist commitments” 
(Lethem “Art of Fiction” 61), the presence of the ring disrupts the entire world of the 
story for characters and readers alike. In The Fortress of Solitude, however, even the 
208 
fantastic powers inherent in the ring, and in the superhero the boys become, cannot 
prevent the erosion of their relationship in the face of the stormy realities of race, class, 
education, and drugs. By the end of “Underberg” Dylan’s mother has left, his father 
continues to work like a monk in the attic, and Dylan has finished his secondary school 
career at a selective high school without the objections of his mother who was always so 
proud to have her son be one of “only three white children in the whole [public] school” 
(23). On his way to Camden, “the most expensive college in America” (270), Dylan stops 
by Mingus’s house back in the old neighborhood and buys back a bunch of comics from 
his friend who needs the money to support a drug habit. This moment in the novel marks 
a clear contrast in the trajectories of the two characters as Dylan also buys the ring back 
from Mingus, who ends up shouting Dylan out of the house as he intervenes in what 
becomes a violent exchange between his father and grandfather. Following the liner notes 
memorializing Barrett Rude Jr.’s time as lead vocalist for The Subtle Distinctions, the 
novel undergoes a drastic change in voice as the second half, “Prisonaires,” is narrated in 
first-person by Dylan, and catches up with Dylan in his present life as a freelance music 
journalist with a black girlfriend to mark the maintenance of his street credibility that 
made him such a success at the upper-crust Camden College before he dropped out. The 
novel culminates in Dylan’s unsuccessful attempt to use the ring to break Mingus out of 
prison, where he has been serving “good time” without being “written up in years” (488). 
In the end, Dylan lives and moves in the free world, while Mingus remains incarcerated. 
The ring is passed off to another imprisoned childhood friend/enemy, Robert Woolfolk, 
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who kills himself trying to make an escape, and the closing juxtaposition between Dylan 
and Mingus seems to signal the inevitability of the social forces of race and class. 
In response to a similar question about the organization of the novel in two 
different interviews, Lethem says that “at the start I meant to write a book of two halves” 
(“Art of Fiction” 61), and that 
in the first half of the book, though the characters are suffering, there’s a golden 
glow that makes everything okay. Whereas the feeling in adulthood, in the second 
section, is that nothing is okay. In the last part of the book, everyone seems so 
estranged and inconsolable that you want to make them go back to the way they 
were. But rescue is impossible. (Conversations 95-96) 
 
 
The novel as a whole seems poised to take on the social themes of racial and class 
inequities. Yet if we turn from race and class as substantive, definable categories that 
serve as our foundation of the world of the novel, and turn instead to the material domain 
of the perfect slate for sidewalk games, the malleable rubber of the spaldeen ball, the 
silver contours of the ring given to Dylan, then a new vista opens briefly. The problem 
that most immediately seems to stand in the way of such a materialist reading is Lethem’s 
convoluted representation of the ring. Is the ring actually magical? Do the boys truly fly, 
become invisible, and swim like fish under water? What we decide to do with the ring 
has a significant impact on how we read the text as a whole, but also on how we 
understand the networks of relation that are attempted but ultimately doomed to failure in 
the world of the novel. 
The reviews of Lethem’s novel are reminiscent of the various interpretations of 
Morrison’s enigmatic narrator and representative of the critical confusion surrounding 
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what to do with the ring in relation to the rest of the book. In the pages of Time, Lev 
Grossman almost dismissively mentions the “magic ring that intermittently” gives the 
boys superpowers as a “risky element of magical realism” (77). Like Grossman, Jason 
Picone reads the ring as a mere literary convention that might seem at first to violate the 
“book’s ground rules,” but ultimately does not because of Fortress’s underlying 
commitment to the fantastic (27). Whereas Grossman and Picone rely on the genre of 
magical realism to explain the phenomenon of the ring, A. O. Scott, writing for the New 
York Times Book Review, reads the ring as a metaphor symbolic of the book’s nearly 
allegorical message: “the ring may, then, seem like a distraction or a crutch, a bit of game 
playing to soothe the novelist’s well-established postmodernist allergy to realism […] I 
prefer to think of it as a sign of utopian possibility” (7). Peter Bradshaw’s entertaining 
reading in Britain’s New Statesman explicitly moves away from both the language of 
magical realism and from Scott’s metaphorical reading as he recalls his initial discovery 
of the ring’s magic powers: “I absorbed this only after much rereading and goggling and 
eye-knuckling, so casually does Lethem introduce the revelation, in a storyline that often 
seems ancillary to the rest of the novel […] I found myself gasping: ‘Is it a metaphor? Is 
it delusion? No, it’s really happening!’” (52). But it is Michiko Kakutani’s “White Kid, 
In a Black World” in the New York Times that goes the furthest in separating the narrative 
of the ring from the rest of the novel by branding it as “Coover-esque allegor[y] and high 
jinks” and as “a vestige of the postmodernist techniques” Lethem employs in earlier 
works (“Books of the Times”). She characterizes the passages devoted to the ring as 
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“awkward interludes” and “cutesy pyrotechnics” (“Books of the Times”). Much as it does 
for the characters in the novel, the ring seems to pose a problem for readers. 
Reviewers’ disparate reactions to the ring are echoed in the few critical treatments 
of the novel that have sprung up in the relatively short time since its publication in 2003. 
Contextualizing Fortress in the larger lineage of the comic-book novel, Marc Singer 
argues that 
the sudden popularity and cultural legitimacy of the comic book has granted 
novelists more latitude to reference superheroes, but it has not altered this 
reductively metaphoric reading, resulting in an unfortunate irony: Many of these 
novels are far less sophisticated in their modes of signification and their narrative 
structure than the comics they purport to represent. (276) 
 
 
Without a single reference to the ring that transforms Dylan and Mingus into Aeroman, 
Singer dwells in the world of metaphor, arguing, “Lethem renders the impossible feat of 
becoming the flying superhero Aeroman and the mundane occurrence of pubescent 
sexual awakening as equally mysterious, equally prone to create private new selves that 
supplant old ones” (276). Matt Godbey’s reading of gentrification as a symptom of the 
novel’s treatment of race, class, and authenticity places Fortress squarely in a “canon of 
contemporary works that include literature, movies, newspapers, magazines, and other 
popular cultural mediums” that he identifies as “the fiction of gentrification” (132). 
Focusing on Dylan’s romanticization of black culture and experience as his means of 
distancing himself from the gentrification of his childhood neighborhood, Godbey’s 
illuminating analysis resonates with Kakutani’s review in that it would prefer to ignore 
the ring altogether. Although he charts Dylan’s and Mingus’s diverging trajectories over 
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the course of the novel to explain how Dylan is granted “a sense of agency denied 
Mingus and other Gowanus residents,” Godbey, like Singer, never mentions the ring 
(146). Each of these critics offers insightful readings of the novel that focus on the 
Dylan/Mingus relationship to illuminate how the realities of adulthood dismantle 
childhood superhero metaphors (Singer 277), and on how white urbanites envision the 
consequences of gentrification as a product of their own alienation rather than as a 
product of the racialization of others (Godbey 147). However, like the new future made 
possible at the end of Morrison’s Jazz, these revelations are ultimately impossible 
without the materiality of the ring. 
Kakutani’s review, along with Singer’s and Godbey’s critical analyses, raises the 
important question: how would the novel be different without the magic ring? What if 
Lethem had simply composed a straightforward narrative in which we follow the 
burgeoning friendship, maturation, and growing apart of a young white boy and a young 
black boy in the heart of Brooklyn? That seems to be the story that Kakutani wants to 
read, and the story that Godbey actually read. But much like the opal ring that comes in at 
the end of Morrison’s novel, the material object that turns two teenage boys into magical 
superheroes is as vital to the juxtaposition of their respective narratives as it is to our 
understanding of what Lethem is doing at the level of the novel by calling on the specter 
of the comic book and critiquing the racializing process of gentrification taking over the 
urban centers of the U.S. Along with a handful of other material objects of emphasis, the 
ring has the capacity to forge new modes of relation, but when the possibilities of the 
material are ignored or shunned in favor of a continued faith in the social categories they 
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have come to recognize as familiar, Dylan and Mingus are unable to effect change in 
their own lives. The ring is so important, then, because it uncovers the potential fluidity 
of the social, but also because its promise is ultimately ignored as the novel closes with 
Dylan’s hollow meditation on life’s  
middle spaces, those summer hours when Josephine Baker lay waste to Paris, 
when “Bothered Blue” peaked on the charts, when a teenaged Elvis, still 
dreaming of his own first session, sat in the Sun Studios watching the Prisonaires, 
when a top-to-bottom burner blazed through a subway station, renovating the 
world for an instant, when schoolyard turntables were powered by a cord run from 
a streetlamp, when juice just flowed. (508) 
 
 
This form of nostalgia may resonate with anyone who reads Dylan’s voice, but it is an 
empty longing for simulacra that serve as a comfort to those whose future is hopelessly 
determined by the social parameters they treat as substances. This meditation seems 
appealing when we are content to settle for the false binaries created by the familiar 
social categories Lethem seems at first to reaffirm, but it is finally rendered impotent 
when considered in contrast to the unrealized possibilities offered by the material domain 
of the novel, and especially those of the ring. 
The subtlety with which Lethem introduces the power of the ring into the text is 
the polar opposite of Morrison’s abrupt insertion of her ring and can be confusing 
because, as Peter Bradshaw proclaims in his aforementioned review, we are reading 
along in a traditional-feeling, realist narrative when, all of a sudden, Dylan and Mingus 
are flying around all over the place. The very first time we catch sight of the ring Dylan is 
in an empty lot trying to assert himself as a graffiti tagger with his own identity, “but this 
isn’t going to happen today. Because today is the day the flying man falls from the roof” 
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(99). Next, there is “a shadow flashing at the corner of the boy’s eyes […] Flight, 
reversed. Then a collapsing thud, someone thrown, and the wheezing sigh, the exhale 
thrown from a body by force of impact” and all of this followed by a voice: “Little white 
boy,” groans the voice. “Whatchoo doin’?” (99). The narrator consistently refers to the 
falling person as “flying man,” but the flying man is homeless, filthy, and smells of urine. 
For all his straightforward characterization, the descriptions, actions, and words of the 
flying man in the larger context of a realist novel direct our readerly minds toward an 
ironic portrayal of a drunken derelict who is much more a falling man than a flying man. 
Dylan gives the man two quarters and then a dollar as the man “turns a silver ring on his 
pinky finger” and explains to Dylan that he “used to fly good” (101). When Dylan 
responds that he has seen the man fly, we are inclined to read him as humoring the 
derelict out of fear. Thus, the first revelation of the ring and its powers can be completely 
missed because of the racial tension in which the scene is couched. While it might seem 
that race is only an ancillary concern to a young boy confronted by a homeless man 
described as “huge,” the ritual the two engage in whereby Dylan gives the man $1.50 is 
an example of a racialized exchange called yoking that recurs throughout the novel: 
“Sixth grade. The year of the headlock, the year of the yoke, Dylan’s heat-flushed cheeks 
wedged into one or another black kid’s elbow, book bag skidding to the gutter, pockets 
rapidly, easily frisked for lunch money or a bus pass” (83). The yoke is not always 
physical. When the flying man asks Dylan for a dollar, the boy is “almost relieved to shift 
to such familiar turf. On automatic, he digs in his pocket” (100). Even in its introduction 
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to the narrative, the power of this material object is overshadowed by the racialization of 
an exchange of currency, pushing the miracle of flight into the shadows of racial tension. 
This exchange works in reverse as well. While in its adolescent form it involves 
the yoking of white kids as the black kids of Brooklyn lift lunch money and bus passes, in 
its adult form it involves the guilt-induced, or at least sympathetic, spending of white 
money on behalf of homeless black people such as the flying man. In fact, the next time 
we see the flying man he has been lying on the sidewalk for days, where Dylan and 
Mingus spray paint his sleeping bag with their “Dose” tag. Dylan’s father sees the tag one 
night as father and son walk home together from a lecture given by one of Abraham 
Ebdus’s fellow experimental filmmakers. Disappointed in his son, Abraham wakes the 
homeless figure who groans himself into animation with the snort, “Fuckin’!” (142). 
Abraham calls an ambulance, and days later he and Dylan visit the now grounded flying 
man at the “red brick hospital wedged against one side of Fort Greene Park,” where the 
Jamaican nurse frowns at Abraham’s disappointment with the care the derelict is 
receiving: “She frowned too, showing her disagreement with Abraham Ebdus’s 
implication that the hospital wasn’t doing its job with this drunk fool, who was killing 
himself like many thousands of others and deserved no particular special notice for 
having happened to be checked into this ward by a white man” (146). When the flying 
man calls Dylan to his side, rather than being asked to produce some spare change as he 
expects, Dylan is encouraged to go into a drawer, where the man directs him to take out 
the silver ring and, “Take it, man” (147). Whether object lesson or sincere attempt to 
encourage his son to see the man as a person and not a graffiti canvas, the trip to visit the 
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flying man in the hospital is the event that places the silver ring into Dylan’s hands. But 
the derelict’s relinquishment of the ring is bookended by his drunken stupor on the 
sidewalk, overlooked for days because he does not lie in one of the fast-gentrifying 
zones, and his being dressed in one of Abraham Ebdus’s old suits and put on a bus bound 
for a Syracuse Salvation Army where he’ll be given “three squares and a bunk on the 
guarantee of his attendance at the local Alcoholics Anonymous, where among the hard-
bitten, laid-off-lathe-operator types he’ll be the sole black face” (150). Isabel Vendle’s 
gentrification project marches on as the homeless man who is finally named, Aaron 
Doily, leaves the city. 
If we approach the text with race as a primary lens, asking how the novel can 
inform our knowledge of race rather than asking what is there, then of course we will 
continue to wind up with the same conclusions about white and black that we had when 
we began. This approach is tantamount to asking a question to which you already know 
the answer. Shifting our focus to the material domain of the text, we find such social 
categories defined and redefined. Leaving aside the ring for a moment, Lethem also has a 
fascination with other material objects in Fortress, including the vast network of slate 
sidewalk squares lining the streets of his Brooklyn neighborhoods. The Dean Street kids 
play a marbles-style game with bottle caps called skully, and in spite of his early 
ineptitude with the spaldeen used for stoopball, Dylan gains some notoriety for his 
mastery of skully. Dylan is most well-known for his uncanny ability to find “the ideal 
square of slate” on which to play, a square whose slate “shouldn’t be flawed by a crack or 
vein, or tilted, or bowed” (20). He prefers a square close to his own house “for the way it 
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was shaded by a particular tree—the dynamics of space and sound, the quality of privacy 
and access, for a whole series of subtle aesthetical distinctions […] and so Dylan declared 
it the best square for skully, on the whole. And he was believed” (20-21). Although some 
of the kids continue to make fun of Dylan, he is considered an authority on skully, and 
his squares draw the biggest crowds and the most inventive innovations. Dylan attempts 
to redraw the borders of the typical skully square into the star-shaped parameters used in 
Chinese checkers, but the other kids reject this game: “it wasn’t skully” (21). Dylan’s 
talent with the sidewalk is even enlisted by some of the girls who ask him to draw their 
hopscotch diagrams. Lethem spends a thorough paragraph detailing the making of skully 
caps, discussing the ideal size, weight, metal, and waxiness: “Like a tiny factory Dylan 
made rows of perfect skully caps and lined them up along the stoop: vanilla Yoo-Hoo 
with pink wax, Coke with green, Coco Rico, the cork of the cap still stinking of sugar, 
with white” (22). Yet the entire complex sidewalk world that Dylan and his mates 
assemble together crumbles “after Dylan’s rapid rise to chief alchemist and philosopher 
of skully, nobody seemed to want to play the game anymore” (22). The materiality of the 
sidewalk, the chalk, the bottle caps has forged a common network that is no respecter of 
race, class, or gender, but when the children look up from the slate and see each other, 
see Dylan as the “chief alchemist and philosopher” everything falls apart. 
Much like the perfect sidewalk slate, the ring offers Dylan—and eventually 
Mingus—the opportunity to form new ties among the Dean Street crowd. Unlike the 
slate, the ring also creates opportunities to break through the circumference of the 
Gowanus neighborhood through the startling ways in which it empowers its wearer. 
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Dylan first discovers these powers during a game of stoopball in which he is suddenly 
transformed into a master outfielder, able to snag homeruns out of the air in a single 
bound. After a few amazing catches, the narrator muses on Dylan’s state of mind in 
which he sees “the ring and the ball in some kind of partnership of magical objects” 
(160). He even finds himself outjumping the amazing Mingus as the two leap for the 
same fly ball and Mingus “f[a]ll[s] short, minus the advantage of the flying man’s ring,” 
and lands on the ground barking, “Kangaroo boy!” (163). Dylan goes unaccountably 
unhassled at a block party later in the summer, and the narrator speculates, “maybe this 
night’s just lucky, maybe he’s passed through some flame and come out the other side. 
Maybe it’s the ring. Maybe the ring has made him invisible. Maybe the ring has made 
him black. Who can say?” (166 original emphasis). The unrealized potential of 
constructing an alternative mode of relation using the credibility imparted to him by the 
ring renders Dylan’s racialization of his newfound powers especially disappointing. 
These social rubrics seem impassable. In his analysis of Fortress alongside Lethem’s 
more recent rewriting of the Marvel comic Omega: The Unknown, David Coughlan 
tackles these impassable gaps by comparing them to the “gutters” that separate the 
individual panels in a comic. Coughlan argues that Lethem’s Brooklyn in Fortress is a 
“city laid out like a comic book page, where each block of houses can be seen as a panel, 
and the streets are the comic’s gutters” (206). He goes on to interpret the gutters of 
Gowanus as representative of “the ever present possibility of failure, the unbridgeable 
abyss between a series of isolated individuals” (207). For Coughlan, this impassable gap 
applies not only to race relations but also to Dylan’s connections with his father, mother, 
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and his hometown in general. But to read the various gaps and gutters in the novel as 
impassable is to ignore the power of the ring, which Lethem has caused to stand out like a 
sore thumb in the narrative. 
The fact that Mingus also takes up the ring and wields its power in his own right 
provides a contrasting possibility to the inevitable social settling that dominates most of 
the novel. Even at the height of racial bifurcation, Mingus uses the ring for the first time 
to prevent two young black boys from picking on a white boy. After Dylan enters eighth 
grade, however, he and Mingus seem headed for the most recognizable, stereotypical 
social positions. Mingus has begun “fluffing cushions for change, palming pennies from 
the dish Abraham kept at the front door, scraping up enough for a nickel bag” (196). 
Dylan, on the other hand, finds out from his science teacher Mr. Winegar that his test 
scores have made him the only kid in I.S. 293 to be accepted into Stuyvesant, a 
competitive academic high school. When Dylan expresses hesitation about attending 
Stuyvesant and his desire to go to Sarah J. Hale with his friends, he can see in Mr. 
Winegar’s eyes that he “might as well have said I think I’ll just go straight to the 
Brooklyn House of Detention […] You’re white! Winegar wanted to scream. Man can fly! 
Dylan wanted to scream” (200-01 original emphasis). Thus the ring, having given Dylan 
the power of flight, offers an alternative to the familiar social categories of race that 
would determine Dylan’s future, as well as Mingus’s. When Mingus uses the ring for the 
first time we are told that it’s “no problem, he’s a natural” (210). He chases two black 
bullies away from a white boy, and then the white boy corrects his pronunciation of the 
superhero name Dylan and Mingus have adopted: “‘Aer-o-man,’ corrects the white boy. 
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‘That’s what I said—Arrowman’” (211). What is at once significant and tragic about the 
ring is that it has the power to break through the seemingly substantive social barriers that 
stratify the world of 1970s Brooklyn, and yet this breakthrough ultimately fails. In other 
words, the gutters are not impassable, as Coughlan has deduced, but the characters’ 
continued reliance upon the borders that have typically demarcated the gutters continues 
to render them as wide as the Grand Canyon. 
Lethem drives home the ring’s power as Mingus and Dylan embark together on a 
series of crime-fighting adventures. Leaving the balking of reviewers and critics aside, 
the ring is clearly real, and the boys clearly fly: “Aeroman flew six or seven times that 
fall, was perhaps involved in eight or nine incidents, could claim maybe three bona fide 
rescues, legible crimes authentically flown down on and busted up” (223). These heroics 
involve a “six-foot Puerto Rican,” “a small Chinese guy,” “drunks boxing at the door of a 
social club,” and Aeroman, the white boy and black boy who share a superhero identity. 
But something begins to change. Mingus excels in the acrobatic feats made available by 
the ring, while Dylan slowly takes up the position of audience: “they’d meant to swap it 
back and forth, the changing from black to white one of Aeroman’s mystifying aspects, 
another level of secret identity, but it had always been Mingus in the costume, always 
Dylan crouched behind a parked car or dangles as bait” (238).When Mingus gets arrested 
as Aeroman for trying to break up a drug deal set up by an undercover cop, the days of 
the ring seem over for both. The materiality of the ring is subordinated to the categories it 
actually has the capacity to reimagine. Drifting apart for a time, Dylan returns to 
Mingus’s house before leaving for Camden College and buys back a bunch of his comics, 
221 
and the ring, from Mingus. Going back to Lethem’s interview with Sarah Anne Johnson, 
the shift that seems to take place here—as the boys become men, the material presence of 
the ring dissolves into the social strata of race and class, and the novel moves from part 
one to parts two and three—is readily understandable: “In the first half of the book, 
though the characters are suffering, there’s a golden glow that makes everything okay. 
Whereas the feeling in adulthood, in the second section, is that nothing is okay” (95-96). 
Critics such as Singer and Coughlan have read this shift as a reassertion of the “literal 
over the symbolic” (Singer 277), and as a critique of “relations, ritual, identity, 
marginalization, consumption, and capitalism” (Coughlan 200). Focusing on the ring, 
however, it seems equally valid to read the second half of the novel as the unrealized 
space in which the social remaking that seems so possible in the first half flounders in 
contrast to the self-indulgent wallowing of Dylan as narrator who imagines himself as the 
victim of the gentrification forces sweeping his old neighborhood. 
Dylan’s identity as an adult is intimately bound up with his childhood experiences 
in Brooklyn to which he assembles a small shrine in the Berkley apartment he shares with 
his black girlfriend Abby: “Aaron X. Doily’s ring, Mingus’s pick, a pair of Rachel’s 
earrings, and a tiny, handmade, handsewn book of black-and-white photographs titled 
‘For D. from E’” (316).
6
 Although not in direct reference to this scene, Matt Godbey 
maintains that 
Lethem’s novel implicates identity construction through the consumption of 
objects, places, and experiences in a system of urban renewal that helps define 
urban landscapes as sites of authenticity, and, in doing so, suggests how 
neighborhoods often are reduced to signifiers, denuded of the human element, 
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paving the way for larger policies and practices that reinscribe racial and 
economic bias onto the urban landscape. (134) 
 
 
Godbey’s insightful analysis of the novel’s view on gentrification helps us see that 
Dylan’s nostalgic identity crisis in the face of the transformation of his old Gowanus 
neighborhood into the Boerum Hill of Isabel Vendle’s dreams are best read as a 
“victimhood [that] becomes less tenable when one places his crisis of alienation and 
dislocation alongside the actual, physical alienation and dislocation of Gowanus/boerum 
Hill’s poor black, Puerto Rican and Dominican residents and his role in facilitating 
gentrification” (140). However, what I want to point out as equally important are the 
unrealized possibilities for community inherent in the perfect squares of sidewalk slate, 
and more specifically in the ring. Lethem offers potential alternatives to the static and 
predictable outcomes that finally result from the ready-made reliance on race and class. 
The ring is not merely symbolic, metaphoric, allegorical. The ring is actual, real, 
material. Thus, what seems at least as important as Dylan’s or Mingus’s participation in 
playing out the roles set before them is the power of the ring goes inexplicably unrealized 
when both characters allow an object that empowers them with flight and invisibility to 
gather dust for years. 
As the categorical and cultural realities of race press Dylan and Mingus into their 
respectfully recognizable roles as guilty white gentry and perennial prison inmate, the 
ring is all but forgotten, and we cannot help but wonder what happened to Dylan’s radical 
yet unstated assertion that “Man can fly!” How could someone with the power of flight 
succumb to the same pressures that shape the lives of those without this power? Dylan 
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seems to awaken to the tragedy of this question a little too late as he decides to return 
home from California to New York with a plan in the back of his mind to free Mingus 
from prison. During his time on the west coast he has found that the power of the ring has 
changed from enabling flight to turning its wearer invisible, so he arrives at the prison 
intending to have Mingus put it on and follow him out. The guards sift through the 
contents of his pockets, asking “What’s this ring?” and, pointing to a single orange 
earplug, “What’s that?” (439). Dylan responds that it is an earplug for his airplane ride, 
but there is some confusion on the part of the guard and he wonders to himself, “I’d never 
pondered the bourgeois implications of an earplug” (440). Whereas the sidewalk slate 
and silver ring have typically offered the opportunity to reconstruct the social categories 
that organize our daily lives, the contents of Dylan’s pockets now seem to build the walls 
of class higher than ever as the material world is constantly being organized according 
the familiar social patterns of race and class as if they were not processes. When Dylan 
tries to give Mingus the ring toward the end of their visit Mingus tells him to put it away. 
Dylan insists, “‘You could use it to break out of this place,’ I said quietly. His laugh now 
was bitter, and authentic. ‘Why not?’ ‘You couldn’t even use that thing to break into this 
place.’ The rest, until my time was up, was small talk. […] A wall had fallen between us” 
(444-45 original emphasis). After leaving, Dylan puts on the ring and sneaks back in to 
talk with Mingus for hours, hearing the long story of his rap sheet and about how their 
childhood friend/enemy Robert Woolfolk is also in prison and has gotten Mingus in all 
kinds of trouble with other inmates. Dylan leaves Mingus and sneaks invisibly through 
the prison until he finds Robert and gives him the ring. The exchange ends no differently 
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than the myriad yokings Robert bestowed on Dylan when they were kids: “‘Yo, Dylan?’ 
‘What?’ ‘Fuck you, motherfucker’” (493). As white Dylan bluffs his way into getting a 
guard to escort him back to the parking lot, he hears that an inmate has leaped to his 
death off of a gun tower. Robert Woolfolk, unaware of the ring’s transformation into an 
object that enables invisibility rather than a flight, is unable to adapt to the change and his 
attempt to use the material object to break through the walls society has built around him 
results in his death. 
Once the social begins to appear as a substance in our understanding of the world 
then the material possibilities can go unrealized for so long that they can be rendered 
impotent when enacted within the confines of familiar categories such as the racial and 
class strata that dominate Lethem’s novel. Dylan’s whiteness literally enables him to talk 
his way out of prison, while Mingus’s spirit is so utterly broken by the legal system that 
he resists the chance to escape. The material domain loses its potency in the second half 
of the novel because it finds itself treated as subordinate to and not constitutive of the 
social categories of race and class. In order to actualize a remaking of the social through 
the material domain of everyday life the consensus categories that are typically relied 
upon must be opened up for renovation at the very least. I do not mean to say that we can 
ever forget, or that we should forget, how race, class, nation, gender, generations, and 
other categories have been understood. Instead, I am simply proposing that we must be 
willing to pause and look at what is there rather than constantly assuming what is there 
and dwelling on what we know about what is there. 
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The final meditative pages of Fortress enact the sad state of affairs to which we 
are left when we are willing to bracket what is there and ignore the material possibilities 
of remaking the order of things. After leaving New York, Dylan drives through Indiana to 
visit the man his mother ran off with when he was still a Gowanus kid. The man, Croft, 
offers Dylan the rusty old manual typewriter on which he had pushed Dylan’s mother to 
write her son postcards, but Dylan turns it down and the two go for a pleasant walk 
instead. Leaving Indiana, Dylan listens to Brian Eno’s Another Green World and reflects 
on the way in which music became a cathartic resource in his life as he built his personal 
world in the middle space “the communists and gays and painters of celluloid imagined 
they’d found in Gowanus, only to be unwitting wedges for realtors, a racial wrecking 
ball. A gentrification was the scar left by a dream” (508). But these middle spaces are not 
the beautiful products of nostalgia. They are the only logical possibilities left to a 
generation who forfeits the possibility of remaking rather than settling into the social 
categories they have allowed to define the parameters of their lived experiences. We 
should feel no pity for Dylan who opines, “a middle space opened and closed like a 
glance, you’d miss it if you blinked” (508). The novel ends in memory with Dylan 
driving down the road, not alone, but with his father some years earlier during his college 
days: 
Abraham and I let ourselves be swept through the blurred tunnel, beyond rescue 
but calm for an instant, settled in our task, a father driving a son home to Dean 
Street. There was no Mingus Rude or Barrett Rude Junior with us there, no 
Running Crab postcard or letter from Camden College pushed through the slot. 
We were in a middle space then, in a cone of white, father and son moving 
forward at a certain speed. Side-by-side, not truly quiet but quiescent, two gnarls 
of human scribble, human cipher, human dream. (509) 
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Even the middle space that Dylan seems to remember with some sad fondness is marred 
by the “cone of white” that shelters father and son from the everyday reality of the world 
in which they must live and operate. It is true, as Matt Godbey has pointed out, that the 
novel “reveals how gentrification is a deeply racialized process” (147), but it is also true 
that the material domain of the novel, and especially the silver ring, highlights this 
revelation by uncovering alternative possibilities for remaking this racialized social 
realm. 
The contrast between the promises that go unfulfilled in Lethem and the 
triumphant remaking of the social in Morrison highlights the powerful yet painful 
possibilities inherent in the material domain of everyday life. Morrison’s characters are 
ever-willing to start again. Joe Trace lives through at least seven changes in his life, 
becomes seven different Joes, and at the end of the novel he is poised for his eighth 
incarnation. Lethem’s characters, however, constantly subordinate the possibilities 
offered by the material world that surrounds them to the familiar social categories that 
have been presented to them as “what is there.” Whereas Jazz represents the potential to 
be found in constantly poking at “what is there,” Fortress represents the inevitability of 
social stratification when “what is there” is taken for granted and bracketed in favor of 
the suspicious inquiry into “how we know.” When considering whether to close this 
study by giving either Morrison or Lethem the final word, I chose Lethem in spite of 
Morrison’s more promising narrative because it seems to me that Lethem’s novel is 
indicative of postmodern fiction’s last gasp, its attempt to communicate in any way 
possible that the material opportunities for remaking everything that seems normal 
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around us are consistently being overlooked in favor of the pleasurable demystification of 
what we think we know about our social existence. Why has critique run out of steam, as 
Latour asks? Well, perhaps because instead of capitalizing on the possibility of 
rearranging the material world into configurations that open conventional social 
categories, we continue to linger in our own intellectual morass, repeatedly yanking the 
curtain back on the wizard and ignoring the plasticity of the world surrounding us.
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Notes 
 
 
1
 In his classic treatise on interpretation, Freud and Philosophy, Paul Ricoeur argues that the triumvirate of 
Freud, Nietzsche, and Marx forms an influential “school of suspicion” in which the act of interpretation is 
primarily informed by our tendency to “look upon the whole of consciousness primarily as ‘false’ 
consciousness” (33). Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick characterizes the influence of this “school of suspicion” on 
critical theory of the twentieth century more broadly by arguing that this “paranoid inquiry” has become 
“coexstensive with critical theoretical inquiry, rather than being viewed as one kind of cognitive/affective 
theoretical practice among other, alternative kinds” (6). Felski extends this conversation by drawing from 
Ricoeur’s frame, Sedgwick’s assertion and other more recent arguments such as Stephen Best’s and Sharon 
Marcus’s in their 2009 essay “The Way We Read Now,” to develop her own nuanced theory of “suspicious 
reading [as not] just an intellectual exercise in demystification but also a distinctive style and sensibility 
with its own specific pleasures” (216). Felski also offers a book-length treatment of alternative 
interpretative strategies in her 2008 “un-manifesto” Uses of Literature. 
 
2
 The tension between epistemology and ontology is nothing new in discussions of postmodern literature. 
Ihab Hassan calls our attention to what he sees as the postmodern shift away from questions about 
knowledge and transcendence to questions about being and immanence in his classic “Postface” to the 
second edition of The Dismemberment of Orpheus in 1982. Extending Hassan’s work, Brian McHale 
argues that postmodern fiction’s interest in the ontological is not so much a binary opposition to the 
epistemological foundation of modernist fiction so much as it is a shift in the dominant “hierarchy of 
devices […] that is, modernist fiction deploys strategies which engage and foreground questions such as 
[…] ‘How can I interpret this world of which I am a part? And what am I in it?’ Other typical modernist 
questions might be added: What is there to be known?; Who knows it?; How do they know it, and with 
what degree of certainty? […] The dominant of postmodernist fiction is ontological. That is, postmodernist 
fiction deploys strategies which engage and foreground questions [such as] What is a world?; What kinds 
of world are there, how are they constituted, and how do they differ?” (9-10). Following McHale, Linda 
Hutcheon further complicates this tension by suggesting that postmodernism should be understood, not so 
much in terms of Hassan’s binary oppositions or McHale’s shifts in dominant, but in terms of 
“unresolvable contradictions”: “postmodernism is the process of making the product; it is the absence 
within the presence, it is the dispersal that needs centering in order to be dispersal; it is the idiolect that 
wants to be, but knows it cannot be, the master code; it is the immanence denying yet yearning for 
transcendence. In other words, the postmodern partakes of the logic of ‘both/and,’ not one of ‘either/or’” 
(Poetics 49). As with her theory of “complicitous critique” in The Politics of Postmodernism that I discuss 
in the first chapter, Hutcheon’s theory of the postmodern seems most helpful here. However, when we turn 
our attention to the material world of postmodern fiction, asking questions about human and nonhuman 
actors and their roles in making the very processes, absences, and dispersals of postmodernism, then what 
becomes clear is that what makes fiction postmodern is its fundamental commitment to questions about 
“what is there.” Whereas Alan Sokal accuses postmodernism of ignoring or even denying the existence of 
an external world, and the editors of Social Text are willing to bracket the existence of that reality in order 
to engage in epistemological inquiry, critics such as Hassan, McHale, and Hutcheon have had their fingers 
much nearer the pulse of postmodernism in their interest in questions of ontology. I would argue that while 
postmodern fiction certainly acknowledges the existence of an external world, and certainly, as Hutcheon 
suggests, is not predominantly interested in either its being or our knowledge of its being, what makes 
fiction postmodern is its unwillingness to bracket the material world and become bogged down in an 
endlessly suspicious inquiry. 
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3
 The chain link is given to the nameless narrator as a gift from Brother Tarp, who has kept it as a reminder 
of the chain gang from which he escaped in his former life down south. He explains the significance of the 
object by justifying his reasons for keeping it: “Because I didn’t want to forget those nineteen years I just 
kind of held on to this as a keepsake and a reminder.” He says, “Funny thing to give somebody, but I think 
it’s got a heap of signifying wrapped up in it and it might help you remember what we’re really fighting 
against. I don’t think of it in terms of but two words, yes and no; but it signifies a heap more […]” (388). 
This yes/no binary becomes a both/and in the hands of Ellison’s protagonist and resonates with Charles 
Johnson’s later discussion of Amiri Baraka’s theory of the place of black writers in the American literary 
tradition as perpetual outsiders: “Baraka placed his finger perfectly on the role all ‘outsiders’ have played 
in respect to a host society: ‘outside and inside at the same time,’ and thereby capable of the observations 
and omniscience neither group—black or white—can generate from its center” (21). Setting aside potential 
objections to the “center” Johnson seems to perceive as formative to either racial marker, the troubling of 
the boundaries between inside and outside serve to strengthen the purposes of this study insofar as I want to 
move away from the strictures of “how we know” race, for instance, and move toward a more open and 
mercurial conception of “what is there” that has led to the theories of race that exist, and the remaking of 
race that is constantly in-process. 
 
4
 Gates traces the trope of the talking book in the African American literary tradition back to “five black 
texts published in English by 1815” that demonstrate the significance of “recording an authentic black 
voice in the text of Western letters” as an answer to the rising significance of writing as an indicator of 
humanness (130). Gates characterizes the trope of the talking book as “the ur-trope of the Anglo-African 
tradition” (131), and insists that “the trope of the Talking Book is not a trope of the presence of voice at all, 
but of its absence” (167). Thus, as we consider the significance of Morrison’s talking book speaking in the 
1920s and being written by Morrison herself in the late 1980s and early 1990s, we should consider the 
novel itself as an absent space in which the material components of the narrative might be constantly 
arranged and rearranged to form unique configurations. 
 
5
 In her essay “Signifyin(g) on Reparation in Toni Morrison’s Jazz,” Marjorie Pryse argues that by making 
the book itself the narrator of Jazz, Morrison creates a relationship between text and reader that renders 
their positions interchangeable, but preserves the distance between them. Pryse relies here on the 
psychoanalytic theory of transference offered by Melanie Klein: “While agreeing with Sigmund Freud that 
transferences ‘are new editions or facsimiles of the impulses and phantasies which are aroused and made 
conscious during the progress of the analysis,’ Melanie Klein maintains, unlike Freud, that transference 
‘originates in the same processes which in the earliest stages determine object-relations’” (583-84). This 
transferential relationship between text and reader is important to Pryse because it enables Jazz to explore 
the region between the two “to create the possibility that a talking book may engage in a psychodynamic 
relationship with a reader” (584). 
 
6
 I don’t reference Dylan’s “black girlfriend” flippantly here. I merely intend to emphasize Lethem’s 
treatment of Dylan’s and Abby’s relationship as one established more for Dylan’s nostalgic comfort than 
for love. As reviewer A.O. Scott suggests, in the latter half of the novel Dylan comes across as a “moody, 
thwarted 30-something in 1999, an obsessive, pedantic music critic who seems to love the fact that he has a 
black girlfriend more than he loves the girlfriend herself” (7). 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION: AFTER ISMS, OR, THE PROMISE OF POSTMODERNISM 
 
 
To read literary criticism of the last decade and more is to realize that if you have 
just arrived at postmodernism’s funeral then you are exceedingly late. As Hutcheon said 
of postmodernism in 2002, “Let’s just face it: it’s over” (Politics 2
nd
 ed. 166). Numerous 
studies in recent and not-so-recent years strike out at whatever comes, “after,” “beyond,” 
and “post-” postmodernism, and there has been a revived interest in something called the 
“post-contemporary,” a theory of the present that first briefly produced a blip on the radar 
of literary studies in the 1970s.
1
 At the same time, however, the legacy of postmodernism 
has become part of the fabric of aesthetic production. Hutcheon explains this paradox in 
her contribution to the collection Postmodernism, What Moment? (2007), in which she 
declares that postmodernism is both alive and dead in the twenty-first century (17). Josh 
Toth thinks through the aftershocks of postmodernism at length in The Passing of 
Postmodernism (2010). Toth is not merely content to point out that “what comes after 
postmodernism remains informed by postmodernism” but pushes further to demonstrate 
“that the current epistemological, or cultural, reconfiguration—a reconfiguration that 
maintains many postmodern ‘traits’—betrays the inevitable persistence of what Jacques 
Derrida might refer to as the ‘inheritance,’ or ‘specter,’ that animated postmodernism in 
the first place” (4). Critics overtly invested in postmodernism as an international 
phenomenon reassess—as Thomas Vaessens and Yra van Dijk do in their introduction to 
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the recent Reconsidering the Postmodern (2011)—the critique and death of 
postmodernism through various means, including a revaluation of its touchstone features 
such as irony, relativism, jargon, and indifference to society.
2
 The funerary and spectral 
language that haunts debates over the postmodern presence in the new millennium 
insinuates a once-vital and familiar entity that is now being reencountered in a skeletal 
and uncanny form.  
But what does the so-called “death” or passage of postmodernism accomplish? Is 
realism dead? Modernism? When and how were these “isms” born in the first place? 
How do their lives, reigns, and deaths affect our reading of literature? Or perhaps more to 
the point, when is the soonest possible moment at which we can abandon this way of 
classifying texts? I am certainly not the first to raise such questions,
3
 yet these 
nomenclatures continue to masquerade as a priori paradigms with as much vigor as the 
social categories I have discussed throughout this project. There is no hidden power 
behind these isms, only groups of people and aesthetic works who see in themselves 
something similar to or different from what they perceive in others, usually others from 
an earlier point in time though not always as Ezra Pound’s many contemporaneous isms 
will attest. For most critics what is unique about postmodernism in this long and tedious 
lineage is that its prefix, post-, suggests that its suffix, -ism, primarily belongs to the 
“modern” found at the heart of the word. As Brian McHale points out, “postmodernism is 
not post modern, whatever that might mean, but post modernism; it does not come after 
the present (a solecism), but after the modernist movement” (5 original emphasis). 
However, whereas McHale argues that the ism does “double duty” by also announcing a 
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unique “poetics” (5), I would like to offer what may seem a hairsplitting postscript. 
Rather than representing, announcing, or naming a new ism, postmodernism’s postness 
signifies the abandonment of isms. That is, postmodernism is not an ism at all, but a state 
or sense of being after isms, even a perpetual afterism. 
Such a rereading of postmodernism should come as no surprise considering this 
study’s preoccupation with flux, movement, work, process, and the significance of 
everyday materiality. The evolution of the suffix -ism has led to its current denotation of 
“a form of doctrine, theory, or practice having, or claiming to have, a distinctive character 
or relation” (OED). Thus, if what the fiction of the last half century shows us is that all 
our doctrines, theories, and practices are the constant products of ongoing material 
processes that are notable because of their very capacity for change, then the 
distinctiveness that stands as the key feature of any ism is a subordinate characteristic of 
postmodernism at best. What the title of this project “Postmodern Materialism” implies, 
then, is a distinctive theory of the material whose only particular characteristic is its 
variability. Note that it takes the addition of a materialism to bring any ism at all to the 
postmodern, and therefore we might say it takes an ism to bring an end to isms. 
Postmodernism does not signify the end of history as some have maintained, nor any 
other apocalyptic reckoning of the aesthetic, economic, historical, or political. Samuel 
Cohen says of the terrorist attacks of 9/11 that “on or about September 11, 2001, human 
character did not change,” and so I would say about the advent of the postmodern (4). 
Postmodernism’s relation to previous isms is less like a schism and more like the open 
space a schism contains, more like the hollow space of Heidegger’s jug, Alvarez’s drum, 
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or Barth’s glass bottle. Postmodernism is a recognition of the boundlessness that actors 
require to move about and form relations without the restrictions imposed upon them by a 
ceaseless insistence on seemingly preexistent doctrines, theories, or practices, and thus it 
calls for a redefinition in our critical discourse. 
Offering conceptual corrections to the problems implicit in his question, “Why 
has critique run out of steam,” Latour pleads with us that  
The critic is not the one who debunks, but the one who assembles. The critic is 
not the one who lifts the rugs from under the feet of the naïve believers, but the 
one who offers the participants arenas in which to gather. The critic is not the one 
who alternates haphazardly between antifetishism and positivism like the drunk 
iconoclast drawn by Goya, but the one for whom, if something is constructed, 
then it means it is fragile and thus in great need of care and caution. (246) 
 
 
As a critical project, the postmodern is a gathering, an assembling of the social into 
myriad configurations that cannot be accounted for solely by what Foucault calls the 
comparison of measurement which relies first on a “consideration of the whole” (The 
Order 53). Postmodernism is not merely one of the anti-positions that Latour antagonizes 
in which “antifetishists debunk objects they don’t believe in by showing the productive 
and projective forces of people; then, without ever making the connection, they use 
objects they do believe in to resort to the causalist or mechanist explanation and debunk 
conscious capacities of people whose behavior they don’t approve of” (240-41). Instead, 
by showcasing the simplest actors in the construction of the social, the project of 
postmodernism is to call our attention away from ourselves, away from our own 
preoccupations, and toward the material world that we all share in common. Such a shift 
in consideration necessitates a theoretical movement away from human essence as the 
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centerpiece of our social relations, and thus precludes an overly reductive comparison of 
measurement that more often than not results in the exclusion, alienation, or 
marginalization of individuals and groups based on perceived differences in being. 
Postmodernism teaches that we are not the point. The singular individual and the 
collective are but small beacons thrown from a boat moving through uncharted waters. 
But if we are not the point, then what, or who, is? Silko answers this question in the 
words of Betonie that have guided much of this study: “it is the people who belong to the 
mountain” (Ceremony 128). What is important in this moment of Tayo’s healing 
ceremony is neither the people nor the mountain, but the nature of their relation to one 
another, the very idea of what it means to “belong.” We belong, not to ourselves or even 
to each other, but to a much larger order of things that is, as Foucault says, “established 
without reference to an exterior unit […] but by discovering that which is the simplest, 
then that which is next simplest,” until we eventually reach “the most complex things of 
all” (53). 
That “most complex thing of all” is, in this case, the relational process we call the 
social, and thus the postmodern project is to showcase the course of moving from the 
simplest things to the complicated and multidimensional “belongings” that make up our 
relations. To redefine the postmodern is, therefore, to insist on the significance of all 
actors in their own rights, an insistence beautifully rendered in Jonathan Safran Foer’s 
first novel, Everything Is Illuminated (2002). This curiously emotive, hilarious, and 
intense work of fiction tells the story of a young man, also named Jonathan Safran Foer, 
who travels from the U.S. to the Ukraine in search of the small shtetl from which his 
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grandparents escaped during the violent and cancerous expansion of the Third Reich 
during World War II. The journey is narrated through a book being written by Jonathan’s 
young Ukrainian counterpart and tour guide, Alex Perchov, and is interspersed with 
letters from Alex to Jonathan and with fantastical sections devoted to a history of the 
shtetl itself. The narratives finally collide late in the novel as Jonathan, Alex, and Alex’s 
grandfather discover the place where the shtetl formerly stood. All that remains is a 
single house occupied by a single old woman they believe to be the young girl named 
Augustine from a photo Jonathan was given by his grandfather. The house is filled with 
things: 
There were many boxes, which were overflowing with items. These had writing 
on their sides. A white cloth was overwhelming from the box marked 
WEDDINGS AND OTHER CELEBRATIONS. The box marked PRIVATES: 
JOURNALS/ DIARIES/ SKETCHBOOKS/ UNDERWEAR was so overfilled 
that it appeared prepared to rupture. There was another box, marked SILVER/ 
PERFUME/ PINWHEELS, and one marked WATCHES/ WINTER, and one 
marked HYGIENE/ SPOOLS/ CANDLES and one marked FIGURINES/ 
SPECTACLES. (147) 
 
 
The many things in the jam-packed house seem at first obvious symbolic representations 
of the remains of the shtetl, and yet as some of the contents of these boxes are unpacked 
and the stories in the items are told, the relationship between things and people takes an 
unexpected turn. 
Among the many “queer things like combs, rings, and flowers,” the woman pulls 
a wedding ring from a box labeled “REMAINS.” She recalls that her friend had buried 
the ring inside a jar and told her “just in case.” She then insists that Jonathan take with 
him a box labeled “IN CASE.” Jonathan says to her through Alex that he cannot possibly 
236 
take the box, and the following exchange ensues between the woman, Alex, who is 
narrating, and Jonathan (the hero) which bears reproducing at length here: 
“I did not understand why Rivka hid her wedding ring in the jar, and why she said 
to me, Just in case. Just in case and then what? What?” “Just in case she was 
killed,” I said. “Yes, and then what? Why should the ring be any different?” “I do 
not know,” I said. “Ask him,” she said. “She wants to know why her friend saved 
her wedding ring when she thought that she would be killed.” “So there would be 
proof that she existed,” the hero said. “What?” “Evidence. Documentation. 
Testimony.” I told this to Augustine. “But a ring is not needed for this. People can 
remember without the ring. And when those people forget, or die, then no one 
will know about the ring.” I told this to the hero. “But the ring could be a 
reminder,” he said. “Every time you see it, you think of her.” I told Augustine 
what the hero said. “No,” she said. “I think it was in case of this. In case someone 
should come searching one day.” I could not perceive if she was speaking to me 
or to the hero. “So that we would have something to find,” I said. “No,” she said. 
“The ring does not exist for you. You exist for the ring. The ring is not in case of 
you. You are in case of the ring.” (192) 
 
 
The ring does not exist to be validated by Jonathan’s and Alex’s search. Instead, the ring 
is what actually brings validation to their search. If the ring, along with the myriad other 
objects, did not exist, if it had not been saved “just in case,” then Jonathan and Alex 
would never come to know the evolution of their own histories. The in-caseness of the 
travelers is punctuated by the fact that the ring refuses to fit on Jonathan’s finger: 
She attempted to put it on the hero’s finger, but it did not harmonize, so she 
attempted to put it on his most petite finger, but it still did not harmonize. “She 
had small hands,” the hero said. “She had small hands,” I told Augustine. “Yes,” 
she said, “so small.” She again attempted to put the ring on the hero’s little finger, 
and she applied very rigidly, and I could perceive that this made the hero with 
many kinds of pain, although he did not exhibit even one of them. “It will not 
harmonize,” she said, and when she removed the ring I could see that the ring had 
made a cut around the hero’s most petite finger. (192-93) 
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If the ring’s significance was dependent upon its discovery by Jonathan and Alex, then it 
would certainly have slid easily onto our hero’s finger in an Odyssean flash of revelation. 
But the object resists. It cannot simply be made to fit Jonathan’s finger. In fact, it injures 
him, leaving a cut as evidence of its lack of “harmony” with his skin. The ring is the 
ultimate thing in this moment as the stories it contains and the shape it possesses defy 
what the narrator of Housekeeping calls the transformation of the thing into “pure 
object,” or into the object that has become nothing more than the imaginative cipher of 
human actors. 
To recognize the resistance of a thing is also to become aware of its capacity to 
participate in the many relational exchanges that constitute our sense of the social. This 
awareness manifests itself in profound ways in the postwar literature of the United States, 
often by revealing how the formations we take for granted as “social” are much more 
fluid than we have been able or willing to admit, and just as often by gathering actors 
together in ways that seem antithetical to those static categories. Perhaps what is most 
important about this particular way of reading contemporary fiction is that it does not 
represent the birth or death of any ism. “Postmodern” is a term exhaustively used to 
denote a certain body of texts that most critics recognize as sharing common aesthetic 
and thematic traits, while “materialism” has been with us as long as there has been a 
Western tradition of writing. What makes this study, and postwar literature, unique is that 
it is intended to serve as a revelation about the way things and people already operate in 
relation to one another, a revelation, not in the divine sense, but in the sense of a 
disclosure or exposure of something that has always been the case. Postmodern fiction 
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has always been after isms, always been attuned to the objects of everyday life, always 
been invested in the material construction of the social, always been dialed in to the 
social as a fluid phenomenon. 
The railroad calendars, tin cans, baseballs, toy drums, glass bottles, target arrows, 
and rings that inhabit postmodern fiction do not exist as mere reminders or symbols in 
case we just so happen to pick up a book and find them there. We are just as much in case 
of the objects. Their existence in these texts draws our hands forward to turn the page, 
jogs our memories in relation to experiences with similar objects, and evokes the many 
stories contained by the Coke bottles and guavas in our own lives. When we talk about 
postmodernism what we are really talking about is our desire to find in art a respite from 
the many stultifying and narrow isms that we have invented to give us a way of 
articulating relations that cannot be fixed in time or space by words, things, or people 
because they are in fact constituted by these entities. If it is anything, postmodernism is 
seeing these relations in their material and fundamental states of flux. Or as I imagine it, 
postmodernism is most beautifully rendered in the final command of Morrison’s 
mysterious narrator to simply “look, look. Look where your hands are. Now.” Although 
our hands sometimes come together in harmony and sometimes in discord, the social is 
always a result of their work. While Morrison asks us to look at our hands to see that we 
are free to “say make me, remake me” (229), the whole of postmodern fiction also asks 
us to look up from our hands to what is being remade because the vision that our eyes 
behold will change as soon as we look back down to our hands in the next now.
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Notes 
 
 
1
 For theorizations of what comes alongside/after/beyond/post- postmodernism, see Christian Moraru’s 
Cosmodernism; Neil Brooks and Josh Toth’s The Mourning After: Attending the Wake of Postmodernism; 
José Lopes and Garry Potter’s collection After Postmodernism: An Introduction to Critical Realism; Klaus 
Stierstorfer’s Beyond Postmodernism: Reassessments in Literature, Theory, and Culture; and Robert 
Rebein’s Hicks, Tribes and Dirty Realists: American Fiction After Postmodernism. For the “post-
contemporary”: Jerome Kinkowitz published a book-length treatment of Vonnegut, Barthelme, Kosinski, 
Baraka, Sloan, Sukenick, Federman, and Sorrentino in 1975 entitled Literary Disruptions: The Making of a 
Post-Contemporary American Fiction, and Larry McCaffery published an article in Boundary the very next 
year with an eerily similar title: “Literary Disruptions: Fiction in a ‘Post-Contemmporary’ Age.” The recent 
revival of the language of “post-contemporary” can be seen everywhere from special sessions at both the 
Modern Language Association and American Comparative Literature Association convenstions in 2012, to 
an entire series at Duke University Press dedicated to “Post-Contemporary Interventions.” 
 
2
 The most important study of postmodernism as a transnational movement is the landmark International 
Postmodernism: Theory and Literary Practice, edited by Hans Bertens and Douwe Fokkema and published 
in 1997. Section 4 of this text, “The Reception and Processing of Postmodernism,” is especially 
illuminating on this front as it maps effects of postmodernism around the globe. For a concise articulation 
of how Bertens and Fokkema imagine the relationship between an international postmodernism and more 
local literary traditions, see pages 300-301. 
 
3
 Perhaps the most cogent discussion of the problem inherent in using “isms” to organize our understanding 
of literature can be found in the work of Chinese critic and novelist Gao Xingjian. See especially his book 
The Case For Literature, translated into English by Mabel Lee for Yale U P in 2007. Gao Xingjian’s 
postulation of a state of being “without isms,” which he discusses in the author’s preface as well as in the 
chapter bearing that title comes as close to a discursive approach to what I call postmodern materialism as 
anything else: “In being without isms one is not rashly attempting to establish some sort of theory, but this 
is not the same as not speaking. Yet there is no beginning and no end; it is speaking for the sake of 
speaking and does not lead to any conclusions” (25). 
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